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Abstract
The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions
and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors
within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in
order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union
and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex
information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such
compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when
crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share
information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role
that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting in-
formation between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This project is about the art of political compromise. Or, more specifically, it is about how
politicians manipulate information to forge compromises—how they figure out what is pos-
sible, how and when they coordinate around a particular political possibility, and how they
influence the public record to highlight, or obscure, their roles in striking political bargains.
This study focuses on political compromises constructed in the context of lawmaking in
the European Union (EU) and explores how political elites—most notably members of the
European Parliament (MEPs)—coordinate around particular policy proposals when crafting
European legislation. A primary goal of this project is to improve our understanding of how
day-to-day policymaking gets done in the EU, and to highlight the centrality of information
transmission in this process.
The popular history of the EU is largely written in terms of large-scale negotiations
between member states. The introduction of the Euro, treaty revisions like those accom-
plished at Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon, and the difficulty surrounding the rati-
fication of the ill-fated constitution, all captured the attention of the world, or at least
of Europe. Furthermore, much of the literature on the EU—starting with the founda-
tional theories of neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963) and intergovernmentalism
(Hoffman 1966, Taylor 1982) and extending to their modern incarnations in liberal intergov-
ernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, Moravcsik 1998) and theories of supranational governance
(Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998)—treats the EU, first and foremost, as an international
regime evolving from treaty to treaty, focusing scholars’ attention on the broad sweep of
European integration. But, as Thomson, Stockman, Achen & Ko¨nig (2006) argue, everyday
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politics in the EU are fundamentally important, and regularly affect the lives of millions
of Europeans. Legislation resulting from the sorts of political compromises considered in
this project regulate everything from cross-border trade in services, to the security proce-
dures governing aviation in the Union, and even the particulars of windscreen defrosting
and demisting systems in motor vehicles. In short, everyday EU lawmaking is affecting the
daily lives of all Europeans. Just as national legislatures routinely pass laws that matter to
their constituents, the EU has for some time now enacted directives and regulations—as a
matter of standard operating procedure, and without recourse to lengthy intergovernmental
negotiations—that affect millions.
Indeed, the reality of routine policy-making in modern Europe has led to an explosion in
work that sees the Union not simply as a traditional international organization, dominated
by high-level interstate bargaining, but as a policymaking institution that is amenable to
analysis with general tools developed primarily to help explain legislating at the national
level (Hix 2005). Although certain policy domains—such as citizenship, social security,
tax harmonization, and common foreign and security policy—remain exclusively subject
to intergovernmental bargaining between the 27 EU member states, policy creation in the
modern EU is, largely, an exercise in bicameral lawmaking between the Council of the
European Union (Council) and the European Parliament (EP). Thus while many European
lawmakers—namely the ministers serving as agents of their national governments in the
Council—represent the preferences of entire states (or at least their governments), those
preferences are channeled through institutions that are largely analogous to those responsible
for lawmaking in nations around the world. Therefore, the ways in which information flows
affect the ability of European politicians to coordinate around policy compromises provide
lessons that are potentially applicable to similar political systems; notably, polities sporting
bicameral legislatures.
Precisely because they serve such a varied constituency, European institutions—like most
federal structures—prioritize minority protection over agile lawmaking. As the Union has
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evolved into a truly bicameral system, with legislative power distributed reasonably equally
between the Council and the Parliament, the pace of lawmaking has, understandably, slowed
(Golub 2002, Schulz & Ko¨nig 2000, Golub 2007, Ko¨nig 2007, Ko¨nig 2008). Starting with
Madison and Montesquieu, theorists have traditionally understood bicameralism as a way to
improve governance by forcing legislation to clear multiple, asymmetric, hurdles on its path
to becoming policy (Heller 2007). Modern versions of this thesis are built largely on the
idea that bicameralism adds an additional veto player to the mix (Tsebelis 2002), biasing
outcomes towards the status quo, but authors nonetheless render such arguments in a positive
light, pointing out bicameralism’s tendency to generate moderate, or Pareto efficient, policies
(Hammond & Miller 1987, Tsebelis & Money 1997). Conversely, one can depict bicameral
caution, not as a moderating influence on potentially unfettered policymaking, but as a
cause of legislative gridlock (Alt & Lowry 1994) and inefficient cross-chamber logrolling
(Heller 1997).
Information management is crucial to the ability of the Union to overcome an institu-
tional bias towards glacial lawmaking so that it may quickly react to policy priorities and
efficiently produce legislation to meet Europeans’ diverse needs. During bicameral nego-
tiations the representatives of two legislative chambers must balance the priorities of both
chambers to hammer out a text that is acceptable to all. At the same time, the proxies of each
house must strive to protect those aspects of the bill that are most important to their own
legislative body, political parties, and constituencies, and each set of negotiators will prefer
to make compromises only when absolutely necessary to placate voters in the other house.
Yet this process plays out in a complicated informational environment. On the one hand,
bicameralism may serve to overcome informational hurdles and produce better policy by
bringing lawmakers with access to varying sources of knowledge to the table (Rogers 2001).
On the other hand, information asymmetry across legislative chambers can exacerbate bi-
cameralism’s tendency towards delay in policymaking (Tsebelis & Money 1997). Legislative
houses are not unified actors but collections of individual legislators representing varying
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constituencies and sometimes belonging to differing political parties. These legislators differ
not only in their policy preferences, but in their priorities, and in their receptiveness to
compromise on particular topics. It may be very difficult for negotiators to predict how
the individual houses will react to specific compromise language, and it may be especially
difficult for representatives from one house to predict the positions of members in the other
chamber.
An influential strand of literature on everyday decision-making in the EU uses game
theory to examine how the Union’s rules help to determine the relative policy influence
wielded by the EU’s major lawmaking institutions, the European Commission, Council,
and Parliament (see e.g. Steunenberg 1994, Garrett 1995, Garrett & Tsebelis 1996, Tsebelis
1997, Crombez 1997, Tsebelis & Garrett 2000, Schackleton 2000, Crombez 2001, Thomson
et al. 2006). This literature, which is based predominantly on procedural spatial models of
legislative bargaining, has highlighted the growth of the EP into a full-fledged co-legislator of
the Council, documents the Commission’s transition from a powerful agenda setter and veto
player into a—largely bureaucratic—supporting player, and provides the underpinnings for
recent work conceptualizing the EU as a bicameral system (Hagemann & Høyland 2010). The
application of rational choice institutionalism to the EU has been instrumental in producing
clear and testable hypotheses about who should be influential in European lawmaking, and
what sorts of policies should survive the Union’s legislative process, but it has been criticized
for the relative simplicity of its assumptions (Ho¨rl, Warntjen & Wonka 2005). Furthermore,
its focus on de jure institutions paints a picture of European politics that is often at odds
with the on-the-ground impressions of practitioners and scholars alike (Burns 2004, Thomson
& Hosli 2006).
Taking these criticisms seriously, I build upon the foundations laid by current formal
theories of European lawmaking to construct a model that addresses questions about how
European actors cope with their complex institutional, and informational, environment. I
open my examination of how EU politicians coordinate around bicameral bargains in chapter
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2, highlighting one mechanism by which MEPs may identify acceptable policy compromises
when haggling over legislation with the Council. I argue that, while the Commission no
longer holds strong formal powers over the majority of EU legislation, it serves as an infor-
mational link in the bargaining game between the Council and the Parliament. The model
relaxes a standard, but untenable, assumption commonly held in the existing literature.
Specifically, rather than treating EU policymakers as perfectly informed, I focus on the
fact that information asymmetries across the Council and Parliament can lead to costly
bargaining delay. More specifically, because the Council conducts most of its internal nego-
tiations in secret, while the Parliament is a model of institutional transparency, it is easier
for Council ministers to gauge the Parliament’s bargaining position than it is for MEPs
to measure resolve within the Council. Therefore, the Council has a distinct advantage in
inter-chamber negotiations with the Parliament because its bargaining strength—the cohe-
siveness of the internal coalition supporting its position and the willingness of its members
to incur delay costs—is obscured, while Parliament’s weaknesses and divisions are on full
display. But, because the Commission—in its capacity as the bureaucratic engine of the
Union—has privileged access to internal Council negotiations, it can uncover and expose
Council weakness, and strength, to the Parliament. The Council, on the other hand, cannot
credibly signal its resolve to the Parliament because its protestations of strength will be seen
as cheap talk (Crawford & Sobel 1982, Austen-Smith & Banks 2000).
This story is, at its heart, about how politicians figure out what bargains are possible and
it explores how legislators decide to settle on particular compromises. If the Commission
were not in the picture, MEPs would be forced to court delay to sound out the depths of the
Council’s resolve. Balancing its own appetite for extended negotiation, the Parliament would
open inter-chamber negotiations with a hard line, slowly moderating its position to zero in
on a compromise acceptable to both parties. The Commission can short-circuit this process,
modulating the pace of policymaking. Of course, Commissioners have their own goals, and
will use this power strategically. Indeed, the model shows that the Commission can only
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credibly transmit information when unbiased, or when its preferences coincide with the Par-
liament’s. Thus, I treat the Commission as a strategic mediator, importing techniques from
the study of interstate conflict resolution (Kydd 2003, Rauchhaus 2006) to a complex institu-
tional environment not traditionally found in international relations. When the Commission
is willing to spill the beans, it acts as a coordinator of comprises, speedily guiding the Council
and Parliament to policy bargains. Therefore, the model helps to explain a perception, com-
mon among practitioners of EU politics, that the Commission exerts impressive power in the
modern Union by forging agreement between the co-legislators (Rasmussen 2003, Thomson
& Hosli 2006). Moreover, it helps to reconcile the stark image of EU lawmaking rendered
by procedural spatial models with the rich picture of conciliatory interactions, and techno-
cratic compromise often described—if perhaps somewhat optimistically—by policymakers in
Brussels and Strasbourg.
The model adds to a growing literature that seeks to explain how European politicians
have adapted to the Union’s institutional complexity and daunting information environment,
both by changing their patterns of internal organization and by adopting new modes of com-
munication across institutions (Farrell & He`ritier 2004, Høyland 2006). Moreover, it extends
our understanding of how the preferences of actors within the key EU institutions may in-
teract to regulate the pace of lawmaking in Europe. Indeed, it shows that the relationship
between the Commission’s policy priorities, and those of the other EU institutions, should
continue to affect the rate of policy production in the Union, even in the current bicameral
era. Similarly, it describes an important mechanism through which the rules governing the
selection of European Commissioners may influence Union policies. More generally, the Eu-
ropean example demonstrates how informational asymmetries can interact with institutional
factors to determine the likelihood of gridlock in bicameral legislatures and highlights the
role that bureaucratic actors can play in bridging knowledge gaps between policymakers.
Finding bicameral bargains does not simply require cross-chamber coordination. Ac-
tors within each of the EU institutions must also coordinate with one another to support a
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particular bargaining position in multi-institutional negotiations. Indeed, another common
criticism of formal models of EU policymaking is that they tend to treat the three Euro-
pean institutions as unitary actors, rather than exploring how each policy organ channels
its members’ preferences. The model that I present in chapter 2, while relaxing common
informational assumptions, does little to address this critique. Chapter 3, on the other hand,
investigates how MEPs react to policy recommendations from the Commission, and balance
their ideological preferences against the need to coordinate around particular compromises
in order to create public policy.
A primary focus of this project is that politicians need tools to help them to coordinate
around particular policies in order to legislate efficiently. Furthermore, chapter 2 highlights
the Commission’s ability to provide information that can help MEPs to quickly coalesce
around positions that will reduce the time and effort necessary to produce European public
policy. Yet, for this coordinating device to work, MEPs must be willing to moderate their
own positions and support second-best outcomes, rejecting their immediate preferences in
favor of proposals that are likely to produce viable bicameral bargains. In other words, MEPs
need to compromise their own ideological leanings and those of their constituents—be they
national party leaderships or voters in their home states—in order to effectively engage with
the Council in policy debates.
The European treaties provide a highly institutionalized mechanism for the Commission
to transmit coordinating information to the Parliament. Specifically, before the Parliament
votes on legislation, the Commission provides MEPs with official opinions on each of the
amendments that MEPs have tabled and will consider in plenary. By examining how MEPs
react to these recommendations, I am able to delve into mechanisms that are necessary to
support the inter-institutional dynamic postulated by chapter 2’s formal model and inves-
tigate whether or not MEPs actually alter their legislative behavior in the face of expected
bargaining constraints. Chapter 3 therefore asks the question, do MEPs alter their vot-
ing behavior in anticipation of bicameral bargaining and do they incorporate information
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transmitted by the Commission into their voting calculus?
To answer these questions I take advantage of the variety of contexts within which MEPs
vote in the legislature. Specifically, while MEPs spend much of their voting time dealing with
actual legislation that is subject to negotiations with the Council and for which the Com-
mission renders opinions, they also vote on a variety of internal non-legislative resolutions
that do not directly concern the Council and upon which the Commission does not com-
ment. I leverage the extensibility of the Bayesian statistical roll call voting model (Clinton,
Jackman & Rivers 2004) to exploit this natural experiment and identify the extent to which
MEPs alter their votes in the face of Commission messages and expected Council responses.
I build a statistical framework that assumes that MEPs are utility maximizers that balance
ideological concerns against pressure to quickly generate policy and use it to identify which
MEPs incorporate coordinating information into their voting decisions and break from their
typical voting patterns in light of bargaining constraints.
Using these tools, I find that a subset of MEPs behave differently on bicameral legisla-
tion than on other measures and that they vote in a way that varies systematically with
Commission recommendations. Specifically, MEPs from national governing parties, and who
have ideological predispositions that do not completely preclude compromise, moderate their
positions in face of coordinating information. On the other hand, MEPs from opposition par-
ties either ignore Commission recommendations or actively agitate against them, sometimes
even sacrificing their ideological purity to stand apart from the inter-institutional consen-
sus. Moreover, Commission opinions appear to play a crucial role in this story, providing
information that does not simply mirror MEPs’ expectations about Council positions.
These findings paint a micro-level picture of how legislators within one house coordinate
around compromises when engaging in bicameral bargaining. Furthermore, they provide
a link between the high-level story of inter-institutional information transmission, told by
chapter 2, and individual decisions with the EP. Indeed, these findings should force re-
searchers to think carefully about how voting coalitions form in the Parliament and, more
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generally, have implications for our understanding of the underlying causes of legislative vot-
ing decisions across bicameral systems. Moreover, the theoretical and statistical models that
I develop to examine this story represent a useful for framework for understanding previous
results describing a government-opposition “dimension” to voting in the EP (Hix, Noury
& Roland 2007). Of course, the statistical tools that I describe here also have potential
applications in other contexts, and can help to elucidate a wide range of external influ-
ences on legislative voting behavior. Similarly, they speak to existing tools that use voting
patterns to measure legislative ideology (e.g. Poole & Rosenthal 1985, Clinton, Jackman &
Rivers 2004, Poole 2005) and provide an example of one way to disentangle the variety of
factors that drive voting behavior (Hall 1992).
Forging compromises among political elites is one thing; selling these bargains to con-
stituents is quite another. Furthermore, while party heads—and in the case of the EP, party
group leaderships—may often wish to build durable coalitions around viable bicameral bar-
gains, it may be difficult to bring the rank and file into line. In parliaments that record
votes, legislators’ policy compromises become an indelible artifact of the public record. This
reality can constrain both legislators’ ability to sacrifice principles in the name of expedi-
ency and to escape detection when they ignore their political masters’ attempts to forge
voting coalitions. Chapter 4 extends my discussion of the role of information in compromise
coordination in the EU to examine one way in which MEPs massage the public record of
their behavior in the Parliament. Specifically, the chapter investigates the determinants of
roll call vote publication in the EP. In the process I engage an important methodological
debate about roll call vote analysis that asks how strategic considerations within parliaments
influence the picture of legislative behavior that is painted by the voting record (Carrubba,
Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery & Schambach 2006, Clinton & Lapinski 2008).
Like many legislatures, the EP records and publishes only a subset of legislative votes,
with party group leaderships requesting roll call when it suits them. Of course, this raises
the specter of selection bias in studies that rely on roll call votes in the EP. And, from a
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substantive point of view, it forces us to ask why politicians choose to publicize certain types
of votes and not others. Using techniques imported from machine learning and computer
science, I demonstrate how one can use legislative text—namely the transcripts of speeches
delivered during debates on the EP floor—to predict when party groups will request roll
call votes. In turn, I use measures derived from the predictive model to explore when, and
why, EP party groups choose to emphasize the voting record. The technology that I develop
to examine roll call votes in the EP is broadly applicable to other legislatures that publish
only a portion of their voting records and can serve as a foundation for building tools for
modeling selection bias in roll call votes that will help to improve the inferences we draw
from cross-national studies of legislative voting (Carey 2008).
Not surprisingly, EP groups request roll on especially controversial issues and use public
votes to highlight disagreements within the legislature. Most notably, party groups call roll
when they are unified in opposition to a policy for which they are not responsible. This
finding demonstrates one way in which roadblocks to building consensus around particular
policies in the Parliament may form. Effective, and efficient, legislating—and especially
bicameral bargaining—often requires all parties to moderate their positions in ways that
violate ideological orthodoxy, and may elicit the wrath of external interests. By publicizing
controversial votes, factions within the EP can make compromise costly for their opponents.
To a lesser extent, party groups also call roll to advertise their support for legislation on
which their members took active leadership roles. Thus, the overall picture that emerges
is one of blaming and credit claiming through public votes. On the other hand, I find
only modest support for the idea that party leaderships use public votes to enforce voting
discipline among their members.
Chapter 4 emphasize the fact that patterns of parliamentary compromise are functions,
not only of legislative institutions and inter-chamber information transmission, but of the
structures that allow external actors to monitor legislative behavior. At the beginning of
this introduction I argued that day-to-day lawmaking in Europe matters. Nonetheless, the
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citizens of Europe are still largely oblivious to what goes on within the EP. Of course,
interest groups, lobbyists, and national party leaderships all take an interest in what MEPs
do in the legislature, providing an audience for public records of MEP behavior, such as
roll call records. In its quest to reduce its “democratic deficit,” the EU has taken great
strides to promote transparency in lawmaking and strives to increase public interest in
European policymaking. While institutions play a pivotal role in determining the form of
EU policy, and the efficiency with which it produces legislative product, long-term changes in
the external information environment also have the potential to factor prominently in how
European politicians coordinate around compromise, by altering the patterns of pressure
that drive politicians’ decisions.
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Chapter 2
Bureaucratic Mediation and
European Lawmaking
We have long understood that bureaucrats can exert substantial influence over both the
content and implementation of laws in democratic political systems. Similarly, just as gov-
ernments represent their states’ interests within inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in a
manner that is often largely analogous to the way in which lawmakers represent constituents
within legislatures, so too can the bureaucrats that populate such organizations influence
supranational policy creation and application. Thus, while elected officials maintain monop-
olies on lawmaking in most democracies and states’ representatives hold the reigns of IGOs,
appointed civil servants, nonetheless, may substantially determine the policies pursued by
national governments and international organizations.
On the one hand, because bureaucracies house stores of policy expertise that are of-
ten unrivaled among elected officials and interest groups, politicians are commonly forced
to rely on bureaucratic recommendations when formulating policy. Bureaucrats, therefore,
may take advantage of their informational assets to ensure that policy-makers’ understand-
ing of issues leads them to make choices that the relevant civil servants—the staff of a
government ministry, for example, or perhaps the permanent employees of an IGO—prefer
to other possible outcomes. Furthermore, bureaucracies are often largely responsible for
implementing policy, providing appointed civil servants with substantial leeway in inter-
preting exactly what laws and international agreements mean in practice. Indeed, a large
literature examines the circumstances under which national government agencies may sub-
vert the policy intentions of elected officials (Brehm & Gates 1997) and investigates how
lawmakers tailor their legislation—and bureaucratic oversight mechanisms—to channel civil
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servants’ discretionary tendencies to their best advantage (Epstein & O’Halloran 1999, Hu-
ber & Shipan 2002). A similar literature explores analogous questions within international
organizations, using principal-agent models to describe the extent to which states can main-
tain control over international institutions and to probe the circumstances under which
international bureaucracies may take advantage of delegated powers to exert influence over
international policy-making and implementation (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney 2006).
This essay discusses another avenue of bureaucratic influence, highlighting the role that
government agencies and similar institutions may play as informational conduits linking
groups of policy-makers. Specifically, I argue that appointed civil servants may influence
policy-outcomes—and, furthermore, the dynamics of policy-making—by acting as mediators
between those actors—usually elected politicians—with the power to choose policy. Indeed,
because bureaucrats possess information and skills that are indispensable to policy-makers,
they often engage directly with all of the actors that have a say in a given policy-making
institution. For example, in separation-of-powers systems where both the executive and leg-
islature influence policy—or in a bicameral system where two legislative houses must both
approve legislation—it is common for civil servants from government ministries, owing to
their singular access to expertise on a given issue, to consult directly with all the relevant
decision-makers. Similarly, the secretariat of an IGO will typically make itself available to
all the member states of the organization. Even in unitary political systems, where a sin-
gle lawmaking body decides policy, bureaucrats will tend to interact with all those factions
that have a agenda or veto power within the policy-making process. These contacts rep-
resent both a way for policy-makers to learn about the issue at hand and an opportunity
for bureaucrats to obtain unique insights into the preferences, and bargaining positions, of
policy-makers. I argue that bureaucrats can leverage their access, strategically revealing
information about policy-makers to one another. Thus, civil servants are often in a position
to adopt a mediating role, acting much like a third party arbiter in other bargaining envi-
ronments. Furthermore, under some circumstances, bureaucrats can take advantage of their
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mediating capacity to guide policy-making in a direction that they prefer. Moreover, by
regulating the information environment within which policy-makers negotiate, bureaucrats
may sometimes modulate the rate at which policy-making gets done, and therefore may
fundamentally alter the efficiency of a given political institution.
I explore the circumstances under which bureaucratic mediation may influence policy-
making outcomes and efficiency1 in the context of lawmaking in the European Union (EU). In
particular, I develop a model of lawmaking under the codecision procedure in the EU that
illuminates the mediating role that the European Commission plays in inter-institutional
bargaining between the two house of the EU’s bicameral legislature, the Council of the
European Union and the European Parliament. Building on a standard sequential bargaining
model (Fudenberg & Tirole 1983, Sobel & Takahashi 1983), I argue that the Commission
can influence European lawmaking by relaying information about the Council’s bargaining
resolve to the Parliament, but only when the Commission and the Parliament share similar
preferences. While the Parliament is a largely transparent body, the Council makes most
of its internal decisions in secret and it is difficult for other actors to gauge the preferences
of its members or the strength of its bargaining resolve. This asymmetry in information
disadvantages the Parliament and has the potential to hamper lawmaking efficiency. Indeed,
the model shows that, lacking other sources of information, the Parliament has incentives to
float aggressive early offers to evaluate the Council’s bargaining strength, only moderating
its position if the Council rebuffs its initial proposal. The Commission can sometimes play
an important role in mitigating this asymmetry, relaying information to the Parliament that
allows it to forgo a costly search for compromise.
Specifically, in line with the above discussion, Commission representatives sit in on all
levels of internal negotiations within the Council (Cini 1996, Nugent 2001), yielding the Com-
mission particular insight into the Council’s negotiating position. The model shows that,
1Here, I use the term (in)efficiency to refer to the degree to which policy makers exert effort and time
when bargaining over policy. These are dead-weight costs that actors can avoid, in principle, when they
perfectly understand each others’ negotiating positions.
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when the Commission’s interests and the Parliament’s coincide, the Commission has incen-
tives to relay this information to the Parliament. On the other hand, when the two actors
disagree, the Parliament has reason to be wary of the Commission’s information. Further-
more, the Commission’s ability to signal truthfully interacts with the Council’s bargaining
strength to determine lawmaking duration. When the Council holds a weak bargaining
position—when its procedural costs to delay are large, it places little importance on the
manner at hand, or when disagreement within the Council hampers its ability to maintain
a hard-line position—lawmaking will take little time. On the other hand, when the Coun-
cil’s delay costs are low and its bargaining position is strong, delay may be substantial; but
this inefficiency is mitigated when the Parliament trusts the Commission’s estimate of the
Council’s bargaining strength. Thus, the Commission plays a pivotal role in regulating the
EU’s legislative efficiency. Not surprisingly, the Parliament also achieves better bargains,
on average, when the Commission provides it with accurate information about the Coun-
cil’s bargaining strength. Therefore, while it has no direct say over the policies decided
under codecision, the Commission may collude with the Parliament to push outcomes in its
preferred direction.
The model that I present here bridges a gap between theoretical accounts of codecision
lawmaking in the EU that treat the Commission as a bit part player in codecision (Tsebelis
& Garrett 2000, Crombez 2001) and empirical research that ascribes substantial lawmaking
influence to the European bureaucracy, even after the wide-spread application of codecision
to Union decisions (Rasmussen 2003, Burns 2004). It demonstrates the Commission’s ability
to wield influence in the absence of strong formal agenda-setting or veto powers, but also
helps to delineate the circumstances under which it may be influential. Furthermore, it
provides a prime example of the mediation game that can arise between policy-makers and
bureaucrats, and exposes an important relationship between bureaucratic bias and policy-
making efficiency. Indeed, because the EU straddles the line between a traditional IGO
and an out-and-out government, this case highlights the wide array of situations in which
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such a dynamic may take hold. Moreover, the relationship between legislative efficiency
and bureaucratic mediation that I discuss here is, in principle, quite general. Indeed, this
mechanism may help explain why political institutions that look similarly prone to deadlock
and delay—perhaps two states with comparable bicameral legislative setups and similar
political cleavages—may behave quite differently in practice, expending varying degrees of
time and effort to produce effective policy. Whenever veto-power over policy is spread across
institutional actors, how the biases of bureaucratic mediators interact with what each player
knows about the others’ bargaining strengths can be crucial.
2.1 Codecision: Power, Information, and Efficiency
Lawmaking in the European Union is dominated by three bodies, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Prior to the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1993, the Parliament played third fiddle to the Commission—effectively the
government executive and bureaucratic arm of the Union—and the Council,2 which is com-
posed of the ministers of the Union’s member states.3 Maastricht ushered in the codecision
procedure, and with it, a new era of Parliamentary ascendency in the EU (Crombez 1997,
Crombez, Steunenberg & Corbett 2000, Tsebelis & Garrett 2000, Schackleton 2000). The
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 simplified the procedure somewhat, and expanded the scope
of codecision to cover over half of EU legislation. Counter-balancing the wide extension of
this complicated—and often very lengthy procedure—the Treaty also made it possible for
the Council and Parliament to conclude bargaining after their first reading of a Commission
proposal, should the Council agree with the Parliament’s initial opinion on the legislation.
2001’s Treaty of Nice did little to change codecision beyond tinkering with the weighting of
states’ votes in the Council and expanding its purview to yet a wider swath of legislative
2The exact composition of the Council varies depending on the topic at hand: ministers represent their
nations in the Council with respect to their portfolios.
3But see Tsebelis (1994) for an argument about the Parliament’s conditional agenda setting power at
this time.
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topics (Galloway 2001). Similarly, provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that went into effect on
December 1, 2009 extended codecision’s reach still further to cover all but a few exclusive
areas of policy-making, re-naming codecision the “ordinary legislative procedure” in the
process, while doing little to alter the function and form of the institution. Thus, the Ams-
terdam incarnation of codecision remains largely intact to this day. And, while applicable to
the majority of EU legislation since the turn of the century, with the expansions of Nice and
Lisbon, codecision now truly represents the standard lawmaking procedure in the Union.
Therefore, to explore the dynamics of law-making in modern Europe one must necessarily
engage the—often arcane—details of this complicated procedure.
The literature on lawmaking in the EU, and on codecision more specifically, has largely
focused on the relative power that the Commission, Council, and Parliament have to obtain
policy outcomes that they, or their pivotal members, most prefer when crafting legisla-
tion. This literature largely revolves around a series of procedural spatial models, based
on non-cooperative game theory, that describe the ability of the EU institutions to affect
policy choices as a function of institutional preferences and the decision-making rules em-
bedded in the Union’s various lawmaking procedures.4 Initially, arguments revolved around
whether or not codecision advantaged the Parliament relative to the earlier consultation
and cooperation procedures. Indeed, one stated goal of the Maastricht treaty was to im-
prove the Union’s democratic legitimacy by putting the directly elected Parliament on more
even institutional footing with the indirectly elected Council, and especially, the appointed
Commission (Crombez 2001). Furthermore the Parliament itself maintained that the Maas-
tricht version of codecision failed to put it on equal legislative ground with the Council
because the Council could act unilaterally should bargaining between the two bodies break
down during the penultimate stage of the procedure (European Parliament 1992). The opin-
ion that codecision failed to increase the Parliament’s powers was initially maintained by
4See Ho¨rl, Warntjen & Wonka (2005) for a critical review of this literature. There is also a tradition
of using cooperative bargaining models to explain European lawmaking; Boekhoorn, Van Deemen & Hosli
(2006) is a recent example of work in this mode.
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the academic literature (Curtin 1993, Steunenberg 1994). Furthermore, some authors ar-
gued that codecision actually undermined the conditional agenda-setting prerogatives that
the Parliament enjoyed under the older cooperation procedure (Garrett 1995, Garrett &
Tsebelis 1996, Tsebelis 1997). These arguments rested largely on analyses of the proce-
dure that focused only on the final few stages of the legislative game and Crombez (1997)
showed that, if one analyzed the game from beginning to end, one could show that Maas-
tricht substantially improved the Parliament’s ability to obtain its preferred policy out-
comes with respect to previous decision-making procedures. Similarly, considering the final
steps of the procedure, Steunenberg (2000) argued that the Amsterdam version of code-
cision would drive policy outcomes towards the Parliament’s preferred point, weakening
both the Commission and the Council. Furthermore, the argument that the Parliament
has enjoyed enhanced policy-making power under codecision has found substantial empiri-
cal support (Kasack 2004, Ko¨nig & Po˙ter 2001, Selck & Steunenberg 2004, Steunenberg &
Selck 2006, Thomson & Hosli 2006).
One issue on which commentators have generally agreed is that codecision weakens the
European Commission relative to previous procedures. This argument rests on the fact
that the Commission has no formal proposal or veto powers in the final stages of codecision.
Specifically, while the Commission initiates legislation under the procedure, plays an informal
role throughout deliberations, and has some formal power to influence the rules under which
the Council takes decisions in the earlier stages of the process, the Parliament and Coun-
cil may hold off on making a decision until the final possible stage of codecision—dubbed
conciliation—where the two co-legislators haggle over a joint text in a setting that closely
resembles conference committee in the US Congress (European Commission 2010). Further-
more, both institutions may amend the Commission’s initial proposal, under an open rule,
in the stages preceding conciliation. Therefore, given sufficient information and patience,
the Parliament and the Council can anticipate the conciliation outcome and refuse to ac-
cept any early agreement that is not as good for both of them as the expected outcome of
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the entire process. As Garrett (1995, pp. 305) maintains, “. . . under co-decision, the Com-
mission is effectively taken out of the game before the real bargaining over policy begins.”
Crombez (2001, pp. 101) modifies this argument somewhat, drawing a distinction between
the Maastricht and Amsterdam versions of the institution. He argues that, while the orig-
inal Maastricht version of codecision actually provided the Commission with considerable
agenda-setting power, Amsterdam “. . . renders the Commission irrelevant.” In sum, under
the modern codecision procedure, the Commission relinquishes its former role as a first-class
policy-maker with biting agenda-setting and veto rights; rather, its involvement in the pro-
cess is predominantly bureaucratic and its role is largely analogous to that of a government
ministry in national politics. That is, while it is active in every part of the legislative pro-
cess, the Commission provides logistical and technical support to decision-makers, rather
than rendering decisions itself.
Nonetheless, there is an enduring perception, and some empirical evidence, that the Com-
mission can be influential in post-Amsterdam codecision (Rasmussen 2003, Burns 2004).5
For example, Thomson & Hosli (2006) conducted a survey of “practitioners of European af-
fairs,” that asked officials from the Commission and Council secretariat to rate the relative
influence of the European institutions—the Commission, Council, and Parliament—over a
variety of issue areas under both the consultation and codecision procedures. On average,
the practitioners rated the Commission’s influence under codecision as virtually equal to
the Council’s and above the Parliament’s. In fact, the respondents deemed the Commission
more influential during codecision than when operating under the consultation procedure,
even though consultation provides greater formal power to the Commission than codecision.6
Furthermore, many respondents cited the Commission’s skill at “. . . forging political deals
5Additionally, while Kasack (2004) concludes that the Commission’s codecision influence declined after
Amsterdam at second reading, she nonetheless finds that Commission support for Parliament’s amendments
strongly predicts their likelihood of adoption by the Council, a finding that is at least consistent with
continued Commission influence.
6I should note that Thomson & Hosli’s (2006) findings in the same paper—based on a quantitative
analysis of expert ratings of European lawmaking outcomes and institutional preferences—are at odds with
practitioners’ perceptions.
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between other actors, both within the Council and between the Council and EP,” when
justifying their judgements (Thomson & Hosli 2006, pp. 398). In other words, respondents
identified mediation as key to the Commission’s perceived influence. Similarly, in interviews
with a variety of EU officials, Rasmussen (2003, pp. 4) finds strong support for the picture
of the Commission as a mediator, or forger of compromises. In the words of one respondent,
“Sometimes the positions of the Council and Parliament are so far apart that only the Com-
mission can find common ground.” Thus, as Tsebelis & Garrett (2000, pp. 26) conclude,
with the advent of codecision, “[t]he remaining influence of the Commission over legislation
is thus likely to rely more on informal channels—asymmetries of information, persuasion,
deal-brokering—than on formal roles written into various procedures.”
In fact, the Commission is well-situated to use its informational assets to its advan-
tage, adopting a mediating role. Unlike members of the Parliament, who are not privy to
the internal discussions of the Council, Commission representatives are directly involved
in internal Council deliberations. Indeed, from the time that the Commission transmits
its initial proposal to the Council and Parliament at first reading, Commission staff sit in
on all intra-Council negotiations, ranging from working group discussions and meetings of
the Council’s committee of permanent representatives (COREPER) to ministerial meet-
ings (Nugent 2001).7 The Commission also maintains contacts with ministerial staff in the
member states themselves (Cini 1996). Similarly, Commission representatives sit in on Par-
liamentary committee meetings, and maintain close contact with rapporteurs. As Nugent
(2001, pp. 253) remarks, “[The Commission] thus has excellent knowledge of what the
EP and Council want and may settle for. This knowledge can be used, often in an infor-
mal manner, to promote and broker compromises and settlements on difficult points.” The
Commission’s unique access to the range of decisive policy-makers in the Union puts it in a
7Ministerial level meetings of the Council dealing with codecision are now open to the public but are,
largely, stale affairs that provide little information about internal Council negotiations. The Council does
most of its work within COREPER meetings and working groups; these sessions are held behind closed
doors.
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position to play an influential mediating role.
Policy-making is, at its core, about bargaining; agents with veto power over policies
negotiate with one another to find outcomes that all decisive actors can agree upon. While
it may be relatively easy for the relevant factions to find a set of policies that every veto-
wielding policy-maker prefers to the status quo in a given issue area,8 policy-makers may,
nonetheless, vehemently disagree about exactly what policy to pursue from the alternatives
within this set. Exactly what policy prevails, therefore, will rest heavily on the bargaining
positions of the decisive policy-makers. Those veto-players with greater bargaining resolve—
those policy-makers who are more willing, or able, to drag out negotiations to obtain their
most preferred policy, or who find the issue under consideration particularly salient—will
often be able to extract concessions from other policy-makers (Muthoo 1999). But, of course,
the difficulty inherent in evaluating opponents’ resolve is exactly what makes bargaining
interesting, and negotiations would end instantly if every party at the table knew the resolve
of every other bargainer (Rubenstein 1982). Furthermore, knowing that the most resolute
bargainer generally wins the day, each negotiator will do its utmost to project an aura of
infinite resolve, hoping to convince its counterparts that capitulation is the least costly course
of action.
In the context of codecision, this means that, whenever there is substantial disagreement
between the pivotal coalition in the Council and the decisive voter in the Parliament, the
nature of the final policy outcome will rest, largely, on the relative bargaining strength of
these pivotal actors. Amsterdam made it possible for codecision to conclude at first reading
and, in response, the Council and Parliament have greatly increased their inter-institutional
contacts during the early stages of codecision, in the form of informal “trilogues” between
representatives of the three core EU institutions. As others have pointed out, these early-
stage points of contact have altered the dynamics of codecision since Amsterdam (Farrell
& He`ritier 2004). Indeed, as figure 2.1 shows, codecision files increasingly end early on in
8Indeed, if they cannot, then policy movement on the issue at hand will be very unlikely.
21
Figure 2.1: Codecision since Amsterdam.
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the process and first-reading agreements have become the norm. Nonetheless, the legislative
bodies have little incentive to reveal their bargaining strengths to one another during informal
negotiations, when their preferences diverge. These exchanges are a form of cheap talk, where
the Council and Parliament send costless messages to one another about their positions, the
importance they place on the issue at hand, and their bargaining resolve. The core result
of models of cheap talk is that such communication is informative only when the relevant
parties share similar preferences (Crawford & Sobel 1982, Austen-Smith & Banks 2000).
Therefore, while first reading trilogues may help EU institutions to resolve bargaining
quickly on “easy” cases where inter-institutional preferences largely match, they are unlikely
to ameliorate informational asymmetries when the negotiators’ preferences diverge. Instead,
each side will want to talk tough and will largely disregard the other side’s protestations
about an inability to compromise.9 Under such circumstances, bargaining in bicameral
legislatures can result in costly delay (Fukumoto 2008). It is exactly in such conditions
that a well-connected bureaucracy can leverage its role as a mediator to influence outcomes
and potentially improve policy-making efficiency. While the mediator’s communications to
policy-makers are also a form of cheap talk, the mediator’s biases may cut across those of the
pivotal policy-makers, sometimes making effective communication possible. Exactly when
effective mediation occurs is a function of the negotiating parties’ preferences, the bias—if
any—of the mediator, and the institutional rules governing bargaining. Thus, it is neces-
sary to carefully model the bargaining environment when evaluating a given bureaucracies’
mediative capacity. The model that I present here does this for the case of the Commission
and codecision.
Below, I first provide a thorough description of codecision, for the uninitiated. I then
introduce a model that that describes sequential bargaining with asymmetric information
9Of course, this assumes that the pivotal actors on both sides are represented by agents that share their
preferences in these early negotiations. Høyland (2006) develops a model that examines how the party
of the Parliament’s rapporteur affects codecision dynamics and integrating rapporteur influence into the
information game that I present in this paper would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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between the Council and Parliament during codecision and derive its equilibrium properties,
notably a tendency towards inefficient delay. I then augment the model, demonstrating how
the addition of a mediator—in the form of the Commission—changes the equilibrium policy
outcomes, and expected duration, of codecision negotiations. I conclude with a discussion
of the empirical predictions of the model.
2.2 How Codecision Works
Figure 2.2 provides a graphical depiction of lawmaking under codecision. Codecision is a
complicated, and potentially lengthy, process.10 The Commission holds the right to initiate
legislation under the procedure and the process begins when the Commission forwards its
initial proposal to the Parliament for a first reading.11 Within the Parliament, the committee
responsible for the proposal, party groups, and any group of 40 or more MEPs may table
amendments to the legislation. Next, during the debate on the bill that precedes voting in
the Parliament, the responsible Commissioner delivers the Commission’s opinions on any
tabled amendments, along with explanations of the Commission’s positions. Subsequently,
the EP holds floor votes on each amendment and the whole bill as amended, all under a simple
majority rule. After the bill has cleared the Parliament the Commission drafts a new version
of the legislation known as the “amended proposal” which may or may not include each of
the amendments voted on by the parliament. Next, the legislation proceeds to the Council,
which may either adopt the Parliament’s proposal or draft a new version of the legislation,
known as the “common position.” When deciding whether or not to adopt the Parliament’s
proposal, the Council votes by qualified majority if each Parliamentary amendment to the
initial proposal also features in the Commission’s amended proposal, and by unanimity
10See European Commission (2010) for an exhaustive explanation of the current version of the ordinary
legislative procedure (codecision).
11To foster efficiency, the Commission actually forwards its initial proposal the Parliament and Council
simultaneously. Nonetheless, the Council must wait for the Parliament to table a first reading proposal, and
for the Commission to render its opinion on that proposal, before formally acting in the first reading.
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Figure 2.2: The Codecision procedure.
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if the Parliament’s proposal contains language that does not appear in the Commission’s
version.12 Thus, the Commission sets the threshold for adoption of Parliament’s proposals.
If the Council accepts every provision in the EP text, and successfully votes to adopt the
proposal, the process ends and the proposal becomes law. Otherwise the Council must
propose a common position containing any mix of Commission text, EP amendments, and
new Council-generated amendments. Again, the Commission sets the threshold for adoption
of the Council’s counter-proposal. The Council may only adopt a common position that
differs from the Commission’s amended proposal if it garners unanimous support from the
member states; when the Council’s common position matches the amended proposal it may
adopt the position by qualified majority.13
The second reading starts largely like the first, with the EP first considering and tabling
amendments to the common position, the Commission next giving its opinion on each amend-
ment prior to the EP vote on the amendments and bill as a whole, and the Council subse-
quently voting on each aspect of the EP text. Nonetheless, there are a number of differences
between the two stages. First, the EP conducts all votes under an absolute—rather than
simple—majority rule during this reading. Second, the EP can choose to either accept or
reject the common position outright and end the procedure, rather than amending the text,
and indeed, the common position is adopted unless the Parliament can find an absolute
majority that supports amending or rejecting the Council’s text. Third, the Commission’s
opinions on EP amendments, as voiced by the commissioner in plenary, directly set the vot-
ing rule used by the Council when voting on the amendments, rather than indirectly through
an amended Commission proposal. Finally, both the Parliament and the Council face three
12In a subset of issue areas, the number of which has dwindled over time, the Council must act unanimously
in all codecision decisions.
13While the Treaty appears to give the Commission the right to force a unanimous vote at first reading, the
Commission’s ability to use this power is somewhat unclear in practice. Indeed, in a personal communication
with the author, representatives from Europe Direct, the Commission’s public information office, referred
to this issue as “controversial” and refused to provide a straightforward interpretation of the Commission’s
powers in this context. The academic literature tends to assume that the Commission will be unwilling
to exert its legal prerogative if push comes to shove, and assumes that the Council takes its decisions by
qualified majority. I largely adopt this convention in this paper.
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to four month time limits during the second reading.
Specifically, if the Council fails to adopt the act in the second round the conciliation
committee—composed of representatives from the EP and the Council14—forms. This com-
mittee works to hammer out a compromise bill that is acceptable to both legislative bodies,
while the Commission maintains a purely advisory role. The bill is rejected if the committee
fails to reach an agreement on a joint text in a timely fashion, or if the agreed-upon text
fails to garner an absolute majority of votes in the EP and a qualified majority of votes in
the Council.15
2.3 The Model
The Parliament, P , and the Council, C = {C,C}, bargain to set a policy x ∈ R on some
issue governed by the codecision procedure. Decisions in the Parliament are decided by
(absolute) majority; therefore P represents the median voter in the Parliament, with ideal
point θP .
16 On the other hand, the Council takes its decisions by qualified majority vote,
thus both the left qualified majority pivot (q-pivot), C, and right q-pivot, C, where θC <
θC , may, in general, be decisive when the Council takes a position. The status quo on
the dimension of interest is q before bargaining begins. The status quo is stable when
q ∈ [min{θC , θP},max{θC , θP}] because at least one actor will resist any change to the
policy on the given dimension and bargaining is futile. Therefore, because the Commission
will have no reason to waste resources by proposing policy change in such circumstances, I
restrict attention to cases where q falls outside the support of the Pareto set. Furthermore,
14The EP delegation is composed of a representative (in terms of party group membership) of EP members,
typically drawn from the committee responsible for the bill. Each Council minister is represented in the
negotiations.
15Again, certain issue areas require unanimity in the Council.
16I assume full attendance in the Parliament and thus absolute and simple majority rule are identical in
the model. In reality, attendance in the Parliament can be spotty and, as Hagemann & Høyland (2010)
point out, this can endow the Council with a degree of conditional agenda power in the bicameral game.
Incorporating this wrinkle into the model I present here would represent an interesting extension, although
I leave this consideration to future research.
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I assume that players have single-peaked utility functions that are strictly increasing in the
proximity of their ideal points and a given policy, and that q < θC < θP .
17 Given this
setup, all potential bargains—or points in the core of the bargaining game—will fall on the
range [θC ,min{2θC − q, θP , θC}]. Nonetheless, after making some further assumptions, and
outlining the stages of the game, I will be able to limit attention to a more restrictive set of
possible proposals and outcomes.
Throughout the game, actors’ choices will hinge on what bargain they believe will obtain
should proceedings extend all the way into conciliation. Note, nonetheless, that predicting
this outcome is difficult without precisely modeling the bargaining procedure during concil-
iation. Moreover, because the Treaty does not specify a restrictive bargaining protocol, the
literature is divided on this question (Crombez 1997, Steunenberg & Dimitrova 1999, Tsebelis
& Garrett 2000, Napel & Widgre´n 2006). Rather than commit to an explicit conciliation bar-
gaining structure, I simply assume that all players in the game share an ex ante expectation
about the likely conciliation outcome, xcc. Furthermore, following Napel & Widgre´n (2006),
I maintain that the Council q-pivot closer to the status quo, C, will exert substantial influ-
ence over conciliation bargaining. More specifically, I assume that θC ≤ xcc < min{θP , 2θC},
as predicted by Nash’s (1950) bargaining solution and Napel & Widgre´n (2006).18 Thus, in
this model, I treat conciliation as a lottery over possible outcomes with expected value xcc,
rather than specifying strategic actions by players at the penultimate stage of codecision.
Note, furthermore, that because xcc is closer to all pivotal actors’ ideal points than the sta-
tus quo, both houses will accept the conciliation bargain when it is put to a vote at third
reading.
The core Council-Parliament lawmaking game, which I outline here, but explicitly de-
17This ordering assumption rules out a number of symmetric cases that are qualitatively equivalent to the
circumstances that I examine here, particularly cases where the Parliament’s preferences are better aligned
with the status quo than the most conservative member state.
18This logic stems from the fact that C has the least to lose from a status quo outcome, should its obstinacy
lead to such an undesirable result. Furthermore, player’s ideal points are common knowledge in this game
and questions of bargaining patience are largely obviated in conciliation by the strict negotiating time limit
specified by the Treaties.
28
scribe below, consists of two stages, corresponding to Codecision readings, in which the
Parliament makes a proposal to the Council and the Council decides whether or not to ac-
cept the proposal or to hold out for a better outcome at each reading,19 and where each
player pays some delay cost, 0 ≤ ki ≤ θP − xcc,20 when the Council rejects Parliament’s
proposal at a given reading, extending the game either into the second reading or triggering
conciliation. I assume that, while the Parliament median’s cost to delay, kP , is common
knowledge, members of Parliament have difficulty discerning how sensitive members of the
Council are to delay, and thus kC and kC are known only to the Council members themselves.
This asymmetry in information makes good empirical sense. Parliamentary debates are
conducted in public, reports written by Parliament’s rapporteurs are generally available, and
members’ codecision voting records—both on final votes and intermediary amendments—
are, largely, a matter of common knowledge. The Council, on the other hand, conducts
its internal negotiations behind closed doors and publicly deliberates and votes on codeci-
sion legislation only once member states reach an agreement that all parties know will pass
muster. Indeed, internal divisions in the Council are largely hidden from the public, and Par-
liament’s, eye. Even when taking final votes, the Council is notoriously fond of maintaining
a unified front. Member states rarely vote against Council positions; rather they abstain on
contentious votes, and even abstentions are rare. To some extent, this tendency is a result of
the member states’ interest in promulgating belief in the Union’s resilience, demonstrating
the strength of their commitment to the Treaties, and projecting an image of European
unity. It may also represent an explicit strategy by the Council to limit the Commission
and Parliament’s ability to exploit its internal divisions (Tsebelis 1994). Furthermore, the
intra-Council bargaining procedure is a bit of a black box. As in conciliation, there are no
formal institutions that restrict bargaining within the Council. Therefore, it may be difficult
19The model does not allow the Council to make a counter-proposal at first reading, contrary to reality.
As I argue below, this restriction, while unrealistic, greatly simplifies the exposition without substantively
altering the model’s predictions.
20Thus, I assume that players’ bargaining costs are non-negative and not so large that they dwarf the
bargaining space.
29
to predict Council bargaining outcomes, even for Council members. Nonetheless, as was the
case in conciliation, C’s preference-proximity to the status quo gives it substantial leverage
over C under common bargaining assumptions (Nash 1950, Rubenstein 1982). In fact, this
dynamic is intensified here because there is no time limit to negotiations during the Council’s
first reading.
The above discussion implies that it is reasonable to model the Council’s responses to
Parliamentary proposals as if it were a unitary, yet unpredictable, actor. This is clearly
the case when θC < xcc. As long as Council pivots accept proposals to which they are
indifferent, the Council will always accept the proposal x = xcc at any point in the game,
knowing that the Parliament will never have any incentive to propose x < xcc. On the other
hand, C and C might be willing to accept x > xcc at a given point in time, depending on
their delay costs, and one pivot may be more or less willing to compromise than the other.
So there will, in general, be some division in the Council about the circumstances under
which capitulation makes sense, but neither pivot has any incentive to help the Parliament
figure out exactly where that sweet spot is and would prefer the Parliament believe that
kC = kC = 0, thereby forcing it to propose x = xcc at first reading. Furthermore, the
assumption that the Council qualified majority pivots both hold preferences substantially
closer to the status quo than the Parliament median is common in models of EU politics
(Garrett 1995, Tsebelis & Garrett 2000).21 On the other hand, when θC > xcc, C’s loyalties
may be mixed. Indeed, if θC ≥ θP , then C will wish to tell P everything it knows about
the likelihood that a given Parliamentary proposal will be accepted. When xcc < θC <
θP , C would not wish to be quite so forthcoming, but would nonetheless like to transmit
some information about Council internals—information that P would find incomplete, but
credible. This is a potentially interesting dynamic, but not one that I wish to focus on
21Of course, others have criticized this approach (Ho¨rl, Warntjen & Wonka 2005). In general, this assump-
tion seems warranted when talking about policy changes that affect the extent of European integration, or
the relative power of European and national institutions. It seems less justified when considering issues that
deal with overarching political cleavages, such as the traditional left-right divide.
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here. Therefore, drawing on the above paragraph, I assume that the norm of presenting
a unified front within the Council eliminates C’s ability to send direct signals to P about
likely Council bargaining outcomes, without C’s consent.22 Furthermore, I assume that the
relative bargaining advantage that C’s proximity to the status quo affords it is such that C
is never in a position to force a rejection of a first reading offer, simply to signal to P that
it had been too accommodating and could strike a harder subsequent bargain. Nonetheless,
C is able to increase C’s bargaining costs by putting up a fight in the Council when the two
pivots’ preferences diverge with respect to delay.
Given these assumptions, C is the pivotal decision maker in the Council, although C’s
preferences and bargaining resilience help determine C’s cost to delay. Given the expected
conciliation outcome, all potential bargains will fall on the range [xcc, θP ] because P will
never have any incentive to make a proposal that is more accommodating than xcc, nor more
hard-line than its own ideal point. Therefore, I restrict attention to proposals in this range
and, without loss of generality, scale the space such that [xcc, θP ] = [0, 1]. The Parliament,
therefore, prefers policies closer to 1, while the left Council q-pivot prefers bargains closer
to 0. Up to this point I have specified only vague restrictions on player utilities, but I now
adopt specific utility functions. Specifically, I assume linear Euclidean utility functions for
both players, such that
uP (x, t) = x− kP (t− 1) (2.1)
and
uC(x, t) = 1− x− kC(t− 1) (2.2)
where t = 1, 2, 3 is the stage in the game at which bargaining concludes, and ki is the cost
of delay to player i, and x ∈ [0, 1].
22This argument is most persuasive if one conceives of each codecision file in the context of a larger repeated
game. C may wish to reveal information to P in this case, but may prefer that the Council appear united
on many other files. The same holds true for every other potential q-pivot on the Council. Furthermore,
publicizing divisions within the Council may undermine the image of the Union more broadly. Therefore,
appealing to the Folk Theorem, the unanimity norm may be self-reinforcing.
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Furthermore, as I noted above, C knows the value of kP while P is uncertain about
C’s delay costs. Specifically, P knows that C’s cost falls on a range, kC ∈ [0, ω], where
0 < ω ≤ θP − xcc, but believes that kC is equally likely to take any value along the given
interval. This means, of course, that P ’s prior belief is that kC is uniformly distributed, such
that initially
kC ∼ U [0, ω], (2.3)
from P ’s point of view. Note that I have not directly addressed C’s costs in this formalization,
but have rather focused on C’s cost distribution, an approach that requires some further
explanation. Note that the simple linear costs that feature in the model may capture a
variety of issues that modulate players’ willingness to prolong negotiations. On the one hand,
delay costs include basic issues like the time dedicated to evaluating proposals, deliberation
and bargaining over prospective policies, and voting on positions. But opportunity costs
also play an important role here, as time spent on the proposal in question restricts an
actor’s ability to consider other issues on its agenda. Therefore, each ki can be thought of,
perhaps predominantly, as a measure of the relative salience that actor i places on the bill
under consideration. Furthermore, with respect to bargaining within the Council, kC may
incorporate the degree to which the more conservative q-pivot is willing to contest positions
with the more progressive q-pivot, and therefore captures the net effect of each pivot’s
bargaining constraints. In sum, we can interpret ω as a measure of how uncertain the
Parliament is, not only about the Council’s raw bargaining costs, but of the importance the
Council places on the legislation in question, and the relative intra-institutional bargaining
strengths of the Council’s pivotal actors. To formalize the above logic one might represent
kC as a linear function of its constituent parts, such that
kC = k
d
C + k
o
C + k
b
C (2.4)
where kdC is C’s fixed cost to delay, k
o
C represents C’s opportunity cost to putting more re-
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sources into the current bill rather than deploying them on other legislation, and kbC describes
the amount of effort that C must put into intra-Council bargaining to build coalitions around
rejecting the Parliament’s proposal when the more liberal q-pivot would rather accept the
proposal.
2.3.1 Sequential Codecision Bargaining
I begin the analysis by examining how the game plays out between the Council and Parlia-
ment when the Commission is not involved. As I mentioned above, the game has multiple
stages. First, Nature chooses C’s type (i.e. delay cost), kC , drawing it randomly according
to equation 2.3. Subsequently, the first reading commences (t = 1) and P makes a policy
proposal, xP,1 ∈ [0, 1]. Upon receiving P ’s proposal, C may either accept it, ending the game
with payoffs (xP,1, 1−xP,1), or reject the proposal, kicking off the second stage. At this point,
if the Council rejects Parliament’s offer, each player i pays cost to delay ki. Next, Parliament
chooses its second reading proposal, xP,2, and transmits it to the Council. Again C may
choose to accept or reject P ’s proposal, resulting in net payoffs (xP,2− kP , xP,2− kC).23 If C
accepts, the game ends. Otherwise, the conciliation committee convenes. Should conciliation
be necessary, each player again pays cost ki. As I described above, neither player formally
performs any action after the second stage of the game; rather, in this model, conciliation
represents a fixed—but probabilistic—payoff-generating mechanism that takes effect should
the Council reject the Parliament’s second proposal. This means that, at the start of the
game, the players expect a net payoff from conciliation of (xcc − 2kP , 1− xcc − 2kC).24
23Again, note that I make a rather large simplification here by ignoring the Council’s counter-proposal
and modeling the process as if the Parliament makes all the proposals. This choice is largely a matter of
convenience as it simplifies the exposition considerably, especially when I expand the discussion to include
the Commission’s role, in the following sub-section. Nonetheless, as I will argue below, this assumption does
not fundamentally alter the logic of the game, and the many equilibria of the more more realistic game are
qualitatively similar to the single equilibrium that characterizes this, simplified, model.
24This model is a variant of a well-established bargaining model (Sobel & Takahashi 1983, Fudenberg &
Tirole 1983) that economists have applied to a wide variety of topics, most notably union wage negotiations
and strikes. Gibbons (1992, pp. 218–224) provides an introduction to the canonical formulation. Within
political science, Cameron & Elmes (1994) and Cameron (2000) use a similar approach to model veto
bargaining between Congress and the President in the United States.
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This is a sequential game with incomplete information. Therefore, I focus on identifying
perfect Bayesian equilibria for the model. As is often the case in dynamic games, it is helpful
to consider players’ behavior in the last stage of the game first. At second reading C will
accept Parliament’s second reading proposal, xP,2, if it provides it with at least as much
utility as it can expect to get from rejecting the proposal, paying its cost of delay, and
obtaining the conciliation bargain. Therefore, C accepts xP,2 if
1− xP,2 ≥ 1− xcc − kC =⇒ kC ≥ xP,2 (2.5)
and rejects P ’s proposal otherwise.
Now, look at things from the Parliament’s point of view. P takes the condition in equa-
tions 2.5 into account when formulating its course of action at second reading. Furthermore,
as I will subsequently show, the sequence of play leading up to the second reading—most
notably the fact that the Council chose to reject the Parliament’s initial offer—allows P
to update its beliefs about the cost that C pays for delaying bargaining. Note that kC is
a measure of C’s bargaining strength. An especially strong type of C incurs no cost from
delay—kC = 0—while the weakest possible type of Council q-pivot pays kC = ω. Stronger
types are more able to delay; therefore, as I will further describe below, finding itself at
second reading allows P to update its estimate of C’s strength. Specifically, the history of
the game leading up to P ’s move at second reading allows P to put a new lower bound
on C’s strength—or, equivalently, to update its estimate of the upper bound on C’s delay
cost—inducing P to update its beliefs such that, at this point in the game, P believes
kC ∼ U [0, ω2] (2.6)
where ω2 ≤ ω. Therefore, using equations 2.5 and 2.6 to calculate the probability that C
will accept a given offer at second reading, P ’s conditional expected utility from an optimal
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second reading proposal, x∗P,2(ω2), is
uP (ω2) = x
∗
P,2(ω2) ·
ω2 − x∗P,2(ω2)
ω2
− kP ·
x∗P,2(ω2)
ω2
, (2.7)
where
ω2−x∗P,2(ω2)+xcc
ω2
is the probability, given P ’s updated beliefs, that C accepts proposal
x∗P,2(ω2),
x∗P,2(ω2)−xcc
ω2
is the probability that C rejects the second reading proposal, x∗P,2(ω2) is
P ’s payoff if C accepts its optimal second reading proposal, and −kP is P ’s expected payoff
from conciliation. Maximizing, P ’s optimal proposal at second reading is
x∗P,2(ω2) =

ω2−kP
2
if ω2 > kP , and
xcc = 0 otherwise.
(2.8)
Interpreting equation 2.8, we can see that the Parliament makes a second reading proposal
that balances its own distaste for delay, kP , with its updated belief about the Council’s
bargaining strength. When the Parliament believes that the Council is relatively weak (i.e.
ω2 is comparatively large), it makes tough proposals that benefit it more than the likely
conciliation outcome, expecting that the Council will accept a Parliament-biased bargain
because it will not find delay worth the added cost of in time, effort, and lost opportunity to
pursue other issues. When the Council is especially weak, Parliament will demand allocations
close to its own ideal point; when facing a particularly strong Council, the Parliament will
offer the expected conciliation policy.25
Now consider the first reading. If P offers xP,1 at first reading, and C expects that it
will offer xP,2 at second reading, C accepts the first reading offer when it believes that it
will give it a payoff that is at least as good as what it could get by rejecting initially and
accepting the second offer, or by rejecting both offers and holding out for conciliation. That
25Note that the assumption that ω ≤ θP − xcc bounds Parliament’s optimal proposal above, such that
Parliament always proposes compromise positions that are no more extreme than its own ideal point.
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is, the Council accepts the first reading offer if, and only if,
kC ≥ max{xP,1 − xP,2, xP,1
2
} = ω2. (2.9)
Furthermore, should the Council q-pivot reject the initial offer, it can anticipate xP,2, as
identified by equation 2.8. This means that C follows a simple cutoff rule, as a function of
its type, when deciding whether to accept or reject the Parliament’s first offer. There is a
type of C—with delay cost ω2—that is indifferent between accepting xP,1 now, and rejecting
it either to accept the second offer or to hold out all the way to conciliation. All types of
C with kC ≥ ω2 accept xP,1 while stronger types of C with kC < ω2 reject the initial offer.
Therefore, the model exhibits a screening property that, as I mentioned above, allows the
Parliament to eliminate weaker Council types with its first round offer. Thus, should the
game proceed to the second reading, the Parliament will update its beliefs about kC as I
described in equation 2.6.
The Parliament chooses a first reading offer that maximizes its overall expected utility,
or
max
xP,1,ω2
xP,1 · ω − ω2
ω
+ (uP (ω2)− kP ) · ω2
ω
. (2.10)
Moreover, in the lemma 1 in appendix A I show that, in any equilibrium, xP,1 − xP,2 ≥
xP,1
2
. Therefore, substituting Parliament’s optimal second reading proposal, x∗P,2(ω2), from
equation 2.8 into equation 2.9 and solving for ω2 yields an implicit equation for ω2, in terms
of xP,1. In particular,
ω2(xP,1) =

2xP,1+kP
3
if ω2 > kP , and
xP,1 otherwise.
(2.11)
First, assume that ω2 > kP so that, from equation 2.11, ω2(xP,1) =
2xP,1+kP
3
. Substituting
ω2(xP,1) and the optimal second round proposal from equation 2.8 for this case into equation
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2.10 makes it possible to express equation 2.10 completely in terms of ω and xP,1. Maximizing
this expression with respect to xP,1 and solving for xP,1 yields the optimal first offer:
x∗P,1 =
9ω − 11kP
10
. (2.12)
Substituting this result back into equation 2.8, the optimal second period offer is
x∗P,2 =
3ω − 7kP
10
, (2.13)
while, plugging the optimal first offer in equation 2.12 into equation 2.11, the cutoff point
for Council types that reject the first offer in equilibrium is
ω∗2 =
3ω − 2kP
5
. (2.14)
Following analogous logic, the equilibrium offers and cutoff for the case where ω2 ≤ kP are
x∗P,1 = max{0,
ω − kP
2
}, x∗P,2 = 0, ω∗2 = x∗P,1. (2.15)
While the details differ, the equilibrium proposals and cutoffs are qualitatively similar
across both cases. During each reading the Parliament makes a proposal that balances its
beliefs about the range of possible Council types with its own costs to delay. In the case
where ω2 > kP—or, plugging in the equilibrium values, ω >
7
3
kP—the Parliament makes an
aggressive first offer, followed by a more accommodating offer should the game extend into
second reading. The same is true when ω2 ≤ kP =⇒ ω ≤ 73kP , except, in this case, the
Parliament will certainly offer the conciliation outcome at second reading. Furthermore, if its
own delay costs are too high—if kP ≥ ω and the risk of delay outweighs the expected benefit
of any aggressive offer—then the Parliament proposes xcc = 0 at first reading, knowing that
the Council is bound to accept it, ending bargaining.
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In general, when its own costs are sufficiently low, the Parliament makes a series of offers
that maximize the bargaining surplus that it expects it can extract from the Council. The
Parliament’s offer at first reading is at least as aggressive as its second reading offer; indeed,
if the Parliament does not offer the conciliation outcome at first reading, it will certainly
propose a policy at first reading that is closer to its own ideal point than the policy it
suggests subsequently. As I have already noted, the Parliament’s offer at first reading will
satisfy weaker types of Council q-pivots, and they will accede to the Parliament’s demands.
But stronger types will stay in the game. The details of this dynamic varies, depending
on the difference between ω and kP . When ω is sufficiently above kP , the Parliament’s
proposals track an optimal balance between short-term utility maximization, and longer-
term information acquisition. Knowing that only stronger Council types will reject the
initial proposal, the Parliament softens its demands at second reading in hopes of concluding
negotiations without investing in conciliation.
Yet, depending on the circumstances, the Parliament may nonetheless attempt to take
advantage of Council weakness at second reading, and propose an allocation that benefits
the Parliament (Council) more (less) than the conciliation outcome. This is, of course, a
gamble, and especially strong Council q-pivots will reject even the more accommodating
second reading offer. On the other hand, when kP is relatively large, the Parliament simply
maximizes its single-shot expected utility at first reading, knowing that Council types that
will reject the proposal and force a second reading will accept nothing short of the conciliation
outcome. Under such circumstances bargaining never extends into conciliation because the
Parliament will not take the risk of making an aggressive offer in the second stage.
One notable aspect of the model is that the median MEP’s cost to delay must be sub-
stantially lower than that of the Council q-pivot to make extended bargaining worthwhile
for the Parliament. Nonetheless, it would make sense that the average MEP’s cost to delay
would be significantly below that of the member state representatives on the Council. While
the member states have government bureaucracies behind them, and have reasonably large
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staffs dedicated to considering European legislation, they must nonetheless commit sub-
stantial resources when considering each and every piece of legislation that the Commission
proposes. On the other hand, while individual MEPs have limited staffs, and few personal
resources to draw upon, the work-load of the Parliament is distributed across upwards of 700
MEPs. While the rapporteur assigned to the file, and indeed the Parliament’s permanent
secretariat, would probably prefer to complete the case quickly, the marginal cost of extend-
ing a given codecision file is likely negligible for any given MEP. Therefore, the Parliament
as a whole, and the median MEP in particular, should be relatively unencumbered by delay
costs in most circumstances.
It is worth emphasizing that delay is possible in this game and, depending on the values
of kC and kP , bargaining may extend all the way to conciliation. That is, when it is possible
that C’s costs are quite high relative to kP , Parliament will attempt to extract concessions
from the Council at both readings. Yet, when presented with these offers, some especially
strong types of C will still prefer waiting until conciliation to accepting P ’s second reading
compromise proposal. Therefore, unlike full information models of codecision, the sequential
bargaining game allows for the multi-reading codecision files that we observe in real life.
On the other hand, this model does make one assumption—that the Council does not
counter-offer, but rather only accepts or rejects Parliament’s proposals—that is clearly un-
true. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis because, given the Council’s severely
restricted signaling language, the Parliament can never be put into a situation where it has
to update its beliefs, knowing that it is off of the equilibrium path.26 When the Council can
counter-propose, its messages become much more detailed, off-path belief updating becomes
a serious issue, the number of possible equilibria multiplies exponentially, and finding closed-
form solutions becomes difficult. Thus, such models provide poor foundations for building
more complicated theories. Nonetheless, the equilibria of asymmetric bargaining models in
26That is, unless the Council were to reject an offer of xcc at the first reading. In this case, one can simply
assume that the Parliament maintains its belief that kC = 0, as Bayes’ rule provides no guidance for what
the Parliament’s beliefs should be off the equilibrium path.
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which both sides can propose retain much of the flavor of the model that I present here
(Grossman & Perry 1986, Ausubel, Cramton & Deneckere 2001). Indeed, in such models,
the uninformed player makes sequentially more accommodating offers, screening out weaker
types of the informed player as the game progresses, just as the Parliament does in this
model. When there is no hope of extracting an offer from the uninformed player that will
compensate the informed actor for dragging things out further, the informed player makes
an acceptable offer to its counterpart. Otherwise, a cheap-talk dynamic maintains and the
uninformed bargainer makes offers that it knows the uninformed actor will reject, resulting
in a situation that looks quite similar to bargaining with one-sided offers. Clearly, the sim-
plified model that I develop here cannot help explain whether or not Parliament will choose
to make amendments at second reading. Similarly, it tells us nothing about the content of
the Council’s second reading proposals. Nonetheless, it largely captures the dynamics of
bargaining under asymmetric information—even when both sides can make proposals—and,
because of its tractability, serves as a useful platform for building a more complicated model
that considers how the Commission mediates codecision bargaining.
2.3.2 Mediated Codecision Bargaining
We are now in a position to examine the Commission’s role in codecision bargaining. The
game is almost identical to sequential codecision bargaining. First, Nature chooses C’s type,
kC , again drawing it randomly according to equation 2.3. But now, before the Parliament
officially tables its first reading proposal, Nature sends the Commission a private signal,
s ∈ {S,W}, indicating whether or not the Council is in a strong bargaining position, and
thus is likely to reject the Parliament’s opening bid, or in a weak position, and therefore
likely to accept the Parliament’s offer. Specifically, because it is involved in the internal
discussions of both the Council and the Parliament prior to Parliament’s vote on a proposal
at first reading, the Commission has an idea of both the content of the Parliament’s initial
offer, and the likelihood that the Council will accept that offer. More specifically, building
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on the sequential bargaining model, the Commission’s signal is such that s = S when the
Commission believes that kC < ω
∗
2, as defined in equation 2.14, and, therefore, believes that
the Council will reject the Parliament’s initial offer, should the Parliament make that offer
based purely on its prior knowledge—as described by equation 2.3—about the Council’s
bargaining strength. On the other hand, s = W when the Commission believes that the
Council will accept Parliament’s naive first offer, or when kC ≥ ω∗2.
Note that, while the Commission has access to information that the Parliament does not,
that information is relatively imprecise. This aspect of the model makes empirical sense.
Indeed, while the Commission’s special access to intra-Council deliberations affords it private
knowledge about the Council’s baseline bargaining costs, the salience it places on the file, and
intra-Council divisions, it is unreasonable to assume that the Commission perfectly observes
the Council’s bargaining strength. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the Commission would be able to ascertain the Council’s appetite for Parliament’s most
likely proposal. In the model, therefore, the Commission simply knows what the Parliament
will eventually discover at second reading before the Parliament has tabled its first reading
proposal.27
The Commission now sends a message, m ∈ {S,W} to the Parliament, potentially relay-
ing its private information to the lower house. There is no practical way for the Commission
to send such a message to over 700 MEPs in private, so m is observed by all actors.28 This
aspect of the model also seems like a plausible representation of the state of affairs that
characterizes actual codecision lawmaking. In practice, as I mentioned in section 2.2, the
Commission communicates official opinions—with accompanying arguments—on all of the
potential amendments that the Parliament tables to the Commission’s initial proposal at
27An interesting generalization would allow for error in the Commission’s private information. For example,
s could be correct with probability 1− . For now I assume that the signal is accurate, if imprecise. I leave
the more general model to future research.
28Note that every MEP must have access to the same information for the median MEP to maintain its
role as pivotal actor within the Parliament. Therefore, the Commission cannot simply relay its private
information to the median MEP if it wishes to influence Parliament’s proposals.
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first reading. While these opinions serve a variety of purposes, the Commission can, in prin-
ciple, use these public statements to transmit its private information about the Council’s
willingness to compromise to the Parliament. Therefore, although the model abstracts away
from the manner in which the Commission sends messages to the Parliament, the Commis-
sion has an institutionalized method for transmitting information to the Parliament in the
real world.
After the Commission sends its message the sequential codecision bargaining game plays
out, proceeding exactly as it did in the previous section. Initially, the parliament makes a
first reading offer, xP,1, which the Council accepts or rejects. At second reading, Parliament
makes a follow-up offer, xP,2, and the Council again decides whether or not to accept the
proposal. Should the Council reject the second reading offer, the conciliation committee
convenes, ending the game with a lottery.
The Commission—like the Council and Parliament—has preferences over outcomes. The
Treaties envision the Commission as an independent, unbiased, and largely apolitical in-
stitution. Indeed, Commissioners are formally expected to operate independently, and to
make decisions without regard to the preferences of their member states, or national par-
ties, and Commissioners swear an oath to this effect. Of course, academic work often finds
evidence for bias within the Commission (see e.g. Thomson 2008). To highlight the role
that Commission (in)dependence may play in modulating lawmaking in the EU, I model the
Commission’s utility in terms of both its own costs to delay, kM , and the degree to which it
is biased in favor of either of the two institutions’ most preferred outcomes. Specifically,
uM(x, t) = βx− kM(t− 1), (2.16)
where β ∈ R. The parameter β is a measure of Commission bias that all players observe.
When β = 0 the Commission is unbiased and maximizes its utility simply by arranging
for a speedy conclusion to deliberations. This is the situation envisioned by treaty; the
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Commission stands above the disagreements of the political actors and faces an incentive
structure that compels it to guide the co-legislators quickly towards compromise. On the
other hand, when β > 0, the Commission is biased—to a greater or lesser extent—towards
the Parliament median’s point of view. Similarly, when β < 0, the Commission favors
the Council’s position. Furthermore, like the Council and Parliament, the Commission
pays a fixed cost to delay, which I assume all actors observe. And, like the Parliament,
these costs are a function of the resources the Commission must spend when codecision
extends into subsequent readings and the degree to which focusing on the file at hand
restricts its ability to deploy resources to other, perhaps more salient, codecision files. Yet,
perhaps unlike the Parliament, because the Commission plays such an important role in all
aspects of codecision—drafting legislation, advising the Council and Parliament’s committees
during their internal deliberations, rendering opinions on proposals, answering questions in
plenary, helping to mediate trilogues, and providing informational and technical support in
conciliation—its costs to delay are likely to be substantial.
The analysis of this game proceeds largely along the lines of the baseline sequential
bargaining model. Clearly, the mediated codecision bargaining model two pooling Bayesian
perfect equilibria where the Commission sends the same message–either m = W or m = S—
to the Parliament, regardless of the content of the signal that it receives at the beginning
of the game. Under such circumstances, the Parliament has no information at its disposal
that can influence it to alter its approach to codecision bargaining. Indeed, the sequential
codecision bargaining model, that I develop above, describes the Parliament and Council’s
equilibrium behavior when the Parliament disregards the Commission’s message and acts
purely on the basis of its prior knowledge. Below, I examine the circumstances under which
the mediated game can support a fully separating equilibrium. This answers the question:
when does the Commission have an incentive to relay its signal to the Parliament without
embellishment, or equivalently, when can the Parliament believe the Commission’s signal?
I then use the nature of the separating equilibria to examine how the Commission’s ability
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to honestly transmit information affects both the outcome of codecision bargaining, and the
speed with which bargaining is concluded. In the previous section I argued that, because
the Parliament can spread its workload out across so many members, MEPs will find costs
to delay negligible for any given codecision file. Therefore, and to reduce notational clutter,
in this section I assume that kP ≤ 37ω.29
To begin the analysis of the separating equilibria, assume first that m = S and that
the Parliament believes that the Commission has truthfully relayed its private information
such that, in the Parliament’s opinion, m = s. Now, at first reading, the Parliament must
initially believe that the Council’s potential costs are such that
kC ∼ U [0, ω∗2]. (2.17)
Clearly, from this point, the game is exactly the same as the sequential codecision bargaining
game; the only difference is that the potential type space is a subset of the type space that
confronted the Parliament prior to receiving the Commission’s signal. Therefore, following
the logic of the previous section, if 9ω > 41kP ,
30 in any separating equilibrium, if the
Commission sends the signal m = S, the equilibrium offers and cutpoint are
x∗P,1,S =
5.4ω − 14.6kP
10
, x∗P,2,S =
1.8ω − 8.2kP
10
, ω∗2,S =
1.8ω − 3.2kP
5
. (2.18)
Similarly, when 9ω ≤ 41kP , the equilibrium offers and cutoff are
x∗P,1,S =
3ω − 7kP
10
, x∗P,2,S = 0, ω
∗
2,S = x
∗
P,1,S. (2.19)
29This assumption rules out the corner case where the Parliament, given no information beyond its prior,
proposes the Conciliation outcome with certainty at second reading and, perhaps, at first reading. As the
equilibrium offers that I derived in the previous section should make clear, the corner case exhibits a flavor
that is similar to the situation where the Parliament’s second reading offer is unconstrained by its own costs.
Therefore, this simplification does little, if anything, to change the theoretical conclusions that one can draw
from the model.
30Here, the Parliament’s delay cost must be almost five times smaller than the Council’s highest a priori
(i.e. before the Commission’s signal) cost, to obtain the unconstrained solution.
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Figure 2.3: The Likelihood of a second reading given a strong Council and truthful Com-
mission.
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Comparing equation 2.18 to equations 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14, we find an unsurprising result.
Specifically, upon initially learning that the Council is relatively strong, the Parliament
tones down the series of offers that it presents to the Council, adopting a substantially more
accommodating approach. For example, when the Parliament’s own costs to delay approach
zero, the Parliament’s first offer, based on its own prior information, is one and two thirds
the size of the first reading offer it tables after receiving, and believing, the message m = S.
This finding has important implications for how bureaucratic mediation can influence
lawmaking efficiency within the Union. Given a strong Council, bargaining will conclude
more quickly when the Parliament can trust the Commission’s message. When the Parlia-
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ment acts purely on its priors a second reading is guaranteed. On the other hand, when the
Commission can obviate the Parliament’s need to float the initial screening offer described
by equation 2.12, the probability that the Council rejects the first offer is
P (kC < ω
∗
2,S|kC < ω∗2) =
ω∗2,S
ω∗2
. (2.20)
Figure 2.3 depicts this relationship, as a function of kP , for three possible values of ω. Clearly,
for a fixed cost kP , the likelihood of delay increases with Parliament’s uncertainty about the
Council’s bargaining strength. Furthermore, while the probability of a second reading is
about sixty per cent when Parliament faces no delay costs, this probability quickly drops off
as kP increases. The relationship exhibits a discontinuity at kp =
9
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ω—the point at which
Parliament’s second round offer is guaranteed to be completely accommodating—and then
continues its downward trend, reaching zero when kP hits its assumed upper bound of
3
7
ω.
A similar dynamic holds at second reading; Parliament’s second offer after receiving and
believing m = S is always lower than it would be when approaches the game with only
its prior information in hand. Therefore, while delay is possible at second reading in both
pooling and separating equilibria, a file is less likely to make it all the way to conciliation when
the Parliament and Commission can communicate effectively. Overall, when the Parliament
trusts it, the Commission can use its mediating influence to reduce bargaining inefficiency,
sometimes substantially.
Now, assume that m = W and that the Parliament believes the Commission’s message.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept requires the Parliament to hold beliefs that are
consistent with players’ strategies at all points along the equilibrium path. The Parliament
always reaches first reading in this game; therefore, in any separating equilibrium, it must
initially believe
kC ∼ U [ω∗2, ω] (2.21)
after observing m = W . Thus, at first reading, it knows that all Council types will accept
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the offer xP,1,W = ω
∗
2, and thus should never table a more accommodating first proposal.
Unfortunately, the equilibrium concept provides little guidance on how to model the
Parliament’s beliefs off of the equilibrium path. This is an issue here because—in contrast
to the case where s = m = S—when players follow their strategies, the game need not reach
second reading with positive probability in a separating equilibrium after Parliament observes
the message m = W . Indeed, lemmas 2 and 3 in appendix A prove that the second reading
is never reached when players follow their strategies in any separating equilibrium of the
mediated codecision bargaining game, when s = W . Therefore, the Parliament can adopt a
variety of beliefs about the Council’s strength should it—unexpectedly—find itself at second
reading. For example, at second reading, Parliament might conclude that the Commission
made a mistake and decide that the Council must be strong after all. Alternatively, it could
reason that the Commission’s message was correct, but that a misunderstanding or other
idiosyncratic event within the Council had caused the ministers to err in their response to
the Parliament’s offer. In situations like the former case, where the Parliament assumes
the Council is strong should second reading occur, the Parliament has an incentive to play
things safe and to make a relatively accommodating first offer. On the other hand, should the
Parliament maintain its beliefs across both readings—it will make an exceedingly aggressive
offer, proposing its own ideal point under many circumstances, and no less than 2ω∗2.
Moreover, the range of off-path second reading beliefs that can support a separating equi-
librium is distressingly broad. In fact, for certain values of β and kM , there are separating
equilibria where the Parliament holds any belief—so long as the Parliament believes that kC
lies somewhere on the interval [0, ω]—at second reading, after observing m = W . Consider,
for example, an extremely “pessimistic” Parliament that, after observing m = W and un-
expectedly seeing its first proposal rejected, assumes that the Council must be exceedingly
strong and adopts the belief that kC = 0. Clearly, in this case, Parliament’s optimal second
reading proposal is x∗P,2,W = 0.
31 It is easy to verify that, given this second reading belief,
31Technically, when kP = 0, the Parliament is indifferent and may propose any xP,2,W ∈ [0, 1] but, if we
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and corresponding second offer, Parliament’s optimal first offer is x∗P,1,W = ω
∗
2. Of course,
keeping equation 2.21 in mind, it is clear that any weak Council will accept this first round
offer, keeping the second round off of the equilibrium path. On the other hand, as I men-
tioned in the last paragraph, if the Parliament holds “optimistic” beliefs when it finds itself
off the equilibrium path, there are equilibria in which x∗P,1,W = 1. Therefore, it is possible
to make only relatively vague general claims about how the Parliament will behave after
observing m = W and believing the Commission’s message. First, in such cases, bargaining
will end at first reading, again placing the Commission in a position to improve bargaining
efficiency through mediation. Second, Parliament will make a first round proposal the lies
on the range
x∗P,1,W ∈ [ω∗2, 1]. (2.22)
So, when will the Commission have an incentive to maintain its separating strategy s = m
in equilibrium, given the other players’ optimal responses to truthful messages? First, say
the Commission observes the signal s = W , learning that the Council is weak. Comparing
equations 2.18 and 2.19 to equation 2.22, one can see that, should the Parliament believe
the Commission, it will always propose a more accommodating first reading offer when
m = S than when m = W , even if the Parliament holds particularly “pessimistic” beliefs
off of the equilibrium path. Additionally, given that s = W =⇒ kC ≥ ω∗2, the weak
Council will pounce upon the misled Parliament’s over-generous offer at first reading, ending
bargaining at the outset, meaning that the Commission can mislead the Parliament in these
circumstances without risking delay costs.32 Therefore, when β < 0, the Commission always
gains from misleading the Parliament into believing that a weak Council is strong and will
optimally deviate from its separating strategy; thus, there can be no separating equilibria
assume the Parliament finds delay even minutely costly, it will always propose xP,2,W = 0 at second reading
if it believes kC = 0.
32A weak Council always at least weakly prefers accepting a first offer that is less than or equal to ω∗2
to delay, even if it expects the Parliament to fully capitulate and propose an allocation of 0 at the second
reading.
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when β < 0. When the Council and Commission have similar preferences, cheap talk from
the Commission is no more valuable to the Parliament than signals sent directly from the
Council. In such circumstances, the Commission’s mediating capabilities are completely
undercut.
On the other hand, when β ≥ 0, the Commission has no incentive to deceive the Parlia-
ment after observing s = W . First, should the Commission maintain its separating strategy,
lemmas 2 and 3 show that bargaining will end at first reading. Therefore, the Commission
cannot reduce delay costs by tricking the Parliament into adopting a more accommodating
stance than it should, as the Parliament would do if it believed the Council strong. Fur-
thermore, when β ≥ 0, the Commission weakly prefers outcomes closer to the Parliament’s
most preferred bargain to lower allocations. Of course, equations 2.18, 2.19, and, 2.22 show
that the Parliament will always make tougher proposals when it believes that the Council
is weak than when it thinks that the Council is strong, providing the Commission with no
incentive to deviate from its separating strategy when s = W and β ≥ 0.
The final piece in the puzzle hinges on whether or not it is optimal for the Commission
to adopt a separating strategy when β ≥ 0 and s = S. That is, will a Commission that is
weakly biased towards the Parliament’s ideal bargain ever prefer to tell a trusting Parliament
that the Council is weak when it is actually strong? If the Commission relays the true signal
to the Parliament, and the Parliament believes the message, bargaining may end at any
of the three readings, and, weighing the relative likelihood of each possible outcome, the
Commission can expect to obtain the payoff
βx∗P,1,S
(
1− ω
∗
2,S
ω∗2
)
+
[
βx∗P,2,S
(
1− x
∗
P,2,S
ω∗2,S
)
− kM ·
x∗P,2,S
ω∗2,S
− kM
]
· ω
∗
2,S
ω∗2
(2.23)
if it follows the separating strategy. On the other hand, if the Commission misleads the
Parliament—given that s = S =⇒ kC < ω∗2—equation 2.22 indicates the Council will
certainly reject the Parliament’s initial offer. Therefore, in this case, the Commission’s
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expected utility is
βx∗P,2,W
(
1− x
∗
P,2,W
ω∗2
)
− kM
(
x∗P,2,W
ω∗2
)
− kM (2.24)
if the Parliament falls for the deception. The Commission will maintain its separating
strategy when its expected utility from telling the truth exceeds the payoff it expects to
receive upon misleading the Parliament, or when the value of equation 2.23 exceeds the
value of equation 2.24. When β = 0 this condition simplifies to the requirement that
x∗P,2,S − x∗P,2,W ≥ ω∗2 − ω∗2,S, an inequality that will always hold. Therefore, a wide variety
of separating equilibria are possible when the Commission is unbiased. When β > 0 the
condition does not simplify so nicely and the resulting inequality is not particularly easy
to interpret in general terms. Whether or not a separating equilibria is possible hinges
crucially on the degree of the Commission’s bias, β, the Commission’s cost to delay, kM ,
and the Parliament’s delay cost, kP , and off-path beliefs at second reading after observing
m = W in a given potential equilibrium. Furthermore, the interplay between these factors is
quite complicated. Nonetheless, many parameter configurations and off-path beliefs support
separating equilibria when β > 0.
For example, if—contingent on observing m = W—the Parliament adopts the off-the-
path second reading belief that kC ∼ [0, ω∗2], then the mediated codecision bargaining game
has separating equilibria whenever β ≥ 0. Furthermore, this is an attractive equilibrium
from a theoretical point of view because it makes sense for MEPs to update their beliefs in
this manner upon reaching second reading after receiving the message m = W and, following
their equilibrium strategy, tabling an initial proposal that any weak Council should accept.
The Commission is bound to make mistakes from time to time and misinterpret the Council’s
strength. When this happens we would expect that MEPs might conclude that the Council
was strong after all, but would not predict that they adopt particularly specific beliefs about
the exact level of Council strength. Thus the vague off-path belief that “the Council is
strong” seems quite plausible in this context. Moreover, as long as the Commission is weakly
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biased towards the Parliament’s bargaining position, such beliefs will induce the Commission
to act as an honest mediator, coordinating a speedy compromise between the two chambers.
Of course, their are many other belief configurations that can support separating equilibria
when β ≥ 0.
On the other hand there are off-the-path Parliamentary beliefs—and resulting second-
reading strategies—that cannot support a separating equilibrium when β > 0. This state of
affairs can occur when the Parliament is sufficiently “pessimistic” off the equilibrium path
to make a second reading offer that a strong Council has some probability of accepting,
but that generate a second offer that is tough enough to yield an expected outcome to the
right of the bargain, when played against a strong Council, that the players would expect
to strike should the Parliament play its optimal strategy. Given such off-path beliefs, there
can be situations where the preferences of the Commission and Parliament diverge, in the
sense that the Commission is more willing to stomach risk in the hopes of attaining a larger
share of the bargaining spoils. Specifically, when β is sufficiently large, kM is sufficiently
small, and kP is comparably large, the Commission has an incentive to convince MEPs to
take a risk that is not in their best interests. Therefore, one cannot unequivocally say that
the Commission will truthfully relay information about the Council’s bargaining position to
the Parliament when it exhibits a bias towards the Parliament’s most preferred outcome.
Indeed, depending on how the Parliament reacts to unexpected rejections, the Council can
be too biased towards the Parliament’s point of view to be trusted, especially if it suffers
little costs from delay.
In sum, the analysis that I present here demonstrates that effective communication be-
tween the Commission and Parliament is possible only when their preferences are sufficiently
similar. More generally, the model indicates that bureaucrats will be most effective at in-
fluencing policy-making through mediation when the goals of the bureaucracy are similar
to those of those policy-making bodies that are at the greatest informational disadvantage
vis-a-vis their peers. Of course, depending on the way in which MEPs form beliefs when
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confronted with unexpected behavior by the Council, even pro-Parliament Commissions—
and, in particular, exceedingly pro-Parliament Commissions—may not be able to truthfully
communicate to the Parliament. Yet such situations are unlikely if, as one would expect,
the Commission finds delay reasonably costly. Moreover, pro-Parliament bias always makes
persuasive mediation possible for especially plausible off-equilibrium-path beliefs. Finally,
the model indicates that the Commission can always play an effective mediating role when
unbiased. Nonetheless, one should be cautious when considering the implications that un-
biasedness has for successful bureaucratic mediation. In the game that I present here the
Commission receives an accurate, if vague, signal of the Council’s bargaining strength. In
real-world politics, few bureaucrats will have access to such valid measures. Furthermore,
error in observation has the potential to affect the decision calculus of the Commission con-
siderably. An unbiased mediator is concerned only with ending negotiations quickly and will
accept any outcome as a means to that end. Therefore, when there is a chance that the
mediator is wrong about the informed player’s bargaining strength, the mediator will wish
to err on the side of caution and attempt to convince the proposing actor to compromise.
Thus, as Kydd (2003) has argued in the context of conflict mediation, unbiased mediators
may actually be unable to convincingly relay information about one negotiator to another.
2.3.3 Empirical Implications
Taken together, the models that I present in this section provide a number of empirical
predictions about lawmaking in the European Union, and the ways in which bureaucratic
mediators may influence policy-making more generally.
The sequential codecision bargaining model generates implications that mirror standard
accounts of bargaining under uncertainty (Sobel & Takahashi 1983, Fudenberg & Tirole
1983, Grossman & Perry 1986, Ausubel, Cramton & Deneckere 2001). Indeed, it shows
that negotiations will take longer, and codecision will span more readings, when legislation
is more salient, when players face lower fixed bargaining costs, and when the Parliament’s
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uncertainty about the Council’s bargaining constraints grows in comparison to Parliament’s
own delay costs. Furthermore, Parliament’s second reading proposals should always be
more accommodating than the first reading proposals that precede them. Yet, while others
have previously leveraged bargaining models with asymmetric information to understand
the broad contours of how lawmaking gets done in bicameral legislatures (Tsebelis & Money
1997), adding a mediator to the picture yields novel insights.
Because the Parliament can only trust the Commission when preferences align across
institutions, Commission arguments—such as opinions on Parliament’s amendments, and
recommendations to rapporteurs, committees, and speeches in plenary—should only influ-
ence decision-making within the Parliament when the median MEP and the Commission
share policy goals. This does not mean that MEPs will make decisions based purely on their
own ideological predilections. Rather, when the median MEP and the Commission agree,
the majority of MEPs can be persuaded to behave against their most preferred outcomes
and can be convinced to support second-best compromise positions, because they know that
this will maximize their utility in the long term.
When the Parliament and the Commission share preferences, lawmaking should proceed
more efficiently than when they are divided on an issue, holding the level of disagreement
between the Parliament and Council constant. When effective communication between the
Commission and Parliament is possible, the Commission will help the Parliament to avoid
the lengthy and wasteful process of floating a relatively aggressive first proposal to test the
Council’s resolve, shortening negotiations when the Council turns out to be strong. More
generally, the preferences of bureaucrats may interact with the information environment to
help explain variations in legislative efficiency across political contexts that are, institution-
ally, similar. Furthermore, the Commission’s information can help the Parliament to obtain
policy outcomes that it prefers, on average, when compared to bargaining with no help from
a mediator. When the Council turns out to be weak, the Commission can relay this infor-
mation to the Parliament, allowing it to go for the jugular and extract as much bargaining
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surplus as possible.33 Even when the Council turns out to be relatively unimpaired by delay
costs, because it can tailor its offers to the Council’s strength, the Parliament will make out
better, on average, when it can make use of the Commission’s messages when planning its
course of action.
2.4 Conclusion
Acting only in its capacity as a mediator, the Commission can exert impressive influence on
the dynamics of lawmaking. Its control of policy outcomes, on the other hand, is relatively
limited—it cannot force either the Council or the Parliament to accept an outcome that
it cannot abide—but it can direct compromise towards its preferred policy, as long as its
preferences and the Parliament’s are similar. This result is consistent with the impression,
commonly voiced among practitioners of EU politics, that the Commission and the Par-
liament often work together to extract concessions from the Council (Rasmussen 2003, pp.
5). Overall, the Commission’s mediative capacity may help to explain the disconnect be-
tween the Commission’s formal powers and many observers’ beliefs about its strength under
codecision. Acting as a mediator, the Commission will often encourage the Parliament and
Council to settle on compromise positions in the early stages of codecision. In so doing, it
will make recommendations that both parties follow and will appear to exert substantial
influence over the other EU institutions’ decisions. And, in a way, it does. The Commission
does not simply recommend that the Council and Parliament take the course of action that
they would in its absence. Rather, when the appropriate conditions hold, it guides the two
chambers to speedy resolutions that they could not have found on their own. Thus, while it
lacks power over policy, it is surprisingly persuasive.
The story of Commission influence through mediation has important implications for
33Of course, the Parliament’s tendency to do so depends on off-equilibrium-path beliefs, and the game
also sports equilibria in which the Parliament is more conciliatory when it learns that the Council is weak
than it would be if the Commission was not in the picture.
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the way in which political scientists conceptualize policy making in governments and inter-
national organizations. While bureaucracies in national government derive much of their
power from their discretion over the implementation of policy, they nonetheless also en-
joy significant advantages based on their multiple points of contact with other governing
institutions. How relatively well-connected bureaucracies are—and how their institutional
preferences dovetail with other actors—can help explain variation in lawmaking efficiency
across polities. It can also shed light on how perceptions about bureaucratic strength form.
In systems where bureaucratic mediation plays an important role, civil servants will appear
powerful, when perhaps they are only influential. That is, while they are constrained in
their ability to change policy outcomes, their interventions have serious consequences for
the dynamics of the policy-making process. The present research allows us to draw simi-
lar conclusions in the context of IGOs. Furthermore, because IGO staff typically have less
control over implementation than their counterparts in national bureaucracies, supporting
actors in IGOs may wield a greater proportion of their influence through mediation than via
other channels. Thus, the present work dovetails with institutionalist arguments that hold
that international actors can modulate interstate bargaining through information provision
(Keohane 1984, Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal 2001) and contrasts with the intergovernmen-
talist contentions about the powerlessness of non-state actors in international interactions
(Moravcsik 1998, Moravcsik 1999).
55
Chapter 3
The Power of Suggestion:
Commission Influence on Voting in
the European Parliament
No legislators go about the business of lawmaking in a bubble. A variety of sources pepper
lawmakers with a constant barrage of information intended to influence their voting behav-
ior. For example, donors indicate support for particular policies, government bureaucrats
and lobbyists educate politicians about complicated issues and make recommendations about
policy priorities, and party whips cajole lawmakers to follow the party line. When making
voting decisions, legislators must weigh the information they receive from external sources
against their own private beliefs about the likely outcomes of particular policies. Likewise,
they must balance their personal policy priorities with the wishes of actors who may influence
their future careers, such as party leaders, campaign donors, and constituents. Furthermore,
the way in which politicians balance their ideological predilections and previously held be-
liefs with new information and external leverage is fundamental to our understanding of
democratic lawmaking. Indeed, it would be nearly impossible to exhaustively catalogue the
range of academic studies of legislating that deal with this class of questions.
Disentangling preference-congruence from influence is a daunting problem for observa-
tional studies of lawmaking in real legislatures, especially in studies of voting behavior,
one that often appears futile (Hall 1992). For example, when one observes Democrats and
Republicans in the US House voting largely along party lines, should one conclude that
parties influence voting behavior or simply that co-partisans have similar preferences (see
e.g. Krehbiel 1993)? Similarly, when a lawmaker votes in a manner that pleases a cam-
paign donor, how can one tell whether she would have voted differently had the donor not
been in the picture? Sometimes a natural experiment presents itself that helps to overcome
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this problem.1 When one does not, researchers often use an external measure of ideology—
perhaps from a survey2 of legislators—as a control in a model predicting voting behavior.
Unfortunately, this approach is often flawed and rarely convenient. The ideological com-
ponent of a voting decision is driven by the relative utility that the voter derives from the
alternatives up for vote, not simply the voter’s position in the ideological space. Therefore,
because of variation in the location of alternatives across votes, casting a vote against one’s
ideological preference can be significantly more painful for a legislator on certain votes than
it is on others. In other words, sometimes switching one’s vote represents a substantial
concession to outside interests because the legislator greatly prefers one voting alternative
to the other. On the other hand, sometimes both voting alternatives are so close, or so far,
from a legislator’s preferred policy that pleasing a donor or following the whip is no hardship
for the lawmaker, even if she would have voted in the opposite direction in the absence of
an outside force. And of course, when alternatives are such that the legislator and outside
interest have common preferences, voting in line with external pressure requires no sacrifice
from the lawmaker at all. Furthermore, it is typically difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
direct measures of legislators’ relative utility from voting alternatives. This means that many
studies of external influences on voting behavior run the risk of attributing too much, or too
little, importance to outside influences because they treat all voting decisions as equal. And
finally, in many cases, it is difficult to get reliable external estimates of legislator ideology
in the first place, leaving the researcher with little leverage over the question of interest.
Nonetheless, when external pressure is applied selectively across observed votes—for
example, if parties whip only particular divisions or a donor expresses interest in only a
subset of issues on which lawmakers consider legislation—the voting record itself provides
researchers with an exploitable natural experiment. Specifically, because the ideological
1See Bronars & John R. Lott (1997) and Stratmann (2002) for some examples from the campaign finance
literature.
2Of course, it is not uncommon for researchers to use behavioral measures such as NOMINATE (Poole
& Rosenthal 1985) scores in this context despite the potential endogeneity problem.
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component of voting behavior should remain constant across treated (those votes upon
which the outside influence has communicated a preference to the voter) and untreated
(those votes that are of little interest to the potentially influential actor) votes, one can
adapt existing statistical tools to identify the relative importance that ideology and a given
form of external influence play in legislators’ voting decisions, taking cross-vote variation in
the trade-off between ideological prerogatives and external pressure into account.3
In this paper I take advantage of the extensibility of the Bayesian statistical voting
model (Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004) to identify the extent to which members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) follow the recommendations of the European Commission
when voting on amendments to proposals considered under the codecision procedure,4 net
of the ideological congruence between the Commission recommendations and individual
MEPs’ prefrences. While previous work (Tsebelis, Jensen, Kalandrakis & Kreppel 2001,
Rasmussen 2003, Kasack 2004) has pointed out the strong correlation between Commission
opinion and the success of amendments to codecision bills, my findings demonstrate that
this correlation—at the least the portion driven by voting in the EP—is not simply an ar-
tifact of preferences shared between actors. By taking advantage of the fact that MEPs
vote frequently on questions—such as resolutions and own initiative reports–on which the
Commission provides no opinion, and over which the Council holds no veto, I show that
many MEPs alter their voting behavior systematically when the Commission presents ar-
guments. Specifically, MEPs hailing from parties in national government—and who are
not too ideologically distant from the pivotal players in the Council—make compromises
in light of Commission opinions that are likely to facilitate the speedy conclusion of law-
making negotiations between EU institutions. The Commission’s recommendations reflect
the bicameral bargaining game between the Parliament and Council that is fundamental
3As with all “natural experiments” the viability of this approach is limited by the extent to which treated
and untreated votes are truly comparable in all other respects.
4Codecision, now also known as the ordinary legislative procedure, is currently the primary procedure
under which legislation is developed in the European Union (EU). See European Commission (2010) for an
exhaustive explanation of the current version of the codecision process.
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to codecision and MEPs use the Commission’s opinions to tune their vote choices to the
necessary compromises of bicameral lawmaking. However, the Commission does not simply
channel the Council when making arguments. It plays a mediating role between the two
institutions and provides valuable information to MEPs in its own right. Firstly, because
the Commission controls a substantial bureaucracy, it has access to better information about
the likely effects of policy choices than do rank-and-file MEPs. MEPs may therefore look
to the Commission for guidance on votes concerning issue areas in which they have little
personal expertise. Secondly, the Commission has better access to the Council than do EP
representatives, and therefore more clearly understands the preferences of Council members
than does the average MEP; Commission opinions can serve to transmit information about
these preferences to MEPs, facilitating efficiency and compromise in lawmaking.
To obtain these results I build on the standard spatial voting model by incorporating
external influence components into MEPs’ utility functions, explicitly modeling the rela-
tive contributions of internal ideology and external, Commission-driven, influence to MEPs’
voting behavior. Therefore, unlike standard approaches, this estimation method is firmly
grounded in an explicit model of legislator utility maximization. Linking theory and empir-
ical analysis in this way generates a variety of advantages. First of all, this method takes
into account not only MEP ideology but also MEPs’ ideological distances from voting alter-
natives when generating external influence estimates, overcoming the problem I discussed
above. Moreover, the method provides researchers with a tool that greatly enhances their
ability to interpret the statistical results. Specifically, the model produces estimates of Com-
mission influence that lie on the same scale as MEP ideal points, allowing for comparisons of
the relative import of ideology and external pressure in determining MEPs’ voting decisions
and providing a tool for quantifying external influence that generates substantively mean-
ingful results. Finally, the tools I discuss in this paper also improve our ability to generate
NOMINATE-style (Poole & Rosenthal 1985) maps of legislator ideal points and estimates of
bill locations, cut-points, or other parameters of interest. Because standard spatial scaling
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techniques treat votes as a function of purely ideological voting, they tend to mis-interpret
the voting record, allowing external influences to contaminate inferences about ideal points
and bill locations. By explicitly modeling the contribution of outside influences on voters’
utility functions, one improves the model’s other outputs, generating ideal points and bill
parameters that are, at least, less contaminated by non-ideological considerations.
In what follows, I first discuss codecision and the role that intercameral bargaining plays
in EU lawmaking and MEPs’ voting calculus, arguing that certain lawmakers will strategi-
cally modify their voting behavior under codecision in order to avoid transaction costs and to
facilitate compromise between the EU’s policy-making bodies. Next, I describe a theory of
information transmission between the Commission and Parliament in which the Commission
plays a mediating role between the Council and EP, and discuss the implications this theory
has for voting patterns in the Parliament. I then describe the methodology and demon-
strate how to disentangle ideology from influence on votes over amendments to codecision
legislation and introduce the data that I use to test the theory. I explore the model’s re-
sults, evaluate the consistency of these findings with my theory of information transmission
between Commission and Parliament, and examine how augmenting standard ideal point
estimation technology with outside influences affects bliss point estimates and other model
parameters. Finally, I conclude and describe a variety of other possible applications for the
statistical techniques that I demonstrate here.
3.1 Bicameral Lawmaking and Voting in the EP
Lawmakers in bicameral systems experience an interesting trade-off when voting on legisla-
tion. On the one hand, politicians in one house of a bicameral legislature face all the standard
incentives that occupy legislators; they have personal policy preferences, their party leader-
ships have expectations about their voting behavior, and they have constituencies—in some
cases voters, in others selectorates within their parties—whom they wish to please in order
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to win re-election. On the other hand, they must balance their immediate voting prefer-
ences with the realities of lawmaking in a bifurcated institution. While they might support
a given proposal or amendment for a variety of reasons, they must consider whether or not
voting for—or against—a measure will serve them well in negotiations with their partners in
lawmaking in the other legislative chamber. This state of affairs is not so different from that
facing politicians in unitary systems, in the sense that coalition-building generally requires
compromises and trade-offs that sometimes force legislators to temper their voting behavior.
Often, lawmakers must support second-best outcomes in order to obtain some movement
on policy when their most preferred proposals lack sufficient support or would add aspects
to a bill that would fracture coalitions constructed to support the legislation as a whole.
Nonetheless, legislators in bicameral systems are likely to face transaction costs that dwarf
those weathered by unitary politicians.
For example, under the codecision procedure in the EU, Parliament trades proposals
with the Council until both houses agree on the form of legislation. The process takes up
to three readings. Initially, the Commission makes a proposal to change policy in some way.
The Parliament may then amend the proposal before forwarding it on to the Council. If the
Council agrees to the proposal the process ends, but it may further amend the legislation
and send it back to the Parliament. The second reading is similar, with the Parliament
accepting, rejecting, or amending the Council’s counter-offer, while the Council can accept
or reject Parliament’s second proposal should things come to that. Finally, if the Council
rejects Parliament’s second reading proposal, the conciliation committee convenes, bringing
together representatives from both chambers to hammer out a deal. Should they agree on
a compromise, they send the joint text back to both houses for final approval or ultimate
rejection. This is a complicated, costly, and lengthy process. Indeed, codecision files can
drag on for years. While mistakenly scuttling a compromise in a unicameral legislature can
have serious consequences for the legislators involved, it is likely to be easier to work around
the impasse—for example, by proposing a new amendment to break the deadlock—than in
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a bicameral system. Should the Parliament forward a proposal to the Council that asks for
more than the Council is willing to give, a subsequent reading is likely to result. At first
reading, this means another round of committee meetings, another debate in plenary, and
another round of voting in the EP. A second reading rejection of Parliament’s proposal forces
the convocation of the conciliation committee which adds significant weight to the affected
MEPs’ already substantial work-loads.
In both cases, the staffs of EP party groups and national party delegations spend pre-
cious resources examining the report, weighing competing interests within the group, and
generating voting recommendations for their members on all the amendments that they—
and other groups—might table. For groups—and parties, and MEPs—with an interest in
passing legislation, this is time better spent working on new bills. Therefore, many MEPs
are likely to face strong pressure, both from their party groups and their national party
leaderships, to line up behind compromises on codecision legislation, even when this means
sacrificing their ideological purity to some extent. This should be especially true for MEPs
who hail from mainstream parties, particularly parties that are part of national governments
and, therefore, have representation on the Council. Even for parties that are ideologically
out-of-step with the pivotal voters in the Council, the weight of responsibility may loom
large. These parties are expected to get things done—both at home and in Europe—and
they should lean on their MEPs to back policies that have a chance to win Council support
and to shy away from unsustainable proposals, at least when compromise is not too ideologi-
cally painful. Of course, when a party or group is too at odds with the Council, compromise
will be untenable, so this pressure should hold only for MEPs hailing from parties that can
stomach policies that are also acceptable to the pivotal Council voter.
Additionally, members of the parties that do not participate in government, especially
those on the political fringe, will have little reason to modulate their behavior. Small parties
are unlikely to be blamed for the EU’s inability to pass legislation and, therefore, are largely
free to ignore practical considerations when casting votes. This freedom should be most
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notable among extreme, and eurosceptic, parties. Their ideological leanings, and those of
their supporters, are likely to be too out of line with the Council’s to make compromise
profitable. These MEPs have nothing to gain from moderating their votes to help bills
through the process and they should adopt voting strategies based on position-taking in-
centives, holding tightly to their ideological positions. Indeed, if they do break from their
preferences it should be to advertise their distinctness from the European mainstream, vot-
ing against compromises that obtain substantial majorities, even when supporting a given
proposal would not cause them undue ideological aggravation.
Legislators in bicameral legislatures also face an information problem that can tend to
exacerbate the tendency to incur bargaining costs in such settings. Of course, politicians
who sit together in a unitary legislature will often have trouble observing the bargaining
strength—in terms of patience, internal agreement, and the relative salience placed on the
issue at hand—of opposition players. Negotiators generally prefer to appear strong—or at
least unable to budge—and will not easily relay their willingness to compromise to their
opponents. Nonetheless, unicameral legislators interact with each other on a daily basis,
participate directly in debates with one another, and have many opportunities to catch
glimpses of their opponents’ negotiating weak points. This is not true in bicameral legis-
latures. While party memberships can provide linkages across chambers (Høyland 2006),
individual legislators lack the points of contact with one another that they enjoy in uni-
tary systems. Therefore, they may be less able to gauge the bargaining positions—and
strengths—of their counterparts in the other chamber. Lacking information, politicians in
one house run the risk of proposing legislation that cannot capture the pivotal members of
their counterpart institution, precipitating delay. This problem is perhaps especially notable
for the EP. While the Parliament holds its sessions in public, records many of its votes, and
generally behaves in a transparent manner, the same cannot be said for the Council. Indeed,
the Council is a largely closed institution that rarely opens up its internal workings to out-
side observers. Thus, the potential to misgauge the Council’s bargaining resilience is a real
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one for MEPs. Nonetheless, they have somewhere to turn to help narrow the information
gap: the Commission.
3.1.1 Information, Commission Mediation, and Influence
After initially proposing legislation on a particular issue, the Commission plays a largely sup-
porting role in codecision. Commission representatives take part in informal communications—
called trialogues—between the representatives of the Parliament and the Council and the
responsible Commissioner generally attends Parliamentary committee meetings and plenary
debates on codecision legislation. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, the Commission lodges
opinions on Parliament’s amendments at both readings.5 Additionally, should the process
proceed all the way to conciliation, Commission delegates serve as facilitators in drafting
compromise legislation that is palatable to both the Parliament and the Council and gener-
ally work to assure that the process ends with adoption. Yet, the Commission’s only formal
institutional role in codecision is its ability to set the Council’s voting rule by taking negative
opinions on Parliament’s amendments, forcing the Council to vote unanimously—as opposed
to by qualified majority—to adopt positions that are at odds with the Commission’s official
opinions. Furthermore, because the Commission has no veto power in conciliation, formal
spatial models of law-making in the EU categorically find that the Commission has no say
over policy outcomes on codecision legislation (see e.g. Crombez 1997).
Nonetheless, these results are based on full-information models of lawmaking and do not
consider the Commission’s potential role as a broker of information during the course of the
legislative process. First of all, while the highest echelons of the Commission are populated
by political appointees, each ministry within the Commission—called directorates-general
or DGs—employs hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of experienced, full-time, civil
service staff (Nugent 2001). These career civil servants provide the Commission with a deep
5The Commission also provides a detailed opinion of the common position after it is approved by the
Council, should the proposal reach that stage.
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reservoir of expertise over all aspects of European policy-making and potentially provide the
Commission with both a better understanding of the likely outcomes of particular policies
and a more comprehensive view of the policy options available to the Union than that
available to the Council, and especially to the average MEP.6 Indeed, when practitioners
were surveyed about the relative legislative advantages afforded to the three EU lawmaking
institutions, respondents highlighted the Commission’s “great expertise on the policy areas
affected by its proposals” (Thomson & Hosli 2006, pp. 398) as one of the its key resources.
Furthermore, in order to initially draft codecision legislation, the Commission is forced to
invest in substantial proposal-specific information at the start of the legislative process.
Therefore, both Council and Parliament members have incentives to conserve their own
resources by taking advantage of the Commission’s informational investment when they
believe that they can trust, or at least discern the truth from, Commission signals. Therefore,
we should expect MEPs to turn to the Commission for guidance when they lack information
about a particular vote, perhaps when a policy under consideration falls outside a given
MEP’s area of expertise.
The Commission’s informational advantages also extend to knowledge about the inner
workings of the Council, providing MEPs with the potential to overcome their knowledge
deficit vis-a-vis the Council and reduce the likelihood of extended bicameral bargaining. In-
deed, the Commission has direct access to every level of decision-making within the Council,
with representatives sitting in on working group meetings, COREPER deliberations, and
convocations of ministers (Cini 1996, Nugent 2001). Therefore, when it is in its interests,
the Commission may relay information about the Council’s bargaining position to the Par-
liament. In the context of codecision opinions, the Commission can let the Parliament know
when a particular proposal pushes too far, or when a tabled amendment under-sells the
Parliament’s point of view, conceding too much to a willing compromiser. Nonetheless, the
6Councilors are cabinet members at the national level and therefore have access to extensive staffs of
their own. MEPs, on the other hand, typically only have a handful of full-time staff at their disposal, and
these staff are often shared between MEPs of national delegations (Corbett, Jacobs & Schackleton 2003).
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Commission’s opinions are, largely, a form of cheap talk. The general result of models of
cheap talk (Crawford & Sobel 1982, Austen-Smith & Banks 2000) is that a message sender
can credibly pass information to a receiver only when the preferences of the two parties
dovetail. With respect to the Commission and EP, this means that Commission opinions
will carry the most weight with MEPs when the pivotal (median) MEP and the Commis-
sion have preferences that are more similar than those of the Commission and Council.
When Commission biases turn towards the pivotal MEP it will be in its interests to provide
accurate information about the Council’s bargaining strength, allowing the Parliament to
craft a proposal that is as aggressive as possible without forcing a rebuttal by the Council,
and bargaining delay. On the other hand, when the Commission sides with the Council
it will wish to make the Parliament believe that the Council is strong, encouraging undue
compromise from MEPs. Measuring preference congruence across institutions is a difficult
proposition. Nonetheless, researchers commonly argue that the Commission and Parliament,
because they are European institutions containing politicians with purely European offices,
are more supportive of proposals that expand European power than is the Council, which
is composed of ministers from national governments (Tsebelis & Garrett 2000). Therefore,
we should expect the Commission to most effectively transmit information to the Parlia-
ment when discussing integration-focused proposals, with less communication between the
institutions on measures dealing with traditional, left-right, cleavages.
The final reason that Commission opinions may carry weight with MEPs is not a function
of information transmission, but rather institutional power. As I noted above, Commission
opinions technically set the voting rule in the Council. Most Council decisions are made
by qualified majority, but the Council must vote unanimously when adopting positions that
differ from the Commission’s amended proposal at first reading,7 or when accepting Parlia-
mentary amendments that the Commission rejects at second reading. Therefore, negative
Commission opinions may carry special weight. Because of their influence over the vot-
7The amended proposal incorporates all of the Commission’s opinions on Parliament’s amendments.
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ing rule, the Commission can make it difficult for the Parliament and Council to include
certain provisions in final legislation. MEPs with a vested interested in actual lawmaking,
therefore, may choose to vote against provisions that they support ideologically when the
Commission rejects them in its opinion, because they expect to lose the argument in the end
anyway. As Rasmussen (2003, pp. 7) quotes one Council official: “. . . usually, we examine
the amendments supported by the Commission, for example if there are 100 amendments
and 60 are supported by the Commission, it is useless to examine the others, but it happens
sometimes that we do.” Therefore, we should expect negative Commission opinions to carry
more weight with MEPs than positive ones.
3.2 Statistical Models of Roll Call Voting
As I argued in the introduction, it is difficult to say anything meaningful about how exter-
nal actors influence voting in legislatures without effectively controlling for the ideological
determinants of vote choice. In this section I describe a series of statistical models designed
to examine how Commission opinions on EP amendments influence MEPs’ voting decisions,
taking ideological motivations into account.8 These models are all generalizations of, or
variations on, the canonical statistical roll call voting model developed by Clinton, Jackman
& Rivers (2004). Therefore, to develop the logic of the various Commission-influence models
introduced here, I begin by describing the canonical model, to which I add a hierarchical
prior specification, simplifying model identification, enhancing our ability to interpret the
model’s results, and improving efficiency.
I next present two extensions to the canonical model that allow the utility that voters
(e.g. MEPs) derive from voting yes or no on a given measure to vary as a function of an
outside actor’s opinion (e.g. the Commission’s opinion on a Codecision amendment) while
taking standard spatial voting considerations (i.e. the voters’ ideal points and votes’ proposal
8Some of the models that I develop here are applicable to a wide array of political setting beyond
lawmaking in the EU. I describe a few of these possible applications in the conclusion of this article.
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and status quo points) into account. These models allow one to see whether or not MEPs’
voting behavior co-varies with Commission opinions, net of the ideological similarity between
individual MEPs and Commissioners. That is, these models make it possible to see whether
or not the tendency of MEPs to cast votes that are in line with the Commission’s stated
opinions is simply a function of ideological congruence between the bulk of the MEPs and
members of the Commission, or whether extra-spatial mechanisms are at work. Additionally,
because these models nest the canonical model as a special case, it is possible to use standard
model selection tools to evaluate the explanatory power of the opinion-augmented approach
vis-a-vis the standard model. Furthermore, these models make it possible to examine the
conditions under which Commission opinions and MEP votes dovetail, and those situations
when the Commission’s opinion has little relationship to MEP voting behavior.
3.2.1 The Canonical Statistical Roll Call Voting Model
Following Clinton, Jackman & Rivers (2004) I assume that we can represent each roll call
vote in terms of two points in a D-dimensional policy space. Specifically, MEPs must choose
between the “Yea” position ζj and the “Nay” outcome ψj on each of j ∈ 1 . . .m votes.
Similarly, I assume that each MEP has a quadratic utility function such that legislator
i ∈ 1 . . . n with ideal point xi derives utility
Ui(ζj) = −||xi − ζj||2 + ηij (3.1)
from voting for passage, and
Ui(ψj) = −||xi −ψj||2 + νij (3.2)
for voting for rejection. Again following Clinton, Jackman & Rivers (2004), I assume that
the stochastic parts of the utility function, ηij and νij, are independent with respect to
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both MEPs and votes and normally and jointly distributed with mean E(ηij) = E(νij) and
variance var(ηij − νij) = σ2.9
Given the n×m roll call matrix Y—where Yij = 1 when MEP i votes yea on vote j and
Yij = 0 when the same legislator votes nay
10 on the vote in question—the probability that
MEP i votes in the affirmative on vote j is
Pcan(Yij = 1) = Φ (βj(xi − κj)) (3.3)
where κj =
ψj+ζj
2
is the cut-point dividing MEPs who support measure j from the who do
not, βj =
2(ζj−ψj)
σj
describes the extent to which vote j discriminates between voters,11 and
Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function. Multiplying across MEPs and votes yields
the likelihood function
L(θcan|Y) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
Φ (βj(xi − κj))Yij × [1− Φ (βj(xi − κj))]1−Yij (3.4)
where θcan = {x,β,κ}.
At this point it would be traditional to adopt uninformative conjugate prior distributions
for all parameters in the model and to identify the model by specifying spike priors for
particular ideal points and/or bill parameters. This can be a complicated task, especially
when dealing with a multi-dimensional policy space (Jackman 2001). Therefore, I use a
different approach, recommended by Bafumi et al. (2004), that takes advantage of the wealth
of available prior information on MEPs’ ideological predilections. Specifically, I use the prior
9It is possible to make the less restrictive assumption var(ηij − νij) = σ2j here but a strict common error
variance assumption greatly facilitates estimation of the influence models that I develop below.
10I treat abstentions as missing values in this analysis.
11This parameterization of the statistical roll call voting model differs from the standard approach in
Clinton, Jackman & Rivers (2004) and instead follows Bafumi, Gelman, Park & Kaplan (2004). I use this
parameterization because it makes it easy to work with vote cut-points, greatly simplifying certain aspects
of the analysis and exposition.
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specification
pcan(x,β,κ) = p(x)p(β)p(κ)
=
n∏
i
ND(µxi ,Σx)
m∏
j
ND(0, σ2βjID)
m∏
j
ND(0, σ2κjID) (3.5)
where I assume that σ2βj and σ
2
κj
are known a priori but
µ′xi = Λci (3.6)
and
Σx ∼ W−1K
(
υ, σ2xIK
)
(3.7)
where ci is a k × 1 vector of covariates describing MEP i and each Λ is a D × k matrix of
coefficients mapping MEP characteristics into D-dimensional ideal point space. To complete
the specification, I use a simple conjugate hyper-prior for the hierarchical coefficient matrix.
Specifically, I assume
Λ ∼ N (0, σ2ΛIk), (3.8)
where σ2Λ is known a priori.
Thus, I adopt traditional uninformative conjugate priors for the bill parameters. On
the other hand, I use an informative prior for the ideal point vectors. Specifically, I bring
additional data to the table, modeling each MEP’s prior ideal point distribution in terms
of observable covariates. We have a lot of information about MEPs beyond their voting
behavior that can help tell us identify their ideological preferences. Notably, Hooghe, Bakker,
Brigevich, de Vries, Edwards, Marks, Rovny & Steenbergen (2008) conducted a survey that
asked experts on European party systems to provide quantitative ratings of the ideological
positions of national parties across a variety of ideological dimensions in 2006, right in the
middle of the sixth EP term. While we lack expert judgements about the ideologies of
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individual MEPs, we should expect that MEPs’ own ideologies will covary closely with those
of the national parties as a whole. Furthermore, because each national party delegation is
reasonably small, these rating vary substantially across the population of MEPs. Therefore,
each ci in equation 3.6 holds the vector of ideology scores describing MEP i’s party in
Hooghe et al.’s (2008) expert survey. Specifically, experts provided ratings of national party
viewpoints on the role of government in the economy, their ideological stances on social
issues and civil liberties, and their general positions on European integration.12
Building expert ideology ratings into the prior specification of the statistical roll call
voting model serves a variety of purposes. First of all, it provides a data-driven approach
to identifying the model. Traditional identification techniques require the modeler to make
strong assumptions about the ideal points of individual MEPs or the manner in which
individual roll call votes cut across the ideological spectrum. Especially when dealing with
multi-dimensional issue spaces, it can be difficult to select spike priors that identify the model
in the first place. Furthermore, even when identification seems to have been achieved, poor
choices by the analyst can skew results considerably. In contrast, the data-driven approach
effectively identifies the space without undue interference by the researcher.
Moreover, the hierarchical modeling approach that I adopt here enhances our under-
standing of ideological picture painted by the model. We commonly ascribe meaningful
12Raters placed each party on a scale from 0 to 10 on the first two dimensions. The economy ratings
ranged from “extreme left” to “extreme right” where “. . . [p]arties on the economic left want government
to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role
for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare
state.” The social issue scores again range from “extreme left” to “extreme right” where parties on the
left “. . . favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex
marriage, or greater democratic participation,” while right parties “. . . often reject these ideas; they value
order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social
and cultural issues.” Finally, experts scored each party’s position on European integration from 1 to 7 where
parties with a score of 1 were “strongly opposed” and parties given a 7 were “strong in favor” European
integration in 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2008, pp. 9–10). The survey also asked experts to score the party ideology
on much finer-grained dimensions, coding attitudes towards the internal European market, redistribution,
multiculturalism, and EU foreign policy, to name only a few issues. Using these scores generates results
that are quite similar to those produced by a model incorporating only the broad ideological ratings, but
high multicollinearity between the fine-grained scores makes interpretation difficult. Therefore, I focus my
attention on the broad issue categories.
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descriptions to the issue dimensions that statistical roll call voting models spit out. For ex-
ample, in the EP literature, researchers often argue that the dominant dimension produced
by various scaling techniques captures the traditional left-right political divide, and main-
tain that the second-most-dominant dimension describes MEPs’ positions on the breadth and
depth of European integration (Hix, Noury & Roland 2006, Hix, Noury & Roland 2007). Of
course, researchers make these judgements by extrapolating from the pattern of MEP ideal
points implied by the model, using their own knowledge of MEPs’ ideological orientations
to tell a post-hoc story about the model’s output. Using prior expert ratings of MEPs’ gen-
eral ideological leanings allows for a more scientific approach to ideal point interpretation.
Indeed, after estimation, Λ describes the relationship between each ideological dimension
rated by the experts in Hooghe et al.’s (2008) survey and the dimensions produced by the
model. In other words, we can use Λ to see whether MEPs’ positions on the dominant
dimension produced by the statistical voting model are consistent with their parties’ stances
on the traditional left-right divide. Similarly, the prior specification allows us to examine the
relationship between MEP’s parties’ viewpoints on European integration and their voting
behavior. Furthermore, the estimated variance-covariance matrix for the hierarchical prior,
Σx, describes the extent to which the theoretical concepts measured by each ci account for
variation in MEPs’ estimated ideal points. Therefore, as I will demonstrate below, we can
use the hierarchical approach to link the atheoretical output of the statistical roll call voting
model to explicit ideological concepts.
Finally, incorporating additional information about MEPs into the prior specification
improves the efficiency of the statistical model, reducing the error in estimated ideal points.
Additionally, the model demonstrates how to combine two forms of information about MEP
ideology—subjective expert ratings and objective information about voting behavior—into
a single measure of legislator ideology.
Figure 3.1 presents the results of fitting the canonical model to EP voting data13 from
13I describe the data in more detail, below.
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Figure 3.1: MEP ideal points, as estimated by the canonical model.
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Table 3.1: Explaining the dimensions of EP issue space.
Left-Right Integration
Intercept -1.37 (0.08)* 1.48 (0.10)*
Economy 0.26 (0.01)* 0.04 (0.01)*
Social 0.13 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)
Integration 0.12 (0.01)* 0.34 (0.02)*
Parenthetical values are posterior standard de-
viations and the stars indicate 95% HPD inter-
vals exclude zero.
the 6th term, displaying MEP ideal point estimates for a 2-dimensional model, and painting
a picture of EP ideology that is largely in tune with previous research. I have labeled
the horizontal dimension “left-right” and the vertical dimension ”integration,” in keeping
with standard custom in EU studies (Hix, Noury & Roland 2007), but the results of the
hierarchical model indicate that these terms only partially capture the true meaning of
these dimensions. Table 3.1 displays the Λ estimates generated by the fitted model, showing
how expert ratings of MEPs’ national party ideologies map into the estimated issue space.
The results show that the left-right dimension does, indeed, tap strongly into left-right
preferences and both the coefficients for attitudes towards the economy and social policy
are statistically significant. Note, furthermore, that economic considerations play a stronger
role in this dimension than do social values—the difference between the economy and social
coefficients is statistically significant. This makes sense; the EP has less influence over
European social policy than it does economic policy and recorded votes are likely to reflect
this aspect of the agenda. On the other hand, integration ideology is also significantly related
to this dimension and one cannot distinguish between the magnitude of this relationship and
the degree of covariance between expert ratings of ideology on social issues and ideal points
on this axis. Therefore, because this primary dimension of conflict in the EP corresponds
to aspects of both left-right ideology and preferences over European integration, we should
take care when interpreting its meaning.
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Turning to the second dimension, table 3.1 shows that it is largely related to parties’
attitudes towards European integration. While the coefficient for economy is also statistically
significant, the integration coefficient is 8.5 times its size. Thus, we can be quite confident
when treating this dimension as a measure of MEP’s attitudes towards European integration,
assuming we trust the expert ratings upon which this conclusion is based. Interestingly, the
model estimates Σx =
 0.39 −0.05
−0.05 0.60
, indicating that expert ratings explain more of the
variance on the first dimension than they do the second, and this difference is statistically
significant. Therefore, we may wish to turn to other sources of prior information to help us
understand what the “integration” dimension really captures.
3.2.2 A Baseline Commission Influence Model
I next extend this model by allowing Commission opinions to influence MEPs’ preferences
through a modification of their utility functions. Specifically, I extend equations 3.1 and 3.2
by assuming that legislator i obtains utility
Ui(ζj) = −||xi − ζj||2 + aj · δaai − rj · δrai + ηij (3.9)
from voting yea on j, and
Ui(ψj) = −||xi −ψj||2 − aj · δari + rj · δrri + νij (3.10)
from voting to reject the tabled measure. Here, aj (rj) is an indicator variable that equals
one when the Commission accepts (rejects) the “Yea” position on vote j and equals zero
otherwise,14 δaai (δ
ra
i ) is the utility that MEP i stands to gain (lose) from voting yes on
14Note that aj = rj = 0 on votes, such as votes on amendments to resolutions or own-initiative reports,
where the Commission does not lodge an opinion. I currently assume that the Commission cannot simul-
taneously accept and reject an amendment, although this coding might make sense for partially accepted
motions. For the moment, I leave this extension to future research.
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a measure that the Commission supports (rejects), and δari (δ
rr
i ) represents the utility loss
(gain) to MEP i from voting against when the Commission counseled acceptance (rejection).
This modified utility function leads directly to the following equation for the probability that
MEP i casts a yea vote on measure j:
Pbin(Yij = 1) = Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj · δai − rj · δri ) (3.11)
where βj =
2(ζj−ψj)
σj
, κj =
ψj+ζj
2
, δai =
δaai +δ
ar
i
σ
, and δri =
δrai +δ
rr
i
σ
.
In equation 3.11, δa (δr) is a vector of MEP-specific fixed effects, capturing each leg-
islator’s propensity to follow the Commission’s recommendation to vote for (against) an
amendment, above and beyond her ideological affinity for the measure.15 Therefore, a pos-
itive (negative) value for δai (δ
r
i ) indicates that MEP i derives positive utility from voting
for an amendment that the Commission accepts (rejects) after taking MEP i’s proximity
to the “Yea” and “Nay” positions for vote j into account. Note that this functional form
allows MEPs to be responsive to either positive opinions, negative opinions, or both.16 The
fixed effects are identified by the fact that the Commission provides no opinion on a large
proportion of votes. Thus, even when susceptibility to influence and ideology are correlated,
the influence-free votes allow the model to separate the two effects.17
15Note that I am using “ideological affinity” as convenient short-hand here and do not claim that ideal
points estimated by this model are “pure” measures of ideology. A host of other factors, including national
party and parliamentary party group pressure will influence MEPs’ estimated ideal points.
16One might reasonably simplify the model by adopting the restriction δa = −δr, yielding a single
Commission-influence term for each MEP. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that MEPs might react
differently to positive and negative Commission opinions. For one thing, negative opinions by the Com-
mission limit the ability of the Council to accept EP amendments under qualified majority—as opposed
to unanimity rule—generating a clear qualitative difference in the institutional impact of the two types of
opinions.
17I ran a number of simulations to check the model’s ability to identify parameters effectively. Specifically,
I first simulated roll call matrices from the assumed data generating process described by equation 3.11,
drawing parameters from their prior distributions, and attributing influential opinions to half of the simulated
votes, and verified the model’s ability to recover parameter values. Next, I replicated the process, but
attributed an ideal point to the opinion-giver, and simulated opinions, based on that ideal point, from
equation 3.3. Furthermore, I held the true fixed influence effects of the simulated legislators to zero. Thus,
in this second simulated dataset, the correlation between vote choices and opinions was purely a function
of ideological congruence between the voters and opinion-giver. The model did a good job of recovering
parameters when applied to this dataset and did not erroneously attribute influence to the opinion-giver,
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Comparing equation 3.11 to 3.3 we can see that the canonical model is nested within
the baseline influence model. That is, the canonical model is a special case of the baseline
influence model where δa = δr = 0. Therefore, this model provides for a straightforward
test of the proposition that MEP votes and Commission opinions covary for reasons beyond
simple ideological congruence: statistically significant estimates of values in the δa and δr
vectors would indicate that the relationship between MEP voting behavior and Commission
opinion hinges on factors not considered by the canonical spatial voting model. Furthermore,
one can use these estimates to see who behaves in such an extra-spatial manner. Note finally,
that while many MEPs will tend to vote with Commission to a greater extent than purely
spatial factors would predict, other MEPs will tend to deviate from the Commission’s opinion
in a similar manner, and this model provides a window into both behaviors.
Multiplying across MEPs and votes yields the likelihood function for the baseline influ-
ence model,
L(θbin|Y, a, r) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj · δai − rj · δri )Yij
× [1− Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj · δai − rj · δri )]1−Yij ,
(3.12)
where θbin = {x,β,κ, δa, δr}. To complete the model, I again specify hierarchical priors for
the ideal points and independent, conjugate prior distributions for all other model parame-
ters:
pbin(x,β,κ, δ
a, δr) = pcan(x,β,κ)p(δ
a)p(δr)
= pcan(x,β,κ)
n∏
i
N (µδai , σ2δai )
n∏
i
N (µδri , σ2δri ). (3.13)
consistently generating δa and δr estimates with confidence intervals spanning zero.
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3.2.3 A Conditional Commission Influence Model
The baseline influence model provides a window into the extra-spatial voting behavior of
MEPs and allows one to identify the extent to which individual MEPs vote for or against the
Commission’s wishes in an extra-spatial manner. While useful, this model is a poor tool for
examining broad trends in MEPs’ non-spatial tendencies towards voting with (or against) the
Commission or for summarizing the circumstances under which extra-spatial (in)congruence
occurs. The baseline influence model can only tell us what each MEP’s average extra-spatial
tendency is, shedding little light on what drives MEPs’ behavior. To better understand
what modulates the relationship between Commission opinions and MEP votes I extend the
baseline model, developing a conditional influence model that lets one examine the role that
arbitrary covariates play in this process. While the baseline influence model provided only
for idiosyncratic Commission opinion-following tendencies among MEPs, the conditional
approach allows one to model how MEPs with shared characteristics, or legislators facing
similar circumstances, behave similarly to one another with respect to Commission opinions.
Specifically, I further extend the baseline model by assuming that legislator i obtains utility
Ui(ζj) = −||xi − ζj||2 + aj(δaai + γaazij)− rj(δrai + γrazij) + ηij (3.14)
when voting for measure j and expects utility
Ui(ψj) = −||xi −ψj||2 − aj(δari + γarzij) + rj(δrri + γrrzij) + νij (3.15)
when voting against j. This utility specification implies the following equation for the
probability that MEP i voters in favor of measure j:
Pcin(Yij = 1) = Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj(δai + γazij)− rj(δri + γrzij)) (3.16)
where βj =
2(ζj−ψj)
σ
, κj =
ψj+ζj
2
, δai =
δaai +δ
ar
i
σ
, δri =
δrai +δ
rr
i
σ
, γa = γ
aa+γar
σ
, and γr = γ
ra+γrr
σ
.
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Thus, as in the baseline influence model, the probability that a MEP votes yes on a
given vote is a function of spatial considerations and the Commission’s opinion, as indicated
by aj and rj. But while the baseline model allowed only for an idiosyncratic sensitivity to
the Commission’s opinion, the conditional influence model allows MEPs to share a general
responsiveness to Commission recommendations, as a function of a vector of l covariates, zij,
in addition to their individual, idiosyncratic, responses to opinion, δai and δ
r
i . This shared
responsiveness is captured by the coefficient vectors γa and γr.
For example, one might hypothesize that MEPs are more likely to vote in line with
opinions lodged by commissioners who hail from their own national parties than they are to
support Commission opinions in issue areas under the purview of commissioners from other
parties, or countries. In this case, each zij would be a simple scalar dummy variable, coded
one if MEP i and the commissioner responsible for the bill considered during vote j belong
to the same party, and zero otherwise. In turn, a positive (negative) estimate for the single
coefficient γa (γr) would be consistent with the above hypothesis, while a zero or negative
(positive) estimate would not be.
As in the baseline model, I allow for differential responses to positive and negative Com-
mission opinions. Thus, when aj = 1 (this implies rj = 0, of course), the probability that
MEP i votes in the affirmative is Φ(βj(xi − κj) + δai + γazij). On the other hand, when
the Commission voices a negative opinion on an amendment, the probability that the MEP
votes yes is Φ(βj(xi − κj)− δri − γrzij). And, of course, when the Commission provides no
opinion (aj = rj = 0), MEP i’s behavior is purely a function of spatial considerations and
she votes yes with probability Φ(βj(xi − κj)).
Again, multiplying across MEPs and votes generates the likelihood function for the con-
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ditional influence model,
L(θcin|Y, a, r,Z) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj(δai + γazij)− rj(δri + γrzij))Yij
× [1− Φ (βj(xi − κj) + aj(δai + γazij)− rj(δri + γrzij))]1−Yij ,
(3.17)
where θcin = {x,β,κ, δa, δr,γa,γr}. Finally, I adopt a prior specification that resembles
that of the baseline commission influence model with the addition of improper priors on the
regression parameters.18 Therefore,
pcin(x,β, δ
a, δr,γa,γr) ∝ pbin(x,β, δa, δr). (3.18)
I estimated all of the models described here using Gibbs sampling, simulating draws from the
conditional posterior distributions of model parameters. Appendix B provides estimation
details.
The applicability of these models—and their ability to identify the effects of external
pressure—hinges on the availability of votes that are not colored by external influence that
interests the analyst. The EP provides an excellent arena in which to apply such tools be-
cause it considers both legislative measures—which are subject to the pressures of bicameral
lawmaking, and on which the Commission renders explicit verdicts—and non-legislative res-
olutions and initiatives that have no binding legal ramifications. Indeed, the Parliament still
spends the bulk of its voting time considering such non-legislative questions. These votes
have no purpose beyond position-taking and allow MEPs to wave their ideological flags with-
out worrying about the practical constraints of lawmaking in the EU. Therefore, they make
an excellent set of control votes, and can help researchers to disentangle MEPs’ ideological
18I have little a priori information about the regression parameters in the context in which I apply this
model. Therefore, improper priors provide a reasonable way to incorporate my lack of prior information into
the model. Another approach that would yield similar results would be to adopt vague conjugate normal
priors for the regression parameters. Given more specific prior information, adopting conjugate priors, or
even a hierarchical prior structure could prove useful.
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voting motivations from strategic their ones. Of course, political parties value consistency
in their members and may apply pressure on both sorts of votes. Thus, I do not claim that
MEPs vote in a manner on non-legislative proposals that perfectly reveals their ideological
proclivities. I argue only that, because the Commission renders no explicit verdicts on these
votes, and because MEPs do not need to worry about potential bicameral bargaining costs
when voting on such measures, they represent a useful tool for gaining leverage on questions
of external influence over legislative voting in the EP.19
3.3 Data
Using the Parliament’s online archive (European Parliament 2009a), I collected vote data
from the 6th EP, covering a period from the beginning of the term in July 2004 through May
2008. The Parliament voted 18,493 times over this period but only recorded 4086 of these
votes. I included only votes on codecision amendments and votes regarding own-initiative
reports and EP resolutions—both roll calls on amendments and final votes—in the dataset.20
The Commission lodges opinions only on amendments to Union legislation. Therefore, the
codecision amendments are “treated” observations, where Commission opinions have the
potential to influence MEP voting, while the votes on the initiatives and non-legislative
resolutions serve as a “control” group where Commission opinions can play no role in MEPs’
voting decisions.
I augmented the core voting data by collecting Commission opinions on individual code-
19Of course, all observational studies are imperfect and one can think of ways in which the natural experi-
ment that I describe here could be compromised. For instance, MEPs may use non-legislative resolutions to
signal their intentions on legislative issues, potentially contaminating the results presented here. MEPs may
also know how the Commission feels about particular measures, even when they do not officially lodge an
opinion. Nonetheless, the strategic situation facing MEPs differs drastically across these two types of votes
implying that they should provide significant leverage over my question of interest.
20I general, I dropped final codecision votes from the dataset because the Commission’s position to-
wards such votes—while not officially specified—is a function of their positions on related amendments.
Nonetheless, I included final votes when the Parliament voted on an unaltered Commission proposal as the
Commission implicitly supported the text in question. I did not include votes on legislation considered under
any other procedure, such as consultation, in the dataset.
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cision amendments from multiple sources. In many cases, the Commission’s opinions on
amendments are listed at the end of the transcripts of EP plenary debates available from
the online archive; where possible I transcribed Commission opinions from this source. Ad-
ditionally, I consulted PreLex (European Commission 2009), the EU’s legislative database,
and extracted Commission opinions on amendments from the documents describing the
Commission’s first and second-reading positions on EP’s proposals. In many cases, I was
able to obtain opinions from both sources. While discrepancies were extremely rare, I used
the debate transcripts when the two sources disagreed, because debates clearly reflect the
Commission’s opinion prior to the Parliament’s vote. When the debate transcript did not
clearly indicate the Commission’s attitude towards all of the Parliament’s amendments, I
relied on the positions published in PreLex.21 I dropped codecision votes for which I could
not find opinion information from the dataset, leaving 572 codecision amendments and sin-
gle votes available for analysis, along with 2879 initiative and resolutions in the “control
group.” Where possible, I also collected information on Council positions from PreLex.
Specifically, when the Parliament amended the Commission’s proposal on first readings, I
recorded which of the Parliament’s amendments the Council included in the Common posi-
tion. That is, while there is no way to observe Council opinions on tabled amendments that
the majority of the Parliament rejects, one may nonetheless record the Council’s opinion on
passing amendments. I recorded Council positions on 133 of the 547 codecision votes.22
I gathered information about individual MEPs—their EP group and national party affilia-
tions and parliamentary committee memberships—from the EP’s MEP database (European
Parliament 2009c), and retrieved data on MEPs’ national parties—notably their partici-
21The College of Commissioners is responsible for deciding Commission opinions, and vote internally
when making their decisions. Individual Commissioners do not have the ability to alter the Commission’s
opinions on their own. Thus, while it is technically possible for the Commission to “change its mind” on
an amendment after the Parliament’s vote, such switches are rare in practice, because of the bureaucratic
difficulties involved.
22Admittedly, this is a very restrictive window on Council opinions towards Parliamentary amendments.
Clearly, selecting only passing amendments has the potential to bias conclusions drawn from these positions.
Nonetheless, they can be helpful when one wishes to separate Commission influence over Parliamentary
voting from Parliament’s expectations about the Council’s response to its proposals.
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pation in national government—from the European Journal of Political Research’s yearly
country reports. Furthermore, I collected bill information from the Parliament’s Legislative
Observatory (European Parliament 2009b), including the bill’s procedure, the committee
responsible for the bill, and the identity of the bill’s rapporteur.
3.4 Influence or Agreement?
So, do MEPs alter their votes in a manner that varies systematically with Commission opin-
ions, or is the correlation between the Commission’s recommendations and voting outcomes
simply an artifact of ideological congruence? To answer this question, I fit the baseline com-
mission influence model to a dataset containing 540 of the 547 votes for which commission
opinions are available and a random sample of 540 of the 2879 roll calls on EP resolutions
and own initiative reports.23
The model indicates that a substantial number of MEPs alter their voting behavior
systematically when a Commission opinion is available. Table 3.2 displays the number of
MEPs that experience statistically significant changes in voting behavior, on average, when
considering measures on which the Commission has rendered an opinion. As the table
shows, around 39 per cent of MEPs tend to vote in a manner that is inconsistent with the
way in which they vote on non-legislative issues when the Commission indicates support for
a proposal. In other words, the 95 per cent highest posterior density (HPD) intervals around
the estimated δa parameters exclude zero for 344 MEPs. Of these 344, 267—or about 78
per cent—are more likely to vote for proposals graced with Commission approval than their
ideal point estimates would suggest. On the other hand, 77 MEPs are more likely to vote
23I restricted analysis to votes that were at least somewhat contested, in the sense that at least 25 MEPs
voted for each alternative, losing 7 codecision votes in the process. Furthermore, I dropped MEPs who
participated in less than 100 total votes from the analysis, leaving 893 of the 905 MEPs for whom at least
one vote was recorded. Finally, I replicated the analysis with the entire set of 2879 non-codecision votes,
yielding similar results. I use the results from the sample here for comparability with later results. Fitting
these models takes a lot of time, especially as the number of votes grows, and it was impractical to use the
entire dataset to fit all the variety of model specifications that I explored when conducting this research.
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Table 3.2: How MEPs react to Commission opinions.
Commission Opinion
Accept Reject
MEP Bias
+ 267 144
− 77 237
Total MEPs: 893
against a measure that has been approved by the Commission. Similarly, the estimates
for δr show that around 43 per cent of MEPs alter their behavior when deciding whether
or not to support a measure that the Commission has rejected. Again, more MEPs are
biased in the direction of the Commission recommendation than against it, yet a substantial
number of MEPs—about 38 per cent of those displaying statistically significant responses
to negative Commission opinions—actually tend to support proposals that they would not
otherwise favor in the face of Commission opposition. Interestingly, of the 344 MEPs that
change their behavior in a statistically significant manner when voting on measures towards
which the Commission is positive, and the 381 MEPs that likewise alter their behavior on
proposals that the Commission dislikes, only 144 overlap. Therefore, there are 437 MEPs
that are strongly moved only by one type of opinion, and a total of 581 MEPs—or about 65
per cent—change their behavior in some way when voting in the shadow of a Commission
verdict. Moreover, this lack of overlap in behavior across opinion types implies that different
processes may drive MEP responses across positive and negative recommendations.
These findings provide telling evidence for an extra-ideological relationship between Com-
mission recommendations and voting behavior in the EP. That is, one cannot simply explain
the correlations between MEP voting choices and Commission recommendations in terms of
ideological congruence. The relationship between MEP behavior and Commission opinions
is not epiphenomenal; if MEPs voted the same way on codecision amendments that they do
on non-legislative issues then the estimated δ parameters would not significantly differ from
zero. Furthermore, the process that drives Commission opinion formation is systematically
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related to strategic voting by MEPs on codecision amendments. Nonetheless, these findings
do not tell us much about what drives the relationship between Commission opinions and
MEP voting, nor do they establish that the Commission is influential, in and of itself. For
example, the Commission’s opinions might just reflect what the Parliament already knows
about the Council, rather than providing new information, or otherwise directly influencing
MEP votes. In what follows I delve deeper into these questions, examining who follows—and
who rejects—Commission recommendations, and under what circumstances they do so.
3.5 Who Listens to the Commission?
Table 3.2 shows that a substantial number of MEPs vote differently when the Commission
voices an opinion than when it does not. Raw counts tell us that Commission opinions
matter, but they do not tell us much else. In section 3.1 I argued that MEPs from larger
groups, and especially those in government would be more likely to modulate their voting
behavior in the face of bicameral pressures than small, non-governing parties, especially
those with fringe or eurosceptic policy stances. Indeed, I noted that eurosceptic partisans
might even reject the mainstream positions advocated by the Commission just to say they
did. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display 95% HPD intervals for estimated δa and δr parameters
for MEPs hailing from Germany (DE), France (FR), the United Kingdom (GB), and Spain
(ES). Colors indicate national party membership and the scales are normalized across figures
so that positive values indicate a bias towards voting in favor in both figures.24
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 provide mixed evidence with respect to my hypotheses; MEPs be-
have largely as expected on rejections but their responses to positive opinions are somewhat
surprising. In Germany, the CDU/CSU and SPD sat in a grand coalition—with the CDU
holding the Chancellor’s office—for the bulk of the EP’s 6th term, yet MEP reactions to
commission opinions differed across governing parties. On acceptances the CDU and CSU
24That is, positive values show that a MEP tends to vote with the commission in figure 3.2, and against
it in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: MEP δa values for four countries, 95% HPD intervals.
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Figure 3.3: MEP δr values for four countries, 95% HPD intervals.
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sat largely unmoved (their HPD intervals span zero) while the SPD MEPs reacted with fa-
vor to Commission endorsements. Surprisingly, members of Germany’s left-leaning parties,
the Greens and Die Linke, also tended to vote for amendments supported by the Commis-
sion, while the liberal FDP generally opposed accepted amendments at a higher rate than
their non-codecision voting tendencies would predict. On the other hand, when the Com-
mission rejected amendments, the CDU and CSU MEPs were swayed by their arguments,
the SPD and FDP were largely unmoved, and members of the smaller fringe parties actu-
ally supported such amendments at greater than expected rates. During this period the
Commission, Council, and Parliament were generally dominated by center-right majorities.
Therefore, German reactions to negative recommendations are largely in line with my expec-
tations. The in-government CDU and CSU appear willing to compromise when instructed
by the Commission. The SPD, in government, but not at the head of the government nor
particularly ideologically disposed towards compromise with the Council, is ambivalent, and
smaller fringe parties with little stake in compromise tend to vote against the Commission’s
recommendation, engaging in “anti-government” voting even when their ideological convic-
tions might guide them in the other direction. On the other hand, when the Commission
accepted an amendment the pattern is less clear.
In France, only the Greens (V) show statistically significant tendencies to react to Com-
mission endorsements; again it seems that fringe parties support amendments, to a greater
extent than they otherwise would, when the Commission does. As was the case in Germany,
French reactions to Commission rejections are in line with my expectations. The UMP
controlled the government for the entire observation period and it is the only party with
members that go out of their way to follow the Commission’s recommendation to reject.
Fringe parties—the National Front (FN), the Communists (PCF), and the Greens (V)—all
appear to be fond of protest votes. Interestingly, the out-of-government, but sizeable So-
cialist party (PS), also tends to go against the grain on negative opinions, although many
Socialist MEPs’ opinion effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. As we might
88
expect, the large, governing and center-right UMP moderates its position in a manner that
is consistent with the avoidance of protracted inter-institutional bargaining. On the other
hand, the Socialists, while large, are firmly in opposition and appear moderately inclined
towards protest voting.
In the United Kingdom, parties are again largely impervious to positive opinions, al-
though the MEPs from especially small parties do exhibit positive biases. Strangely, UK
Independence Party MEPs (UKIP) seem to strongly oppose Commission-supported amend-
ments, but as figure 3.3 shows, they also dislike amendments that the Commission rejects.25
British MEPs’ reactions to negative opinions are reasonably well-aligned with expectations,
although government-opposition dynamics do not appear to play a key role in this case. In-
deed, while Labor held Downing Street for the entire observation period, the Conservatives
were more likely to moderate their voting behavior in the Commission’s preferred direc-
tion than Labour MEPs, who, while slightly tending to follow the Commission line, largely
walked to the beat of their own drum. Indeed, the fact that the out-of-government Conser-
vatives clearly join their ideologically right-leaning peers in the CDU and UMP in following
rejections, while governing, but center-left Labour, does not, may indicate that the ability
to stomach compromise trumps the drive to get legislation done in MEPs’ voting calculus.
On the other hand, Spanish MEPs behave in a manner that supports the hypothesis
that governing parties will seek compromise because they are responsible for results. Indeed,
while few Spanish MEPs change their voting behavior in the light of positive Commission
opinions, it is the governing Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) that follows Commission rec-
ommendations to reject, while a few fringe MEPs from the United Left (UL) and Europa de
los Pueblos (EP)—a coalition of left-wing regional parties—engage in protest votes. Perhaps
the differences between Labour and PSOE reactions to Commission opinions are explained
by variation in attitudes towards Europe in Britain and Spain, with eurosceptic Brits less
25As far as I can tell, the UKIP just likes to vote no on codecision roll calls, regardless of the content of
the proposal under consideration.
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Table 3.3: Who follows the Commission?
δa δr
Intercept 0.186 (0.044)* -0.016 (0.034)√
Votes in Govt. 0.001 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002)*
LR Ideal -0.037 (0.028) -0.161 (0.036)*
Integration Ideal 0.007 (0.039) -0.100 (0.026)*
R2 0.011 0.298
Parenthetical values are posterior standard deviations and
the stars indicate 95% HPD intervals exclude zero. While
the coefficients incorporate estimation uncertainty using the
method of composition, the R2 values are based on simple
regressions using posterior means.
concerned about their government’s role in the speedy production of European legislation
than their Spanish counterparts.26
These four countries paint a picture that is, largely, representative of behavior of MEPs
from across the Union. Table 3.3 summarizes these patterns for all MEPs and provides a
more formal test of a number of the arguments that I made in section 3.1. Specifically, table
3.3 presents the results of two linear models in which I regress MEPs’ estimated extra-spatial
responses to Commission opinions (their δs) on an indicator of governing status—the square
root27 of the number of codecision votes during which the given MEP’s party held a port-
folio in national government—and MEPs’ estimated ideal points.28 I argued that belonging
to a party in government would compel MEPs to take intercameral bargaining costs into
account when making codecision voting decisions. Conversely, opposition parties hold little
responsibility for passing legislation quickly and thus are more free to vote their preferences.
Therefore, MEPs from governing parties should be more willing to vote against their ideo-
logical tendencies on codecision measures than opposition legislators. Nonetheless, ideology
26Unfortunately, my data do not speak to this question and many other explanations exist. Nonetheless,
this difference is intriguing and perhaps worth further examination.
27I use the square root transformation because these are counts. Results are robust to transformation.
28Both the response variable and some of the explanatory variables in these regressions are estimated
parameters themselves. I use the method of composition (see e.g. Tanner 1993, pp. 30) to propagate
measurement error in these parameter estimates to the regression estimates.
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should temper this dynamic because, while MEPs may be willing to make compromises to
make sure legislation passes smoothly, there will be a limit to how far legislators will be will-
ing to go. In the context of the 6th EP, given the Council’s largely center-right composition,
this means that left-wing MEPs should be less willing to modulate their voting than legisla-
tors on the right. And, indeed, the results in table 3.3 are consistent with these arguments,
at least with respect to negative Commission opinions. As the second column of the table
shows, government MEPs—and MEPs on the right—vote in concert with the Commission,
even at the cost of their own preferences, to a degree that is statistically significant.
Interestingly, integration ideology also predicts MEPs’ tendencies to vote with the Com-
mission, and MEPs that are more supportive of European integration reject amendments
that the Commission does. This finding is somewhat surprising because MEPs tend to
support integration to a greater degree than ministers in the Council, even when they hail
from the same parties. For instance, as figure 3.1 shows, MEPs from the large Christian
and Social Democratic groups stand strongly on the side of integration, something that may
not be true of their counterparts at home. We would not expect compromises with the
Council to favor integration-oriented MEPs over eurosceptics. Therefore, this result is not
particularly consistent with the compromise hypothesis. On the other hand, the finding
is weakly consistent with the argument that the Commission communicates best with the
Parliament in situations where their preferences coincide. Being a European institution, the
Commission is often thought to back integration to a greater degree than the Council and
pro-integration MEPs may, therefore, be more willing to follow Commission arguments than
other legislators.
Table 3.3 also conclusively demonstrates that the relationship between government sta-
tus, ideology, and MEPs’ willingness to pay intercameral bargaining costs cannot explain
legislators’ behavior when the Commission supports amendments. Indeed, none of the fac-
tors considered in the regressions correlate significantly with MEPs’ δa estimates. Clearly,
the mechanisms underlying MEP responses to positive and negative acceptances differ, as
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figures 3.2 and 3.3 also imply. Indeed, the R2 values in table 3.3 indicate that the three ex-
planatory variables explain almost a third of the variance in MEP behavior on amendments
the Commission dislikes but virtually none of the variance in reactions to Commission ap-
proval. One possible explanation is that Commission acceptances are better conceptualized
as non-rejections, rather than as actual endorsements. The Commission’s institutional power
in codecision stems from the fact that its rejections force the Council to act unanimously.
Passing an amendment that the Commission dislikes, the Parliament runs a real risk of bar-
gaining delay because the Council may find it difficult to construct unanimous support for
a version of the bill that incorporates the tainted measure. Therefore, the results strongly
support the idea that the Commission wields influence in codecision—perhaps substantial
influence—simply because of its control over voting procedures in the Council. Importantly,
this implies that the content of Commission opinions matters and that the relationship be-
tween recommendations and MEPs’ votes is not driven entirely by what legislators already
know about the Council’s likelihood of accepting particular amendments.
3.6 Influence or Reflection?
This last result provides some evidence that the Commission is influential, in and of itself, but
we can do better. Specifically, the conditional Commission influence model provides a tool
with which to control for the possibility that Commission opinions influence the Parliament’s
behavior only because they mirror what the Parliament already knows about the Council. To
this end, I fit the conditional model to a reduced dataset, containing the same non-legislative
votes as the data that I used above, but holding only those codecision votes for which I was
able to collect Council opinions. While this sample suffers from obvious selection issues, it
provides a useful testbed for examining how dependent Commission influence is on Council
preferences. When fitting the conditional model to these data I include a single covariate in
Z, indicating the Council’s eventual decision—positive or negative—on the amendment in
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Table 3.4: Variance in Commission-Council verdicts.
Commission Opinion
Accept Reject
Council Decision
Adopt 42 16
Reject 23 52
question. Table 3.4 summarizes the variation in these data; note that we observe cases in
all four cells, although Commission-Council agreement is clearly the norm.
The conditional model provides evidence that the Commission is, indeed, influential.
While the coefficients that the model estimates (γ¯a = 1.16 and γ¯r = −0.99 and both are sta-
tistically significant) indicate that eventual Council decisions explain quite a bit of variation
in the tendency of MEPs to react to Commission opinions, a substantial proportion of MEP
behavior is left unaccounted for. Specifically, the model estimates statistically significant δa
and/or δr parameters for 45 per cent of MEPs. Therefore, MEPs change their voting behav-
ior in the face of Commission arguments to an extent that Council preferences cannot explain
alone. It is difficult to tease out exactly what is driving this result. Nonetheless, the finding
implies—if somewhat tangentially—that the Commission provides MEPs with information
that they do not already have, as I have hypothesized. While the Commission’s institutional
powers may account for a significant degree of its influence, they operate through the behav-
ior of the Council. If MEPs know ahead of time how the Council will behave, they can use
this information to decide when the Commission’s negative opinions will bite. Therefore,
the fact that Council opinions do not explain large components of the relationship between
Commission opinion and MEP vote behavior is consistent with information transmission by
the Commission.
The argument above shows that MEP behavior is consistent with information transmis-
sion by the Council, but it is far from conclusive. One useful aspect of the models that I
introduce here is that they allow one to see how allowing for external influence alters esti-
mates in comparison to the canonical ideal point model. Interestingly, ideal point estimates
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Figure 3.4: Mean cutpoint estimates across models.
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do not change substantially when one fits the baseline influence model to the data. Indeed,
the map of ideal points produced by the expanded model looks just like figure 3.1 and ideal
points correlate across models almost perfectly. This is not surprising because the influence
model relies on non-legislative votes to identify ideal points, attributing differences in voting
behavior across procedures, not to ideology, but strategic response to outside influence. On
the other hand, the models generate substantially differing pictures of the characteristics of
the codecision votes.29 Figure 3.4 compares mean point estimates of the cutpoints—the κ
matrices—on codecision votes produced by both models. Strikingly, the correlation in point
estimates of cutpoints across models is around 0.06. On the left-right dimension there is
little pattern in the cross-model relationship. Cutpoints estimates are quite uncertain, and
the lack of agreement across specifications may stem simply from the model’s inability to nail
down cutpoints on this dimension. On the integration dimension, on the other hand, there
is a clear pattern to the disagreement. Specifically, the baseline influence model moves cut-
points that the canonical model sees as extreme towards the center of the issue space. What
look like rah-rah votes to the canonical model often appear to the influence model as votes
on controversial proposals where influence swayed MEPs to vote against their ideological
priorities.
Therefore, when influence does occur, it appears to happen with respect to the integra-
tion dimension. This is consistent with mediation by the Commission, as I argued in section
3.1, because mediation is most likely to occur on issues where the Commission and the av-
erage MEP share priorities. Because the Commission’s opinions are mere cheap talk, the
MEPs should trust the Commission’s recommendations when they expect the Commission
to have the pivotal MEP’s interests at heart. While suggestive, this evidence for information
transmission by the Commission is, also, less than conclusive. The Parliament median and
the Council are likely to disagree with one another on integration votes; perhaps this finding
29Bill parameters for non-legislative votes are almost completely identical across the two model fits, as
one would expect.
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is simply a result of MEPs adjusting their voting behavior only when holding to their own
preferences becomes potentially costly. In either case, the result is interesting. And, to-
gether with the finding that Commission opinions influence MEPs even taking the Council’s
preferences into account, the evidence in figure 3.4 lends plausibility to the argument that
the Commission acts as a strategic mediator under codecision. Nonetheless, nailing down
the role of this information transmission mechanism will require further research.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a window into the strategic behavior of MEPs, helping us to better un-
derstand how their institutional context—specifically the pressures of bicameral lawmaking—
influences their voting behavior. I demonstrate that MEPs from governing parties, and who
are ideologically open to compromise with the Council, tailor their votes in a manner that
is consistent with a concern for intercameral bargaining outcomes. Specifically, these leg-
islators vote against proposals that they might otherwise support when such proposals are
likely to cause bargaining delay and impede legislative efficiency. The European Commission
plays a key role in this process, relaying information about Council bargaining positions to
MEPs, and using their wealth of expertise to guide MEPs in their voting choices. While
it is difficult to prove that the Commission selectively reveals Council bargaining strength
to the Parliament, it does appear to influence Parliamentary voting, and its opinions do
no not simply mirror Council preferences. Furthermore, its one institutional power during
the codecision process—beyond its prerogative to introduce legislation—appears to pack a
punch. MEPs who should be concerned with getting laws passed quickly react strongly to
negative Commission recommendations and are loath to support amendments that could
force unanimity within the Council.
The findings demonstrate the importance of considering the wider inter-institutional
bargaining environment when studying the voting behavior of legislators. MEPs approach
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legislation that requires compromise with the Council differently from intra-parliamentary
resolutions and initiatives. Thus, the mechanisms that drive voting behavior differ depend-
ing on the institutional context. Standard techniques for modeling legislative voting, such
as common ideal point estimation models, treat all parliaments equally. This will often
provide us with an inaccurate picture of what drives legislative behavior; we can improve
our comparative understanding of lawmaking by taking key underlying determinants of vote
choice—such as the need to strike intercameral bargains—into account. Furthermore, this
paper highlights the potential that informational advantages give the Commission to influ-
ence the outcome of codecision legislation, notwithstanding the Commission’s complete lack
of veto-power over other actors’ amendments to the Commission’s proposals. Thus, as others
have argued (Rasmussen 2003), the Commission maintains an important role in a procedure
in which the formal rules render it “irrelevant” (Crombez 2001, pp. 101). More gener-
ally, the Commission’s ability to leverage its access to information highlights an important
advantage—information garnered through the control of ministries and through multiple
points of contact with legislating institutions—available to most executive branches of gov-
ernment. Indeed, because the Commission looks a lot like a parliamentary government,
but has a composition that is not a function of the seats in the Parliament, and has no
recourse to such institutional devices as votes of confidence,30 the EU provides an excellent
laboratory within which to examine the role that informational advantages play in allowing
governments to influence legislators’ voting decisions.
Finally, the techniques that I introduce in this paper may travel to a variety of other
contexts. For example, they may help us to explain when Presidential veto threats influence
Congressional voting in the US, or provide a new way to model the role that pressure groups
play in swaying lawmakers’ votes. Nonetheless, the models can be tricky to deploy effectively.
First, the analyst must have access to a set of roll call votes that are not contaminated by the
30Although the Parliament invests the Commission and can remove it from office with a supermajority
vote.
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influence process that she wishes to model, something that will not occur in all circumstances
in which outside influences weigh on legislators. Additionally, researchers using these models
must be able to effectively measure the preferences of the influential actor and directly link
these preferences to individual votes. This can be quite a challenge, and the EU represents
a rare instance where institutional rules require an influential party to officially register its
preferences on legislative votes. Nonetheless, when these barriers are surmountable, the
influence models that I present here represent powerful tools for separating strategy from
preference when analyzing voting behavior.
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Chapter 4
Predicting and Explaining Roll Call
Sponsorship in the European
Parliament with Debate Speech
Recorded votes in parliaments, or roll call votes (RCVs), occupy a key place in the analysis
of legislatures. In democracies, voting is at the heart of lawmaking and patterns of votes can
potentially tell us a great deal about the size and shape of the policy space (see e.g. Poole
& Rosenthal 1985), the roles played by parliamentary parties (see e.g. Rohde 1991, Cox &
McCubbins 1993, Krehbiel 1998, Desposato 2006, Hix, Noury & Roland 2007), how account-
able politicians are to voters and interest groups (see e.g. Carey 2008), and a multitude of
other topics. Furthermore, the use of recorded votes spans the discipline; while roll calls have
long featured in work on the U.S. Congress, researchers have since applied roll call analysis to
legislatures ranging from the Chilean Senate (Londregan 2000) to the European Parliament
(Hix, Noury & Roland 2006) and the United Nations’ General Assembly (Voeten 2000), and
roll call analyses even play key roles in large-scale cross-national studies (Carey 2008).
Nonetheless, scholars have long cautioned against an over-reliance on recorded votes
(Greenstein & Jackson 1963, Arnold 1990) and recent work has highlighted the potential
for selection bias inherent in RCV analysis (Carrubba et al. 2006, Hug 2010). Indeed, only
a subset of votes in many parliaments are recorded (Saalfeld 1995, Hug 2010), and, even
in the U.S., where roll call votes are often treated as ubiquitous, less than 15% of public
statutes are subjected to roll call of any kind, in either the House or Senate (Clinton &
Lapinski 2008). The selection mechanism driving vote recording is unlikely to be random,
and factors such as the issue area examined by the legislation, the salience of the bill, and
parliamentary procedure correlate with RCV requests in both the European Parliament and
U.S Congress (Carrubba et al. 2006, Clinton & Lapinski 2008). Furthermore, the decision
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to call roll is often endogenous—in many parliaments, individual legislators, groups of mem-
bers meeting some minimum threshold, or political parties have the right to request recorded
votes (Saalfeld 1995, Hug 2010)—and the selection processes underlying roll call votes are,
therefore, likely to result from strategic political considerations. For example, political par-
ties may call roll to discipline their members, embarrass opposing political parties, or signal
their policy positions to a variety of audiences (Saalfeld 1995, Thiem 2006, Carrubba, Gabel
& Hug 2008). Thus, there are likely to be interactions between the way legislators vote
on RCVs and the reasons that the votes that we observe were recorded in the first place.
This means that we may draw biased inferences from RCVs not only because they repre-
sent a non-random sample of all votes, but because legislators may change the way they
vote depending on whether the tally is public or not. In fact, Hug (2010) takes advantage
of the Swiss parliament’s decision to keep track of un-publicized, but technically recorded,
votes to demonstrate that Swiss legislators’ voting behavior does indeed change depending
on whether or not they expect their votes to be observed.
Yet, in most parliaments, unrecorded votes are genuinely unrecorded and we lack tools to
evaluate the extent to which legislators’ voting behavior differs across recorded and hidden
votes. One route to solving this problem is theoretical. Because we typically cannot observe
how legislators vote on secret votes, nor how their voting behavior would have changed as
a function of vote publicity, we should carefully consider the likely mechanisms underlying
the interplay between legislative voting behavior and the publication of individuals’ vote
choices. Indeed, modeling the strategic situation that faces parties and legislators with
respect to RCVs provides insight into when we should trust the inferences we draw from roll
call data, and when we should suspect pernicious selection effects. Unfortunately, theoretical
accounts of roll calling are thin on the ground, and this research area is still in infancy
(Carrubba & Gabel 1999, Carrubba, Gabel & Hug 2008, Thiem 2006). Furthermore, it
is difficult to test theories of strategic roll calling for the very same reasons that we need
them in the first place: the key primitive in theories of roll call selection—expected voting
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behavior—is hidden from analysts. While clever research design can overcome this problem
to some extent, we need new tools to explore the similarities and differences between RCVs
and unrecorded votes. Only with new techniques will we be able to test theories of RCV
selection, and use these theories to improve the use of roll call data in empirical analyses.
This challenge poses a difficult problem because the things we typically observe about both
RCVs and unrecorded votes—the identity of the legislator or party that proposed the bill
or amendment, the procedure under which the vote was taken, the issue area with which
the legislation is concerned, and so forth—provide relatively little information about the
factors, such as the ideological content of the alternatives in question, that should drive roll
call selection. For example, Hug (2010) evaluates the ability of a simple Heckman selection
model to correct the bias in cohesion scores generated from Swiss roll-calls and finds the
results somewhat wanting because of the lack of information about the selection process
carried by observable variables.1
To help remedy these problems, I examine the potential that the automated analysis of
legislative text—such as speeches in floor debates on legislation, legislative reports attached
to particular bills, and the text of legislation itself—has to shed light on the circumstances
under which politicians request RCVs. Specifically, I use the text of floor debates to predict
RCV requests on final votes on proposals considered by the European Parliament (EP), a
parliament where recorded votes are not the norm, but where representatives of the party
groups or any group of 40 or more members can request a roll call on any vote. Effective
predictive models of roll calling are a first step on the path towards statistically correcting for
RCV bias, potentially yielding “propensity-to-be-roll-called” estimates for votes that could
underpin the application of Heckman-style selection models or matching techniques to RCV
bias, at least in certain domains. I show that, when naively applied, state-of-the-art machine
learning tools for text classification (Joachims 1998) do a poor job predicting RCV requests
1The peculiarities of the Swiss case—notably, the fact that the Parliament tallies all votes electronically
and saves roll call records for “unrecorded” votes—allow him to observe true cohesion levels.
101
from floor debates. Yet, by using these same tools to model speaker sentiment towards
proposals, and by using information about the distribution of sentiment in a given debate to
model the probability of a recorded vote request, I demonstrate that one can substantially
improve RCV prediction accuracy.
Furthermore, I use the model of speaker sentiment that underpins the RCV prediction
technique to examine the circumstances under which political parties request roll call votes.
The sentiment model predicts the vote choices of speakers in plenary and, therefore, provides
a window into how legislators would cast their votes on a given measure if the voting record
were made public. Thus, the sentiment measure that I derive from the debates provides a
clear proxy for one of the key unobservable quantities in roll-call analysis. Indeed, while we
can observe actual voting behavior only on votes that are subject to roll call, the sentiment
model generates a measure of that behavior that is observable across all final votes, public and
secret. This variable captures patterns in expected public voting behavior across legislators
who speak in plenary and provides researchers with a fine-grained tool with which to examine
RCV requests, greatly improving our inferential potential when compared to blunt measures
of likely preference patterns among legislators, such as bill issue area, procedural features,
and authorship.2 I use this new measure to explore how political parties react to expected
patterns in public voting behavior when deciding whether or not to sponsor roll calls on
particular votes. The analysis demonstrates that European party groups call roll primarily
on salient and divisive issues, and especially to demonstrate their opposition to policies that
they oppose, and for which they are not responsible. As one Danish staff member highlighted
in an interview, party groups often call roll to embarrass their opponents when they take
the “wrong” side of an issue.3 Groups also use roll call votes to show support for their
own members’ reports and rarely seek to signal their preferences through RCVs when they
2Co-sponsorship, which may be useful in this regard in some legislatures, provides little leverage in the
EP. Non-legislative resolutions are technically introduced by entire party groups and legislative proposals
originate in the European Commission.
3I conducted a series of open-ended interviews with MEPs, EP functionaries, and national delegation
staff members in the fall and winter of 2007.
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strongly support another groups’ measure. Therefore, the analysis provides strong support
for a story of roll call requests within the EP based on taking credit and assigning blame. The
results are also weakly consistent with theories of calling roll to maintain party discipline,
although the present study has less to say on this account. Finally, the findings imply that
researchers should be wary when using roll call votes to draw conclusions about within and
across-group cohesion in the EP, because cohesion co-varies with RCV selection.
4.1 Why Parties Call Roll
Theories of roll call vote requests fall broadly into two categories: position-taking and
discipline-enhancing. First of all, political parties may request open votes in order to pub-
licize their positions—or the positions of other players—on a given issue (Saalfeld 1995).
Through RCVs, party members may signal their preferences to third parties such as con-
stituents, interest groups, other governing institutions, and even coalition members or other
allies within the parliament itself. In the context of the EP, where elections are mainly won
and lost based on the domestic fortunes of national parties, interest groups and other EU
institutions—such as the European Commission and Council—may represent the dominant
audience for such signals. As Thiem (2006) argues, party group leaders can use roll calls
not only to demonstrate the preferences of their members but to demonstrate their ability
to act cohesively as a group. Such cohesion can be an attractive signal to potential coalition
partners and like-minded interest groups and a warning to opposition parties and members
of other institutions that engage in intercameral bargaining with the legislature, such as the
Council in the context of the EP. If EP party group leaders use RCV requests for such pur-
poses, therefore, we would expect them to focus their roll call sponsorships on circumstances
where they expect their rank-and-file members to maintain the party line publicly.
On the other hand, parties may use RCVs to engage in position-taking more to claim
credit for particular policies—and to distance themselves and lay blame for others—than to
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demonstrate the value of the party group as a cohesive unit. Within the EP, party groups
are intrinsically tied to particular proposals by the group-membership of the rapporteur,
the MEP responsible for guiding a bill through the legislative process. Thus, observers will
generally be able to attribute credit—or blame—to the party group of the rapporteur. Yet,
it may be unclear where groups stand on proposals that they do not report; in these cases the
leadership may request a roll call to publicly register a group’s position. Furthermore, such
circumstances can provide a window into the motivation behind groups’ roll call requests. If
groups sponsor RCVs purely for informational purposes—simply signaling their position to
third parties—then they should request RCVs on other groups’ reports with similar frequency
regardless of their disposition towards the proposal. On the other hand, if RCV requests
serve mostly as a way for group leaders to apportion credit and blame, they should target
their public vote requests on other groups’ reports to those measures that they disagree with.
While position-taking accounts explain some of the reasons why parties request public
votes, they may also use RCVs to monitor their own members in order to maintain discipline
within the party and obtain the policy outcomes that they most prefer (Fennel 1974, Jenkins
& Stewart 2003). This account of RCV sponsorship is somewhat controversial with respect
to the EP. Indeed, Kreppel (2002) and Thiem (2006) argue that party groups lack the ability
to effectively sanction their members for defection in open votes, primarily because party
group leaderships are composed of the leaders of national party delegations. These dele-
gation leaders, those authors argue, have little interest in sanctioning their own members.
Nonetheless, many authors attribute significant sanctioning ability to the EP party groups,
maintaining that angering one’s group can have negative consequences for an MEP’s Euro-
pean career, even when the actions that draw the group’s ire are tacitly condoned by one’s
national delegation (Hix 2002, Faas 2003, Hix 2004, Hix, Noury & Roland 2007, Meserve,
Pemstein & Bernhard 2009). Clearly, EP groups may not have the sanctioning powers of
parties in many national legislatures, but it seems reasonable that they might, nonetheless,
swing around considerable weight. Furthermore, Carrubba, Gabel & Hug (2008) develop a
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Table 4.1: Leveraging speaker sentiment.
RCV Secret
Vote|RCV Observed Unobserved*
Vote|Secret Unobserved Unobserved
model of discipline-based RCV sponsorship that they argue is directly applicable to the EP
(Carrubba, Gabel & Hug 2009).
Position-taking accounts of RCV sponsorship provide predictions in terms of what group
leaderships expect voting behavior within their own groups to look like should the vote take
place in public and do not engage in a discussion of how individual MEPs might change their
votes as a function of their publication. While they need not hold any particular assumption
on the matter, theories of RCV requests that argue that sponsorships are solely a function of
informational factors implicitly assume that voting behavior remains constant across public
and secret votes. On the other hand, discipline-based stories argue that legislators may
change their votes if they must make them in the cold hard light. Specifically, when MEPs
have personal policy preferences that differ sufficiently from those of their party leadership,
they may defect from the group line on private votes; yet when party leaders have sufficient
sanctioning ability to offset the gains of defection, these same legislators will change their
votes if forced to reveal them.
Table 4.1 highlights the distinctions between these two broad categories of RCV selection
theories, depicting legislative votes in terms of what researchers observe on a given type of
vote and the counterfactuals that are relevant to both types of theory. The columns in
table 4.1 represent vote types while the rows describe (counter)factuals. Position-taking
theories of RCV selection focus on the top two cells in the table. The patterns of selection
that they predict deal with the differences in expected voting patterns across how legislators
would vote on a given vote—RCV or secret ballot—if it were held publicly. To evaluate
such theories, and to diagnose the extent of the selection problem that plagues a given set
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of roll call votes, we need only the observable roll call votes and a good measure of how
legislators would have behaved on secret votes, had they cast those votes in public. On the
other hand, effective tests of discipline-based theories—and effective evaluations of selection
effects driven by discipline-based RCV sponsorship—require measures of all four cells in table
4.1. Such theories ask questions like “How would a given MEP have voted on a given RCV
if it were held in secret?” and “If that secret vote had been an RCV, how would legislators
have altered their behavior?”
The text-based analysis that I present in this paper provides a measure of the unobserved
votes described by the top right cell in table 4.1. Specifically, I fit a model that uses
legislative speech to predict voting behavior in recorded RCVs. This model, in turn, provides
a predictive measure of how MEPs who spoke in debate would have voted on a secret
vote, had it been taken publicly. Thus, I restrict my examination of theoretical accounts
of RCV selection primarily to position-taking. Nonetheless, it is possible to make some
conjectures that relate to discipline-based theory. Most notably, because third parties are
largely able to attribute credit or blame to party groups on bills that their own members
report, position-taking cannot explain why party groups would request RCVs on final votes in
such circumstances. On the other hand, group leaders might request such votes to maximize
the level of support for their parties’ measures if they believe that public voting will influence
their members to toe the party line.
In what follows I first describe the dataset and explain how to use debate speech to
predict voting behavior in the EP. Next I demonstrate that patterns in expected voting
behavior explain substantial variation in RCV sponsorship, in contrast to other predictors,
and demonstrate a method for predicting RCV requests from floor speeches. Finally, I use
the new measure of expected voting behavior to explain the circumstances under which party
group leaders request public votes.
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4.2 Data
I collected floor debates, voting data, and roll call vote tallies from the European Parliament’s
online archive (European Parliament 2009a). The dataset spans the majority of the 6th term
of the European parliament, from July 2004 through May 2008. During this time-span the
Parliament considered over 1,800 proposals and held debates on almost 800. Though the
MEPs voted 18,493 times during this period, the vast majority of these votes dealt with
amendments and only 1,706 votes were “final” votes on whole proposals.4 The dataset
contains all proposals that were actively debated by the Parliament, and on which the
Parliament held a final vote, during the observation period, yielding 769 debated final votes.5
Each debate consists of a series of speech segments generated by members of the EP
(MEPs) and representatives of other European institutions, such as the Commission and the
Council. Each speaker in the debate is identified by name and role and I coded whether
speakers were MEPs, representatives of the Commission, Council, or other bureaucracy, or
the (acting) President of the Parliament.6 Furthermore, some MEPs formally spoke on behalf
of their parliamentary party groups, while others spoke for themselves, and I recorded this
information for each MEP segment. I cross-referenced MEP speech segments with the EP’s
MEP database (European Parliament 2009c) which provides information on each speaker,
including age, nationality, party group and national party affiliations, and EP committee,
4I code a vote as final if it was a single vote on a proposal, a vote for resolution on a non-legislative
proposal, or a vote for legislative resolution on a legislative proposal. I exclude votes on amended proposals
because, while they do consider the bill in question as a whole, they are generally followed by a vote for
legislative resolution on the same bill. These two votes are linked and should not be treated as separate
observations.
5The EP voted on every proposal it debated, but did not debate every piece of legislation on which
it held a vote. The members of the EP are unlikely to have selected proposals to debate in a random
fashion. Therefore, debated bills may systematically vary from proposals that the EP voted on without
discussion. Clearly, the results I present here have little to say about the determinants of RCV requests
for bills without debates. Nonetheless, these proposals are associated with a variety of textual information,
including legislative reports and the texts of the bills themselves, and it may eventually be possible to extend
the methods I describe here to these data.
6The EP President handles the formal aspects of the debate, such as introducing the topic at hand,
limiting speakers to time, and ensuring that speeches are germane. Therefore I excluded the President’s
speech segments from analysis.
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bureau, and delegations memberships. I also recorded a variety of information about the
bill under discussion from the Parliament’s Legislative Observatory (European Parliament
2009b), including the parliamentary procedure under which the Parliament considered the
bill,7 the issue area covered by the proposal,8 and the identity of the bill’s rapporteur, the
MEP responsible for guiding the legislation through Parliament. Finally, I cross-referenced
the debates with the vote and RCV data available in the online archives, associating each
debate with a final vote. I recorded the outcome of each vote, the type of vote—single, non-
legislative resolution, or legislative resolution—and whether or not the vote was roll-called.
For RCVs, I also recorded the overall vote tallies and the vote decision—yea, nay, abstain,
or missing—of every MEP who spoke in the debate on the bill.
4.3 Roll Call Prediction
Predicting RCV requests from debate text is, at its heart, a classification problem. Specifi-
cally, we require a classifier that can take debates on proposals on the floor and, using only
the text of the debates and related meta-data, group those debates into two categories: de-
bates on bills that political actors will choose to roll-call, and debates on proposals that the
floor will vote on sans roll. Text classification is a well-developed field in machine learning
(Mitchell 1997, Manning & Schu¨tze 1999) and researchers have applied a variety of meth-
ods, including naive Bayes classifiers (Lewis 1998), maximum entropy classification (Berger,
Pietra & Pietra 1996), and support vector machines (SVMs) (Joachims 1998), to text cate-
gorization tasks. I use SVMs9 in this paper because they often outperform other classifiers at
both the traditional problem of categorizing texts by topic (Joachims 1998) and the higher-
7The EP uses a variety of legislative procedures including Assent, Codecision, Cooperation, and Consul-
tation, and numerous non-legislative procedures such as own-initiative reports, decisions, and resolutions.
8The EP bureaucracy provides a four-level issue classification for every proposal. I coded only the first
level in the classification scheme, which groups bills into eight issue areas: citizens’ rights, internal market,
agricultural fisheries and economies, economic and social cohesion, economic and monetary system, common
foreign and security policy, justice, and the state and evolution of the Union.
9I also experimented with random forests (Breiman 2001) with similar results.
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order problem of textual sentiment classification (Pang, Lee & Vaithyanathan 2002), which
features prominently in my approach.
SVMs are based on rigorous statistical learning theory (Vapnik 1995) and are excep-
tionally flexible learners that are capable of finding highly non-linear relationships in data.
Moreover, they tend to strike a nice balance between pattern matching and data over-fitting
and, in practice, often outperform similar techniques at out-of-sample classification. At
their core, SVMs are a two-type classification algorithm. They take a series of training ex-
amples, each consisting of a vector of predictor variables and a binary outcome variable, and
attempt to learn a function mapping predictors to outcomes that is reasonably robust to
idiosyncrasies in the training data. Once trained, an SVM should be able to take predictors
from previously unobserved data points and predict their outcomes with high accuracy.
The SVM algorithm represents each observation as an n dimensional point in space, with
one dimension for each predictor variable. The most basic SVM is a linear classifier that
finds the n − 1 dimensional hyperplane in the predictor-space that simultaneously divides
the training data in a way that minimizes outcome classification error and maximizes the
“margin,” or the distance between the separating hyperplane and the nearest observations
from both classes. Thus, the SVM algorithm works by finding the hyperplane that both
separates the training data in one class (e.g. RCV requests) from the other (e.g. unrecorded
votes), and maximizes the degree of separation between classes. Figure 4.1 illustrates this
concept for a simple case, with two predictor dimensions, x1 and x2.
10 Each point in the
figure represents a training case; filled in circles correspond to one possible outcome, while
empty circles represent the other. The three lines—H1, H2, and H3—depict three possible
separating hyperplanes. H3 does not cleanly separate the training examples, but both H1
and H2 do. The SVM algorithm would select H2 because it not only separates the training
data cleanly, but also maximizes the margin between the two classes.
10This figure is a public-domain image housed on the Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/File:Svm_separating_hyperplanes.png. I retrieved this copy on August, 22, 2010.
109
Figure 4.1: Separating hyperplanes.
Of course, real-world applications do not typically sport observations that are subject to
clear linear separation. Thus, researchers have augmented basic SVMs in two ways. First,
Cortes & Vapnik (1995) extended the basic algorithm to allow for non-separability through
“soft margins,” using techniques that penalize the classifier for mis-classified training in-
stances while still maximizing the margin between the correctly classified instances. This
means that modern SVM software can deal with training data for which no perfectly sepa-
rating hyperplane exists. Second, researchers have also extended SVMs to learn non-linear
relationships between predictors and outcomes by first using kernel functions to map non-
linear input spaces into linear feature spaces and then applying the standard SVM methods
to the transformed space (Boser, Guyon & Vapnik 1992). Using these extensions, one can use
SVM techniques developed for linearly separable data on error-prone datasets that are char-
acterized by highly non-linear relationships between predictors and outcomes. Note, finally,
that once fitted, an SVM can take a given observation—described by a vector of predic-
tor variables—and calculate its distance in feature space to the maximal-margin separating
hyperplane—also known as the decision plane—that the SVM learned from the training
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data. Thus, the SVM chooses a likely classification for new instances simply by observing
the sign of the distance calculated for the given case; observations that sit on one side of the
hyperplane are likely to fall into one outcome class, while instances residing on the other side
should represent examples of the other class. Furthermore, an observation’s distance from
the fitted hyperplane represents how “certain” the SVM is that the given observation comes
from a given class because examples that sit close to the hyperplane are more likely to be
misclassified than those that are further from the dividing line. These hyperplane distance
measures play an important role in my analysis. As we shall see, I use them as a tool to
measure, using only what MEPs said in plenary, how likely a given MEP is to support a
particular piece of legislation.
A more detailed discussion of the mathematics underlying SVMs is beyond the scope of
this article and Burges (1998) provides a detailed introduction to both theory and practice
that interested readers may find useful. I used the e1071 R package (Dimitriadou, Hornik,
Leisch, Meyer & Weingessel 2009) to fit all the SVMs presented here, and used default
parameter settings in each case.11
Before proceeding, I randomly divided the data into training, development, and testing
sets containing 70%, 10%, and 20% of the observations, respectively, following standard
machine learning conventions. I fit models to the training data, using the development set
to evaluate out-of-sample accuracy while tweaking model parameters and choosing which
text features and meta-data to include when fitting the models. The test set provides an
out-of-sample accuracy benchmark for the final fitted models. Each observation corresponds
to a single debate/final vote and Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the number of debates,
speech segments, and segments per debate across the three data subsets.
11Specifically, I use the Gaussian radial basis kernel with γ = 1/k, where k is the number of predictor
variables.
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Table 4.2: Debate statistics.
Total Train Test Development
Debates 769 538 152 79
Speech Segments 15017 10517 2869 1631
Avg. Segments per Debate 19.5 19.5 18.9 20.6
4.3.1 Easily Observed Covariates
Previous research has shown that the decision to call roll in the EP co-varies with both
procedural factors and issue area (Carrubba et al. 2006). If such easily observably charac-
teristics are capable of explaining a large part of the variation in recorded vote requests,
they could provide a low-cost set of variables with which to build selection models of roll call
voting behavior. Therefore, as a baseline, I looked at how effective easily observable charac-
teristics of bills are at predicting whether or not the Parliament will subject final votes to
roll call. Specifically, I fit an SVM to the training data, using easy-to-code aspects of the
legislation recorded in the vote data and the EP’s online Legislative Observatory—such as
the type of final vote (single, resolution, or legislative resolution), issue area of the bill, and
bill procedure—to predict RCV occurrence. Using the development set to monitor out-of-
sample accuracy I settled on a specification that included final vote type, issue area, and four
procedural dummy variables coding Codecision bills, Consultation legislation, own-initiative
reports, and EP resolutions, as predictor variables.
4.3.2 Bill Salience
Another useful predictor of variance in vote recording is bill importance; at least in the U.S.
Congress it appears that RCVs are more frequent on especially salient legislation (Clinton
& Lapinski 2008). Politicians wishing to take public positions on popular or controversial
legislation and party leaders calling roll either to embarrass the opposition or monitor the
votes of their own rank and file should all focus their roll call requests on salient legislation. It
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makes little sense to take positions on bills that nobody cares about; similarly, the opposition
is unlikely to be embarrassed about their position on trivial legislation, however far it is
from the mainstream, and it is wasteful for parties to expend time and political capital on
monitoring and disciplining members for their behavior on low-priority votes. While there
exists no direct measure of bill importance for the EP, the debate data provides information
that may proxy for bill salience: number of speakers. Debates with more speakers are likely
to deal with topics that are important to a wider audience than the bills discussed by only
a few MEPs. For example, the 6th term debate with the most speakers focused on EP
bill A6-0070/2004, titled “Parliament’s opinion concerning the draft treaty establishing a
constitution for Europe,” an issue of utmost importance to MEPs, and a topic ripe for
position-taking.12 119 MEPs spoke in the debate, representing the largest turnout in any
debate in the dataset.
I use the number of MEPs that spoke in each debate to capture the relationship between
proposal salience and RCV requests. The number of speakers ranges between one and
119, with a mean just under 20, and a standard deviation around 14. Thus, there is wide
variability in the number of speakers across debates. I used these counts to fit a second SVM
and also include counts of MEPs speaking formally on behalf of party-groups, and speaker
counts by party-group, in the salience model.
4.3.3 Naive Text-Based Classification
I next evaluated the effectiveness of using entire debate transcripts, and a bag-of-words ap-
proach, to predict whether or not MEPs will choose to record their final vote on a given
proposal. To do so, I ignored the speech segments in the debates, and collapsed each obser-
vation into a single debate-level document. Next, I used the RSNL R library (Fader, King,
Pemstein & Quinn 2009) to tokenize the debates, converting each document into a series of
individual, lower-case, words. I also removed punctuation and garbled tokens, stemmed each
12The final vote on the bill was, indeed, recorded.
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word to reduce it to its root (e.g. running and runner were converted to run), and replaced
all numbers with the word “NUMBER.” Finally, I converted the debates in each data sub-
set into a term-frequency matrix, containing debates along the rows and normalized13 word
frequencies along the columns. Thus, I represented each debate as a vector of 7108 word
frequencies. Therefore, for example, the term-frequency matrix for the training dataset con-
tained 538 rows—one for each debate—and 7108 columns, where each column represented
the relative frequency with which a given word—say “unacceptable”—appeared in a given
debate. I fit an SVM to the training data, using only these vectors of word frequencies to
predict roll call vote occurrence.14
4.3.4 Speaker Sentiment
Bag-of-words classifiers have shown themselves to be highly accurate in topic categorization
(Joachims 1998). In the context of the EP, for example, a 200 word speech with 30 occur-
rences of the word “fish” in it is likely to deal with fisheries legislation. But the relationship
between word frequency and higher order classification tasks, like the one considered in this
paper, is less clear-cut. Therefore, classifiers trained on debates represented as simple bags
of words may predict roll call requests poorly. I take advantage of the structure of the debate
data and political science theory to build a more nuanced RCV request classifier. Specifi-
cally, I make use of the fact that the pattern of roll call requests in legislatures should reflect
not only the salience of the proposal under consideration, as discussed above, but the pattern
of support for the bill in the parliament. Fundamentally, recorded votes should occur only
when there is reasonable variation in support for the proposal under debate. This variation
13I used a term frequency by inverse document frequency (tf.idf) weighting scheme (Manning & Schu¨tze
1999, pp. 543). This approach first takes the number of times a given token occurs in an observation and
then normalizes by the number of observations in which the given token occurs. Thus, common words like
“the” and “and” receive relatively low weights, while unusual words are given higher priority.
14I experimented with a variety of schemes for weighting the term-document matrix, including raw term
frequency and presence-of-feature (rather than frequency-of-feature) approaches. Similarly, I experimented
with filtering out especially (un)common tokens from the term-frequency vectors. The various approaches
all yielded similar development set prediction accuracy.
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may come in multiple forms, depending on the reasons underlying the RCV request. First
of all, when politicians call roll to publicize their differences in opinion with their opponents
there should be significant inter-party variation in proposal support. On the other hand, if a
party requests a RCV to help monitor and discipline its members, or to expose cracks in the
opposition, there should be localized intra-party or intra-coalition differences in bill support.
In cases of pure position-taking, patterns of support may be more haphazard, especially in
parliaments with low party cohesion, but we should, nonetheless, be more likely to observe
roll calls on bills with significant numbers in support and opposition, than on proposals that
are uniformly regarded by the legislature.15
Taking advantage of the likely relationships between bill support and recorded vote re-
quests, I built a two-stage classifier that first uses basic sentiment analysis (Pang & Lee 2008)
to predict individual speakers’ support for the proposal under debate and then predicts RCV
requests based on variables summarizing the pattern of speaker support for the bill, as esti-
mated by the first stage classifier. To train the first stage classifier, I created a subset of the
training data containing only debated final votes on which the Parliament held a roll call
vote. I dropped speakers who could not vote—bureaucrats, visitors, etc—or who spoke in
a purely formal capacity, from the data subset. Furthermore, to focus on debates with rea-
sonable variation in sentiment, I limited the data subset to cases where at least one speaker
voted against the proposal in the RCV on the bill. These restrictions yielded a sample of 216
debated final votes containing 5291 speech segments. In contrast to the previous section, I
kept observations at the speaker level. I then followed the same procedure for converting
textual observations into term vectors that I used for the naive text-based classifier, except
that, following conventions in sentiment analysis (Thomas, Pang & Lee 2006), I represented
each speech in terms of a term-presence vector rather than a term-frequency array. That is,
I coded only whether or not a given term appeared in a particular speech, rather than how
15One exception may be proposals on highly salient issues like decisions on military action. In these cases,
politicians may wish to publicize their positions even if the entire legislature is of one mind.
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many times it occurred. Furthermore, I removed especially common and rare terms that
occurred in more than 99 per cent or less than 1 per cent of the observed speech segments,
reducing the length of the term-presence vectors to 1965 elements each. I then separated
the RCV subset into training, testing, and development sets, just like I did with the whole
dataset. The training, testing, and developments sets held 3758, 963, and 570 speech seg-
ments, respectively. I fit an SVM to the training set, using the term-presence patterns in
individual speeches to predict whether or not the speaker who made each speech voted in
support of the bill in question on the final recorded vote for that proposal.16 Note that
the naive RCV classifier that I described in the previous section operated at the level of
individual debated final votes, represented each debate as a vector of 7108 term frequencies,
and used those vectors to predict whether or not a particular vote was held publicly. In
contrast, the first stage of the sentiment classifier focused on the speech level, represented
each speech segment as a vector of 1965 term-presence indicators, and used those vectors
to predict whether or not the speaker who generated the given segment voted yes on the
associated final vote.
I then used the results of the fitted sentiment model to generate inputs for a second-stage
RCV classifier. Specifically, I took the trained sentiment classifier and used it to predict
speaker support for all of the bills in the original training, development, and testing sets.
That is, I used a speech-level classifier trained on bills with recorded votes to predict the
voting behavior of speakers in every debate, both debates on bills with recorded final votes,
and debates on proposals that faced no roll call. Therefore, my approach tacitly assumes
that the patterns of speech that predict positive votes by individual MEPs in debated bills
which were subjected to roll call will also predict positive votes by MEPs on votes that were
not subsequently put to public vote. This assumption seems warranted because positive
16On a given vote attending MEPs may support or oppose a bill or formally abstain. Furthermore, MEPs
can simply skip votes. For the purposes of this paper, I attempted to predict whether or not MEPs would
vote yes on a given bill, treating no votes, abstentions, and missing votes equivalently. In reality, whether an
MEP votes no, abstains, or simply misses a vote provides information about strength of a MEP’s support
for a bill. I plan to exploit this information in future research.
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and negative speech are rather general concepts, and it seems unlikely that MEPs would
substantially alter the ways in which they express their support or opposition to legislation
across types of votes, even if they could anticipate public votes.17 Of course, many words
that will predict speaker sentiment in a given debate will tell us little about how speakers
feel in the context of another piece of legislation. For example, the term “sovereignty” could
covary highly with negative votes in a debate over a piece of legislation seeking to expand
European powers into areas—like tax policy—that are the traditional domain of member
states, but could predict support for legislation devolving monitoring of states’ compliance
from the Commission to local organs. Therefore, the sentiment classifiers’ success rests on
its ability to find patterns in speech that are generally related to speaker sentiment. Such
patterns could include the use of positive and negative adjectives, for example, although
substantially more complex work presence patterns are likely to play a role. SVMs are
perhaps the best known tool for striking the balance between uncovering complex patterns
in data and avoiding over-fitting that is necessary to perform successfully on such a task;
nonetheless, the success of the sentiment classifier rests crucially on the variance provided
by the training data.
The sentiment classifier works at the speech segment level, mapping verbiage to voting be-
havior. To use the sentiment classifier’s estimates to predict RCV requests, it is necessary to
aggregate the sentiment classifier’s predictions upwards to the debate—or, equivalently, final
vote—level. Let dij be the distance between the term-presence vector representing speaker i
in debate j and the first stage sentiment classifier’s decision plane. Each dij represents how
supportive or antagonistic speaker i’s speech on bill j appears to the sentiment-based SVM.
I calculated the mean distance and overall standard deviation of speaker distances for each
debate j, as well as the within-group standard deviations for each of the seven major party
groups within the EP.18 These measures capture the predicted average level of support among
17That is not to say that we should not expect selection effects in floor speech that may covary with
RCV requests. Nonetheless, while selection issues are likely to weaken the predictive accuracy of the speaker
sentiment model, they do not fundamentally undermine its utility.
18I set group standard deviations to their average values for debates in which no representative of a given
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Table 4.3: Sentiment classifier accuracy (in percent).
Development Set Test Set
Modal Category 75 74
Sentiment Classifier 82 81
speakers for the proposal under debate, as well as the variance in support across speakers,
both as a whole, and within groups. Therefore, they describe the level of disagreement on
the floor during the debate and should help predict RCV requests. Of course, not every
MEP speaks in every debate and these summaries of estimated speaker sentiment will miss
patterns in opinion within the chamber that MEPs do not voice in plenary. Nonetheless, the
variation in speaker sentiment provides substantial information about prevailing attitudes
among MEPs and the level of division in the chamber prior to a given vote.
Finally, I used these debate-level sentiment summary scores to train a second-stage RCV
classifier.19 That is, using debate-level summaries of patterns in the estimated level of
support expressed by speakers in a given debate, I trained an SVM to predict whether or
not any party group would request an RCV on the final vote attached to the debate in
question.
4.3.5 Roll Call Prediction Results
Before proceeding to a comparison of the various RCV classifiers, it is worth noting the
performance of the first-stage classifier in the sentiment model. Table 4.3 compares the pre-
dictive accuracy of the sentiment classifier to a simple pick-the-modal-category approach to
prediction. Clearly, participants in debates are quite likely to vote in support of the bills they
discuss, and simply guessing that the speaker will vote for the proposal is accurate about
group spoke.
19I experimented with a variety of other sentiment summaries, including measures of the overall inter and
intra-group variance contributions, but the classifier trained on the average distances, distance standard
deviations, and group-specific standard deviations provided the best predictive accuracy on the development
set.
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three quarters of the time. This makes good sense; final votes represent the culmination of
extensive legislative wrangling and can reflect the outcomes of a multitude of previous votes
on amendments or portions of the bill. Amendments allow MEPs to better tailor legislation
to preferences on the floor and final votes may not reflect all of the disagreements voiced by
MEPs when the bill was initially debated. Nonetheless, speakers’ utterances during debates
do help to predict their voting behavior on whole bills and the term-presence SVM mod-
estly outperforms modal guessing, correctly predicting 81% of test-set outcomes. Sentiment
classification is a difficult problem in natural language processing and previous research has
shown that one may substantially improve the accuracy of sentiment classifiers by mak-
ing use of information that goes beyond simple term-presence vectors (Pang & Lee 2008).
Therefore, in future work, it may be useful to take advantage of indicators of agreement
between speakers, such as the words legislators use when referring to other speakers in the
debate (Thomas, Pang & Lee 2006), or speaker characteristics, such as group membership
and nationality, to improve the performance of the stage one classifier.
Figure 4.2 presents the development and test set accuracies for modal guessing, the six
RCV predicting classifiers, and a seventh classifier, sentiment+, that combined the vari-
ables from the easy-to-observe, importance, and sentiment classifiers. The EP recorded
about 40% of final votes and picking the modal category (i.e no recorded vote) generated
accurate predictions 61% of the time in the development set and 58% in the test set. The
easy observables, importance-based, and naive text-based classifiers all performed at around
modal category accuracy. Of these three fitted SVMs, only the naive text-based classifier
outperformed modal guessing in both development and test sets, and the easily-observed
and importance models actually did worse than modal guessing on the development data.
Therefore, while they correlate with roll call voting, neither easily observed predictors like
bill issue area and legislative procedure, nor indicators of the salience of a bill explain much
of the variance in RCV requests, at least when held to the high standard of out-of-sample
prediction. This is an important result because it makes one question the likely utility of
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Figure 4.2: RCV classifier accuracy (in percent).
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selection models of roll call voting based purely on simple bill characteristics like issue area
and procedure. Political parties use roll call votes to reveal their preferences or those of their
opponents to the public, or to monitor the behavior of their members. Thus, underlying
preference patterns are likely to be the true determinants of roll call vote requests. While
preferences may tend to align in a manner that makes an RCV more likely under certain
broad sets of circumstances than others, such gross instruments will always predict RCV
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requests quite poorly. Furthermore, one cannot hope to effectively correct for selection in
RCVs using predictors that explain so little variance in RCV requests.
Similarly, a naive bag-of-words representation of floor debates does a poor job of predict-
ing when MEPs will request recorded votes. In contrast, an identical bag-of-words approach
is quite accurate at identifying the issue area of a bill under debate and predicted 57% of
the test-set cases’ 8-level issue area codes correctly, compared to a modal category predictive
accuracy of 22%. Therefore, while the text of the debates contain a great deal of information
about the bills under discussion, a structure-free (i.e. naive text) approach to text classifica-
tion appears unable to effectively tease out relationships between what politicians say when
debating a bill and their propensity to request RCVs when voting on the bill as a whole.
On the other hand, figure 4.2 shows that the sentiment-based classifier significantly out-
performs the modal category baseline, and the other classifiers, at RCV prediction. Repre-
senting debates in terms of the distribution of sentiment that the speakers in the debate have
towards the bill under discussion generates 72% accuracy in both the development and test
sets, a substantial improvement over modal guessing. By taking advantage of things we can
observe—speeches on the floor and voting in roll calls—we can generate useful summaries
of the level of disagreement surrounding a particular piece of legislation. These summaries,
in turn, account for a substantial amount of the variation in RCV requests and, when cou-
pled with standard machine learning techniques, are useful for predicting RCV requests in
previously unobserved data. Furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly, incorporating other
information into the classifier—such as measures of bill importance, issue area, and legisla-
tive procedure—add little predictive accuracy to the model, as the results for the sentiment+
model in figure 4.2 reveal. While the sentiment+ model outperformed the basic sentiment-
based classifier on the development set, there was no difference in accuracy between the two
classifiers on the test data.
The sentiment-based approach to RCV prediction outperforms the competing models
not just because it draws on a rich source of information—indeed, the naive bag-of-words
121
classifier uses exactly the same dataset—but because it is better wedded to theoretical ac-
counts of roll call voting than the other approaches. While we can construct stories for
why the sorts of preference distributions that encourage RCV requests should occur more
often under particular institutional contexts, on especially salient legislation, or when actors
consider certain issues, these factors are—at best—weak proxies for the determinants of roll
call vote selection. Similarly, while the speeches that MEPs give during legislative debates
contain information that can predict roll call requests, one needs to take advantage of theory
to best leverage this information. The predominant theories of roll call requests all rely on
patterns in legislators’ voting intentions to predict roll call votes; the sentiment model works
by using floor debates to explicitly model these voting intentions and, in turn, predicts roll
call votes based on patters in legislators’ expected voting behavior.
4.4 Speaker Sentiment and Roll Call Requests
The sentiment-based model is interesting, not only because of its predictive accuracy, but
because of what it can tell us about the circumstances under which politicians endogenously
request RCVS. The first-stage sentiment model generates measures of the likelihood that a
given speaker will choose to vote in favor of the proposal under debate. While the model
is based on theory, it also provides a novel tool with which to test hypotheses about when
roll call votes are most likely to occur. Specifically, the sentiment measures produced by the
first stage of the classifier allow one to examine how the expected pattern of support for a
bill influences politicians’ decisions to request recorded votes.
4.4.1 Broad Patterns
Figure 4.3 shows predicted RCV probabilities for debates as a function of average predicted
speaker support for the bill (left panel) and the standard deviation of support for the proposal
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Figure 4.3: Predicted probability of RCV by 1st-stage sentiment classifier decision value
debate mean and standard deviation.
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under debate (right panel).20 Remember that each speaker’s sentiment is captured by her
speech’s distance21 from the decision plane of the 1st-stage sentiment classifier. To generate
these graphs I held all other inputs to the sentiment-based classifier at their sample means,
while varying the quantity of interest over its observed range. Looking first at the left panel
of figure 4.3, note that RCVs are most likely at the tails of the average support distribution.
Especially negative distances from the stage one classifier’s decision plane indicate likely
support for the bill under debate while especially positive distances imply that the speaker
20SVMs are a non-parametric machine learning tool and are not built upon an explicit probability model.
Therefore, the SVM does not generate predicted probabilities directly. I generated the predicted probabilities
in figures 4.3 and 4.4 by fitting a logistic distribution to the support plane distances calculated for each
observation by the fitted SVM, using maximum likelihood. More specifically, after fitting the SVM to the
training set, I regressed RCV requests on the fitted distances from the decision plane for each case in the
training set, using logistic regression. To generate out-of-sample predicted probabilities one takes the out-
of-sample observation and feeds it into the fitted SVM, generating a decision-plane distance. Next, one uses
the fitted logistic model to predict the probability of a RCV request from the given decision plane distance.
21More formally, by the vector of term-presence dummies representing the speech.
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will fail to vote for the proposal. Note that the observed range of average support distances
ranges only from -1.0 to around 0.1, in contrast to the speaker-level distances, which range
between -1.8 and 1.5. Therefore, the left panel of figure 4.3 indicates that RCVs are most
likely for votes characterized by especially high levels of support, and by votes where the
floor is divided. The second panel in figure 4.3 further nails home this point but adds some
refinement to the story. First of all, RCVs are most likely on bills characterized by substantial
disagreement among debate participants. But, RCVs are also more likely—although, to a
lesser degree—when everyone taking part in the debate agrees—as captured by variation
in the speakers’ estimated sentiments—about the proposal under discussion. For the most
part, MEPs call roll to publicize differences in opinion. This is consistent with standard
stories of roll call voting, which predict recorded votes when politicians see an opportunity
to differentiate themselves from their competitors on controversial issues (Saalfeld 1995).
On the other hand, MEPs are also somewhat likely to request public votes when they are
highly unified in support of a particular bill. This seems likely to represent position-taking
on universally popular proposals, or perhaps may indicate shows of solidarity on issues that
pit the EP against other institutional actors such as the European Commission or Council.
Figure 4.4 is analogous to the right panel of figure 4.3 and displays predicted RCV
probabilities as a function of within-group support standard deviations for the seven of
the EP’s parliamentary party groups.22 I plotted each curve in figure 4.4 by varying each
within-group support standard deviation over its empirical range, while holding all other
model inputs at their means.23 RCVs become more likely as within-group disagreement
grows, although the strength of the relationship varies across groups. The largest groups—
22These include the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European
Democrats (PPE-DE), the Socialist Group in the EP (PSE), the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN), the Group of the
Greens/European Free Alliance (Verts/ALE), the Confederal Group of the European Left-Nordic Green
Left (GUE/NGL), and the Independence/Democracy Group (IND/DEM). I exclude the Identity, Tradition,
and Sovereignty Group (ITS) because it was very short-lived.
23The within-group support standard deviations are surprisingly uncorrelated across groups, with the
PPE-DE and IND/DEM groups topping the scale at r = 0.25. The curves in figure 4.4 are different lengths
because their observed supports vary.
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Figure 4.4: Predicted probability of RCV by 1st-stage sentiment classifier standard deviation,
across EP party groups.
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the largely Christian Democratic PPE-DE, the socialist PSE, and the liberal ALDE—are
highlighted in red in the graph and display the strongest association between intra-group
strife and RCV requests. Therefore, while overall levels of conflict among debate participants
are indicative of RCV likelihood, intra-party squabbles also make recorded vote requests more
common. This result is potentially consistent with a story of roll calling by parties in order
to monitor their own members and maintain cohesion (Carrubba, Gabel & Hug 2008), and
also with the idea that parties may request public votes to expose cracks in their opponents’
discipline (Saalfeld 1995). It is exciting, and somewhat surprising, that we observe this
effect. For one thing, we might expect to observe little open disagreement in debates within
parties for exactly the same reasons we might expect them to maintain high discipline in
RCVs. Furthermore, disgruntled partisans may say one thing in a debate and then vote
the other way when pressured by the whip. The sentiment measures I use here are not
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pure measures of support, per se, but rather predictions about likely voting behavior given
speaking behavior; insofar as politicians say one thing and do another, they will tend to
underestimate differences within party groups. Nonetheless, one must be cautious when
interpreting figure 4.4 because it describes the relationship between expected intra-group
cohesion and RCV requests across roll calls sponsored by all of the party groups in the
EP. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate between parties’ use of roll calls to monitor and
discipline their own members, and their tendency to request roll to expose divisions within
the opposition.
4.4.2 Group-by-Group RCV Requests
To more carefully investigate the mechanisms underlying roll call requests I constructed a
panel of potential group roll-calls based on the same set of 769 final votes that I used to train
and test the sentiment model. Each observation in this dataset represents a single group’s
opportunity to request an RCV on a given final vote. The dependent variable in the analysis
is a simple dummy indicating whether or not a particular group decided to sponsor an RCV
on a given vote.
While previous research has examined such decisions by characterizing them as functions
of broad categories of votes, I rely primarily on the outputs of the sentiment classifier—or
speech-based measures of expected patterns in public voting behavior by MEPs—to model
the circumstances under which groups request roll call votes. Remember that the stage-
1 support classifier produces a measure, dij, representing the distance between the term-
presence vector representing speaker i’s speech in debate j, and classifier’s decision plane.
Each dij is a measure of how likely speaker i is to vote in support of proposal j, as predicted
by the classifier. Thus, dij is a proxy for how speaker i would vote on j if the vote were
recorded. In other words, dij provides a measure of both of the quantities described by the
cells in the top row in table 4.1. Of course, if vote j was held publicly, we are likely to
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have an even better measure of this concept, namely MEP i’s actual vote.24 But, when no
roll call vote is held, the vector dj, containing decision plane distance measures for every
speaker that took part in debate j, provides a novel proxy for the, otherwise unobservable,
concept described by the top right cell in table 4.1. Therefore, I use various summaries of
dj as predictors when modeling roll call vote requests by particular party groups.
25
Both position-taking and discipline-based accounts of RCV selection posit that RCVs will
be more common when legislators disagree on a proposal than when a vote is uncontroversial.
I measure the level of agreement within the EP, or chamber disagreement on a given vote j,
in terms of the standard deviation of dj. Similarly, to examine how intra-group agreement
co-varies with RCV requests, I operationalize group disagreement for group k on vote j as
the standard deviation of the subset of elements in dj representing speeches from members
of group k. Political parties that call roll to take positions may either wish to claim credit
for a proposal that they support or to distance themselves from, or blame another party for,
bills that they disagree with. Therefore, I measure the group sentiment of group k towards
proposal j in terms of the average decision value of speakers from group k in the debate on
bill j. Additionally, I consider a number of non-speech-based predictors of RCV requests as
control variables, including whether or not bill j was especially salient,26 if the vote was on
legislation or a parliamentary resolution, and whether or not the bill under consideration
represented a group report. This last variable is an indicator that equals one when the
rapporteur for bill j—the MEP assigned to research the measure and guide it through the
24This is not always the case. For instance, voter i may not have attended plenary on the day that vote
j was held.
25The process I use to model group-level roll call requests is analogous to what I did when fitting the
two-stage sentiment classifier above. Nonetheless, the the two models differ substantially in purpose. In the
previous section I sought to determine if patterns in expected voting behavior could explain the variance
in overall roll call vote predictions, and my focus was, primarily, classification accuracy. In this section the
sentiment scores serve to examine the predictive accuracy of common theories of roll call selection.
26As in the previous analysis, I measure salience in terms of the number of speakers present for the debate
on bill j. Initial exploratory analyses indicated that the relationship between number of speakers and roll call
requests, while generally positive, is non-linear. Furthermore, the distribution of speakers is highly skewed
towards the low end and contains quite a few outliers. Therefore, I classified votes as salient if the debates
that preceded them featured an especially large number of speakers. Specifically, I coded a vote as salient if
the number of MEPs that spoke in the debate was greater than one standard deviation above the mean.
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Table 4.4: Sentiment and party group roll call requests.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Group Sentiment -0.66 (0.15)* -0.82 (0.15)* -0.98 (0.16)*
Group Disagreement -0.26 (0.22) -0.23 (0.22) -0.06 (0.22)
Chamber Disagreement 2.30 (0.30)* 2.06 (0.32)* 1.88 (0.32)*
Salient 0.81 (0.34)* 0.84 (0.34)* 0.81 (0.34)*
Legislation -0.28 (0.15) -0.41 (0.15)* -0.40 (0.15)*
Group Report 1.20 (0.16)* 0.07 (0.46)
Group Sentiment × Report 1.54 (0.55)*
Observations 4376 4376 4376
Log-Likelihood -1099.10 -1068.17 -1062.75
Standard errors are in parentheses and ∗ ≡ p < 0.05.
Party group fixed effects not shown.
parliamentary process—hails from group k, and which equals zero otherwise.
Table 4.4 presents three logistic regression models that predict groups’ roll call vote
requests using combinations of the covariates described above.27 Each model includes group
fixed effects to account for idiosyncrasies in predilections to request roll call votes across
groups, which table 4.4 suppresses. Furthermore, the table reports clustered robust standard
errors which reflect possible dependence between observations within votes. Model 1 in the
first column of table 4.4 predicts requests solely in terms of patterns in speaker sentiment, bill
salience, and legislative procedure, while models 2 and 3 examine how a group’s ownership
of a given report affects its RCV sponsorship calculus, both individually, and in the context
of group sentiment towards the bill.
The best predictor of roll call vote requests is chamber disagreement. The coefficient
on this variable is positive and statistically significant across all three specifications. Fur-
thermore, the substantive effect of chamber disagreement is substantial. Across all of the
observations, the average predicted probability that a given group will sponsor a roll call on
27There are seven major groups (ALDE, GUE/NGL, IND/DEM, PPE-DE, PSE, Verts/ALE, and UEN)
and 769 debated final votes, yielding 5383 possible observations. I was forced to omit 1007 of these potential
observations when no members of a given group spoke in the debate and for which I have no measure of
group sentiment or disagreement.
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a vote is around 0.08, according to model 1. Yet, for those cases in the sample where chamber
disagreement is at least one standard deviation above its mean, the average probability that
a group will sponsor a roll call doubles to 0.16. Similarly, the probability of sponsorship
drops to 0.05 on votes on measures where chamber disagreement is more than one standard
deviation below the sample mean. Thus, as virtually all theoretical accounts of roll call vot-
ing would predict, and as the findings from the sentiment-based classifier depicted in figure
4.3 indicate, roll call vote requests are most common on controversial measures. This finding
is not surprising but this paper provides the first empirical evidence for this result that does
not rest on a substantial inferential leap. The sentiment scores used here derive directly
from the behavior of individual MEPs, and as the previous section demonstrated, they are
effective predictors of MEP voting behavior. Thus, while still a proxy for legislators’ vot-
ing intentions, they do a much better job of measuring theoretical primitives than lumping
votes into categories based on their issue areas, procedural status, or even bill authorship.
Furthermore, they vary across votes at a much finer level of detail than do previously used
proxies for patterns in vote intention.
The advantages of using such fine-grained measures of vote intention become especially
clear when we directly address the reasons that individual groups call roll, something that is
inherently difficult to do with existing measures. For example, the current analysis demon-
strates that EP party groups use roll call votes to stake out their positions against bills with
which they disagree. Indeed, the coefficient on group sentiment is negative and statistically
significant across all three specifications in table 4.4. Again, the substantive influence of this
variable is non-negligible; when the value of this variable is less than one standard devia-
tion below the mean, within the sample, the probability that a given group calls roll nearly
doubles to just above 0.14, according to model 1. As I argued in section 4.1, EP groups are
inherently tied to particular proposals by the identity of the rapporteur—and constituents,
national parties, and interest groups can readily guess the position of MEPs who hail from
the same party group as the rapporteur. Therefore, they concentrate their RCV requests on
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bills on which their positions may be less clear.
Interestingly, the relationship between group disagreement and RCV sponsorship is sta-
tistically insignificant across all three specifications. It seems that party groups may not
take as much care to ensure that the entire group is on the same page before sponsoring a
roll call vote as we might expect. One possible explanation for this finding is that groups
sometimes call roll to discipline or monitor members but that their sanctioning powers are
not sufficient to maintain high levels of party cohesion. Of course, this argument is largely
speculative and the models that I present here cannot speak directly to this question. In-
deed, because the sentiment measures that I use here only tell us something about how
MEPs are likely to vote on recorded votes, they are less well-suited to examining theories
of discipline-based roll calling than accounts based on position-taking. A perhaps simpler
explanation is that, because EP groups are made up of so many individual national parties,
group leaders are forced to put up with some degree of defection by party delegations on
any given vote (Kreppel 2002). Indeed, multiple MEPs and party delegation staff members
emphasized this point during personal interviews that I conducted in the fall of 2007.
Turning to the controls, one finds, not surprisingly, that all of the models in table 4.4
indicate that RCV requests are more likely on especially salient votes. In addition, groups
are less likely to request vote recording on actual legislation than they are on parliamentary
resolutions, at least once one takes the group membership of the rapporteur into account.
Thiem (2006) argues that roll call votes should be less frequent on legislation in the EP
because national party constraints are more binding on votes that can affect national policy
than on pure position-taking measures, and finds strong empirical support for her claim in
a model that predicts roll call vote requests with easily observable measures. On the other
hand, the tendency of party groups to request roll call votes less frequently on legislation may
have more to do with how much party groups disagree with one another than their internal
cohesion because MEPs put far more effort into hammering out sustainable compromises—
both within the Parliament and across EU institutions—on legislation than they do on
130
resolutions.
Finally, models 2 and 3 investigate how a party group’s ownership of a given report affects
its RCV sponsorship calculus. Interestingly, while, overall, groups call roll to signal their
positions against legislation, they also call roll more often on their own reports than they do
on other groups’ reports. At first blush, this may seem counter-intuitive, but the interactive
effect revealed by model 3 clarifies the result. Specifically, party groups sponsor RCVs on
their own reports when the average group member agrees with the rapporteur and request
roll calls on other groups’ reports when they dislike the contents of the bill. Therefore, even
though groups are already clearly linked to reports that belong to them, they nonetheless
emphasize their support for bills that they favor when full responsibility for the report can be
attributed to the group. On the other hand, they virtually never request roll calls on other
groups’ reports that are in line with their preferences, and only infrequently sponsor RCVs
on their own reports when the majority of the group stands against passage. Therefore,
groups appear to engage in RCV sponsorship more to take credit and assign blame than to
simply signal their preferences to third parties.
4.5 Conclusion
The results in this paper demonstrate the potential that political speech has to help re-
searchers to better understand roll call votes. Furthermore, they emphasize the important
role that patterns in legislators’ sentiment towards bills play in decisions to publicly record
parliamentary votes. They underscore the serious nature of the selection problem inherent
in RCV data while simultaneously developing a foundation upon which we may build tools
to overcome this issue. While modest, the predictive accuracy of the sentiment-based model
is encouraging, especially in light of the rather esoteric nature of the RCV classification
task. This paper provides a solid first step towards predicting RCVs with legislative text,
and highlights the importance of capitalizing on our theoretical understanding of politics
131
to best take advantage of natural language’s ability to help predict political behavior. Fur-
thermore, the approach presented here has the potential to provide measures that can help
researchers statistically deal with selection bias in RCV-based analyses. Distances between
debates and the decision plane of the sentiment-based RCV classifier represent predictive—if
noisy—propensity-to-be-roll-called scores and I hope to examine their utility in this context
in future research. I am also currently working on improving the accuracy of the stage one
sentiment classifier, using agreement modeling techniques introduced by Thomas, Pang &
Lee (2006). Hopefully an improved stage one classifier will lead not only to better speaker
sentiment scores, but to greater accuracy in second-stage RCV prediction.
Furthermore, the current research provides a new tool for testing theories of roll call vote
sponsorship, by generating a new way to measure expected voting patterns within legisla-
tures. By using a non-parametric model to predict vote behavior with legislative speeches, I
was able to tease out the circumstances under which party groups in the EP are most likely
to request roll. The findings show that groups sponsor RCVs predominantly to distance
themselves from controversial opinions with which they disagree, but also request public
votes to demonstrate their support for their own rapporteurs. In general, they behave in
a manner that is consistent with a process of credit-taking and blame assignment. Inter-
estingly, there is limited empirical support for the argument that parties will call roll only
when their own rank-and-file are in step with the general group line.
These findings have important implications for how we use roll call vote data from the
EP. For one thing, they imply that measures of cohesion in the Parliament will be skewed
and will tend to overestimate the overall level of disagreement within the EP. And, insofar
as RCV sponsorship strategies may have changed over time, raw cohesion scores based on
RCVs may misrepresent general trends in party group polarization. Furthermore, while the
evidence on the relationship between within-group disagreement and RCV sponsorship is
mixed, there is some reason to believe that RCVs may under-represent the level of within-
group disagreement in the Parliament. This finding behooves researchers to re-examine some
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of the most prominent findings in research on the EP. Notably, Hix, Noury & Roland (2007)
use RCV data to demonstrate that intra-group cohesion has increased over time. Further-
more, they argue that party group cohesion is a function of a variety of factors, including
group size, national fractionalization, and the percentage of national parties within the group
that hold governing status at home. If these variables also predict RCV sponsorship then
there is the potential that selection bias may influence these findings.28 Furthermore, the
propensity-to-be-roll-called scores generated by the sentiment-based RCV classifier represent
an excellent measure with which to model RCV selection in this context. Thus, re-evaluating
these findings in the context of selection bias represents another interesting avenue for future
research.
The approach that I use here to measure sentiment on the floor has a variety of potential
applications and generalizes easily. Specifically, whenever one observes a particular political
indicator only infrequently but has access to speeches, legislation, reports, or other forms of
political text that are likely to contain content that covaries with the variable of interest,
there exists the potential to use standard machine learning tools to generate proxy measures
for that indicator across an expanded sample of observations. Indeed, as large collections of
digitized political text become increasingly available, these techniques may allow researchers
to study a variety of topics that we currently know little about. More generally, as social
scientists’ access to large swaths of digitized data grows, techniques for data reduction are
likely to become invaluable to researchers. Nonetheless, the applicability of these tools is not
universal. As the present study demonstrates, simply throwing a bunch of text at a support
vector machine is unlikely to generate meaningful results. Rather, one must carefully leverage
theory to get the most out of these powerful data reduction techniques.
28While the current paper does not engage this issue directly, it is perhaps worth noting that the coefficient
on group size is statistically significant when one adds the indicator to the model in table 4.4.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
While the EU has existed in one form or another since the 1950s, its modern incarnation
is very young. Indeed, the codecision procedure is less than twenty years old and truly bi-
cameral lawmaking has only recently applied to the majority of Union legislation. Political
scientists have built a strong theoretical foundation for explaining inter-institutional bar-
gaining within the Union, but our understanding of the role that information asymmetry,
and transmission, plays in European lawmaking remains limited. Each of the above chapters
examined some way in which politicians in the EU manipulate or react to information flows
in the process of coordinating around policy compromises. I use this conclusion to outline
some ideas for new research in this area that build on the work in the preceding chapters.
The formal model in Chapter 2 shows how the European bureaucracy can act as a go-
between in bicameral negotiations between the Council and Parliament, overcoming infor-
mation asymmetries between the two institutions when it is in the Commission’s interest to
do so. This work demonstrates that avenues of information transmission can help determine
the speed of lawmaking in Europe and emphasizes the power that can accrue to political
actors—namely the Commission—simply through access to information. But this model rep-
resents only a partial explanation of the politics of information sharing between European
institutions. Most notably, there are actors beyond the Commission that have privileged
access to information within the European legislative process. Perhaps most importantly,
other authors have emphasized the advantages that rapporteurs—the MEPs responsible for
guiding particular pieces of legislation through the lawmaking process—have in European
lawmaking (Corbett, Jacobs & Schackleton 2003, Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Farrell &
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He`ritier 2004, Kaeding 2004, Kaeding 2005, Hausemer 2006).
Rapporteurs are more deeply engaged in the legislation they oversee than are other
MEPs and regularly interact with representatives of the other EU institutions in informal
negotiations over the bills that they chaperone. Thus, like the Commission, they have two
informational advantages over the average MEP. First, they know more about the their own
legislation’s content than other members, and therefore are likely to have a better grasp of
available policy options, and their likely implications. Second, through their multiple con-
tacts with the Commission and Council, rapporteurs may be in a position to observe aspects
of the Council’s bargaining resolve than other MEPs cannot.1 Indeed, Høyland (Unpub-
lished) develops a model of codecision lawmaking that implies that bicameral bargaining in
the EU should proceed more quickly when the rapporteur assigned to a bill hails from a
party represented on the Council than when an opposition party controls the report. He ar-
gues that MEPs from governing parties will be well informed about the Council’s bargaining
position, encouraging speedy compromise.
Combining Commission-based and rapporteur-focused accounts of information transmis-
sion during European lawmaking is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future research. Specif-
ically, MEPs may be able to look to two sources—the Commission and the rapporteur—for
information about the Council’s bargaining strength. Using evidence from two signal-sending
parties may provide MEPs with more information about the Council’s resolve than they
could obtain from a single source, but this may depend on how preferences are distributed
across actors. While the Commission’s composition varies only infrequently, rapporteurs are
drawn from all of the EP’s major party groups and have preferences that span the ideological
spectrum. Therefore, the Commission and the rapporteur may face differing strategic in-
centives and, therefore, may send inconsistent signals to other MEPs. In turn, the receivers
of these signals may be able to turn such inconsistency to their advantage, extracting value
1Although I would argue that the Commission’s direct access to internal Council organs provides informa-
tional advantages that should outstrip those available to rapporteurs through their engagement in tripartite
negotiations.
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from multiple messages under circumstances in which a single sender would be strategically
uninformative.
Similarly, if we consider the (likely) possibility that actors are incompletely informed
about the mapping between policy choices and outcomes, but that both the rapporteur and
the Commission know more than most MEPs, then the ideological breakdown across the
two informed parties may hold striking implications for when other MEPs may be able to
elicit truthful information about the mapping between policies and outcomes. Specifically,
the degree of Commission-rapporteur preference divergence will modulate how much infor-
mation the Parliament can extract from these well-informed actors. This, in turn, may
create information-based incentives for party groups to pursue particular reports and to
leave ownership of other pieces of legislation to ideologically opposed groups. MEPs take
rapporteur assignments very seriously. Indeed, in a series of interviews I conducted in 2007,
MEPs repeatedly cited reports as one of their highest priorities, and as their main tool for
wielding influence within the Parliament. While studies that evaluate the ways in which
party groups distribute reports abound (Mamadouh & Raunio 2003, Kaeding 2004, Kaeding
2005, Hausemer 2006), merging this line of research with a theoretical account based on
asymmetric information could pay dividends.
Furthermore, because rapporteurs are more ideologically varied than the Commission,
they provide a useful tool for gaining empirical leverage over how MEPs react to the Commis-
sion’s recommendations to the EP. The analysis in chapter 3 provides strong evidence that
MEPs alter their voting behavior in response to bicameral bargaining constraints, and shows
that MEP voting varies systematically with Commission recommendations. Nonetheless,
there is room to improve on these findings, especially in terms of more accurately identifying
the extent to which the Commission provides new information to MEPs that alters their
voting behavior. An examination of situations in which rapporteurs and Commissioners
differ in their opinions on tabled amendments could prove effective in this regard. Specif-
ically, because both actors should have access to information unavailable to other MEPs,
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how MEPs react to divergence in recommendations—and how these reactions interact with
Commissioner, MEP, and rapporteur preferences—should help to isolate the independent
effects of Commission, and rapporteur, influence.
Finally, there is substantial room for new scholarship linking the inter-institutional bar-
gaining model of chapter 2 to the internal organization of the EP. While chapter 3 explores
how Commission signals, transmitted as a part of this over-arching game, drive voting deci-
sions in the EP, it does not directly discuss the role that party groups play in this dynamic.
While the key finding of this analysis—namely that MEPs from governing parties are more
susceptible to Commission influence than their counterparts—it leaves one wondering where
the party groups fit into the picture. And, while chapter 4 demonstrated the role that party
groups can play in publicizing legislative voting, potentially changing the costs of compromise
for rank-and-file MEPs, it does not directly link this phenomenon to bicameral bargaining.
In their highly influential work Hix, Noury & Roland (2007) argue that the EP has grown
increasingly cohesive over time as a result of the internal organization of party groups and
the work of group leaderships. This impression extends to the EP itself; Inger Segelstro¨m,
a MEP in the Socialist group, told me that the Socialists had become more cohesive during
the 6th EP term precisely because of the efforts of PSE president Martin Schultz.2 But
others argue that group cohesiveness is attributable not to party organization, but to limited
information and satisficing by MEPs. In particular, Ringe (2010) maintains that most MEPs
are uninformed about the majority of legislation dealt with in the legislature and simply
follow the lead of more informed members, such as rapporteurs and committee members,
who share their preferences. Both of these stories have interesting implications for how
MEPs coordinate around policies as they anticipate bicameral bargaining. On the one hand,
if party groups are indeed strong, they should play a key role in organizing their MEPs
into coalitions around viable bargains. On the other, if MEPs simply follow the leader,
then the identity of the coordinating influences will vary from bill to bill. Each model of
2Interview with MEP Inger Segelstro¨m, November 27, 2007.
137
parliamentary organization is likely to generate different implications for the dynamics of
bicameral bargaining between the EP and the Council. Explicitly incorporating theories
of EP organization into a story of bicameral bargaining would be a first step in building a
model of European policymaking upon full-fledged micro-foundations.
Over the past two decades scholars have increasingly, and fruitfully, applied the tools
of rational choice to lawmaking in the EU, illuminating how the Union’s ever-changing
institutions interact to channel actors’ preferences into policy. The spatial bargaining models
that are at the heart of this endeavor are likely to remain central to our understanding as the
Union continues to evolve. Nonetheless, if this line of research is to remain relevant, future
work in this vein must relax the overly simplistic assumptions that have underpinned the
majority of our models of European politics. Crucially, we must reduce our reliance on the
assumption of complete information and expand the small set of studies that explore how
asymmetries in knowledge affect EU politics. Just as importantly, we must continue to draw
links between what we know about interactions amongst European institutions and what we
have learned about how politicians operate within these same structures. Only by linking
the two levels of analysis can we truly understand how European politicians coordinate
compromise.
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Appendix A
Details of the Formal Model
Lemma 1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential codecision bargaining game
xP,1 − xP,2 ≥ xP,1
2
.
Proof. Say, instead that
xP,1
2
> xP,1 − xP,2, (A.1)
implying, from equation 2.9 that
ω2 =
xP,1
2
. (A.2)
First, consider the case where ω2 > kP . Then, plugging the appropriate case from equation
2.8 into equation A.1, we get
xP,1
2
> xP,1 −
(
ω2 − kP
2
)
=⇒ ω2 > xP,1 + kP .
Now, plugging equation A.2 into the above result yields
xP,1
2
> xP,1 + kP =⇒ kP < −xP,1
2
.
But
−xP,1
2
≤ 0 in equilibrium, contradicting the assumption that kP ≥ 0.
Now, look at the case where ω2 ≤ kP . Inserting the relevant case from equation 2.8 into
A.1 yields
xP,1
2
> xP,1 =⇒ xP,1 < 0.
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But we know that P will never table a proposal below zero in equilibrium, again creating a
contradiction.
Lemma 2. In any separating equilibrium of the mediated codecision game,
x∗P,2,W = ω
∗
2
when the second reading is on the equilibrium path after P observes m = W .
Proof. When the second reading is on the separating equilibrium path when m = W , P
must believe kC ∼ U [ω∗2, ω2,W ], where ω∗2 ≤ ω2,W ≤ ω, upon reaching the second reading.
Thus, P ’s expected utility at second reading is
uP (ω2,W ) = xP,2,W ·
(
1− xP,2,W − ω
∗
2
ω2,W − ω∗2
)
− kP · xP,2,W − ω
∗
2
ω2,W − ω∗2
.
Maximizing the above equation with respect to xP,2,W shows that P ’s optimal second round
proposal is
x∗P,2,W =

ω2,W−kP
2
if
ω2,W−kP
2
> ω∗2, and
ω∗2 otherwise.
Furthermore,
ω2,W−kP
2
> ω∗2 =⇒ 5ω2,W > 6ω + kP . This implication contradicts the fact
that ω2,W ≤ ω because I assume ω ≥ 0 and kP ≥ 0. Therefore x∗P,2,W = ω∗2 in any separating
equilibrium where the second reading is reached with positive probability after P observes
m = W .
Lemma 3. The mediated codecision game never reaches the second reading in any separating
equilibrium when s = W .
Proof. First note that s = W =⇒ m = W in any separating equilibrium. Now assume
that there exists a separating equilibrium in which the players reach the second reading with
positive probability when s = W . Under such circumstances the Council will always accept
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P ’s second reading offer x∗P,2,W = ω
∗
2 (see lemma 2) because the Council’s payoff, 1 − ω∗2,
for accepting the offer is at least as good as what the Council can expect from conciliation
(1 − kC).1 Therefore, in such an equilibrium, the Council will only reject P ’s first reading
proposal if it expects to obtain greater utility from waiting for the second proposal than
from accepting the initial offer. That is, C rejects xP,1,W if and only if
kC < xP,1,W − xP,2,W . (A.3)
Thus, remembering that the Council will accept xP,2,W should the game reach the second
reading, and using lemma 2, P ’s optimal first round proposal, xP,1,W , maximizes
xP,1,W ·
(
1− xP,1,W − 2ω
∗
2
ω − ω∗2
)
+ (ω∗2 − kP ) ·
xP,1,W − 2ω∗2
ω − ω∗2
.
Maximizing the above equation with respect to xP,1,W shows that P ’s optimal first round
proposal is
x∗P,1,W =

11ω−9kP
10
if ω∗2 ≤ 11ω−9kP10 ≤ 1,
1 if 11ω−9kP
10
> 1, and
ω∗2 otherwise.
Therefore xP,1,W is at most
11ω−9kP
10
in the sort of separating equilibrium that we are consid-
ering here. Plugging this result and the result of lemma 2 into equation A.3 indicates that
there is a chance that the Council will reject the Parliament’s first offer in equilibrium if,
and only if,
kC <
11ω − 9kP
10
− ω∗2 =⇒ kC <
ω − kP
2
=⇒ ω + kP < 0.
But both ω and kP are greater than or equal to zero by assumption, implying that the
Council will always accept the Parliament’s first offer. Therefore, the mediated codecision
game has no separating equilibria in which the players adopt strategies that would allow
1Remember that kC ≥ ω∗2 when s = W .
141
them to reach the second reading with positive probability when s = W .
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Appendix B
Statistical Estimation
This appendix contains descriptions of the Gibbs sampling algorithms I used to fit the
models described in section 3.2 and various other estimation details. Gibbs samplers work by
successively drawing values from the posterior distributions of a subset of model parameters,
conditional on current draws for the rest of the parameters in the model.1 The analyst allows
the sampler to iterate for t ∈ 1 . . . T iterations, generating T draws from the conditional
posterior distributions of the model parameters. These draws can then be used to summarize
the joint posterior distribution of the given model. Note that the equations below assume
that x is a D × n matrix with ith column xi, β is an m×D matrix with jth row βj, κ is a
D ×m matrix with jth column κj, C is an k × n matrix with ith column ci, Λ is a D × k
matrix, and Σx is a D ×D matrix.
B.1 Gibbs Sampler: Canonical Model with
Hierarchical Priors
The Gibbs sampler for the canonical model takes advantage of a data augmentation ap-
proach, first sampling latent utilities, Yˆij = Ui(ζj) − Ui(ψj), from the truncated normal
distribution
Yˆij | θYˆij ∼

T N (−∞,0)(µYˆij , 1) if Yij = 0
T N [0,∞)(µYˆij , 1) if Yij = 1
(B.1)
1See Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin (2004) or Gill (2002) for an introduction to Gibbs sampling.
143
where θYˆij = {Yij,x,β,κ} and µYˆij = βj(xi − κj). Next, the algorithm samples legislator
ideal points from the conditional posterior distribution
xi | θxi ∼ ND
([
β′β + Σ−1x
]−1 [
β′wxi
′ + Σ−1x Λci
]
,
[
β′β + Σ−1x
]−1)
(B.2)
where θxi = {C, Yˆ,β,κ,Λ,Σx} and wxij = Yˆij + βjκj, and normalizes each xi to have zero
mean and unit variance on each dimension. The sampler subsequently draws bill cutpoints
from the conditional posterior distribution
κj | θκj ∼ ND
([
Bj
′Bj + σ−2κj ID
]−1 [
Bj
′wκj + σ
−2
κj
IDµkj
]
,
[
Bj
′Bj + σ−2κj ID
]−1)
(B.3)
where θκj = {Yˆ,x,β,µκj , σκj}, Bj is the n×D matrix formed by stacking βj n times, and
wκj =
[
βjx1 − Yˆ1j, βjx2 − Yˆ2j, . . . , βjxn − Yˆnj
]′
. After drawing cutpoints, the algorithm
samples each bill discrimination parameter according to
βj | θβj ∼ ND
([
AA′ + σ−2βj ID
]−1 [
Awβj + σ
−2
βj
IDµβj
]
,
[
AA′ + σ−2βj ID
]−1)
(B.4)
where θβj = {Yˆ,x,κ,µβj , σβj}, A is a D × n matrix with typical column Ai = xi − κj,
and, wβj = Yˆj. The sampler then moves on to the hierarchical parameters, drawing the Λ
coefficient matrix from the conditional posterior distribution
vec(Λ) | θΛ ∼ ND
(
vec
([
C′C + σ−2Λ Ik
]−1
C′x′
)
,Σx ⊗
[
C′C + σ−2Λ Ik
]−1)
(B.5)
where θΛ = {C,x,Σx, σΛ}. Finally, the algorithm samples the hierarchical variance-
covariance matrix, Σx, from
Σx | θΣx ∼ W−1
(
n+ υ, [x′ −CΛ]′ [x′ −CΛ] + σ2xID
)
(B.6)
where θΣx = {C, n, υ,x,Λ, σ2x} and W−1(·) is the inverse Wishart density function.
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B.2 Gibbs Sampler: Baseline Influence Model
The Gibbs sampler for the baseline influence model is largely analogous to the sampler for
the canonical model. Throughout this section, s =
[
a r
]
, such that sj =
[
aj rj
]
, and
δi =
 δai
−δri
. Again, the sampler starts by drawing latent utilities from the conditional
posterior distribution described by equation B.1, but where θYˆij = {Yˆij, s,x,β,κ, δa, δr}
and µYˆij = βj(xi − κj) + sjδi. . Next, the algorithm samples legislator ideal points from
equation B.2 except, now, θxi = {s,C, Yˆ,β,κ,Λ,Σx, δa, δr} and wxij = Yˆij + βjκj −
sjδi. Again, the sampler normalizes each ideal point to have zero mean and unit vari-
ance on each dimension. The sampler next draws bill cutpoints according to equation
B.3 where, now, θκj = {s, Yˆ,x,β,µκj , σκj , δa, δr} and wκj = [βjx1 − Yˆ1j + sjδ1, βjx2 −
Yˆ2j + sjδ2, . . . , βjxn − Yˆnj + sjδn]′. The algorithm subsequently draws bill discrim-
ination parameters using equation B.4, but now θβj = {s, Yˆ,x,κ,µβj , σβj , δa, δr} and
wβj =
[
Yˆ1j − sjδ1, Yˆ2j − sjδ2, . . . , Yˆnj − sjδn
]′
. The sampler must now draw the MEP
fixed effects from their conditional posterior distribution
δi | θδi ∼ N


φδa
i∑m
j=1 aj+σ
−2
δa
i
φδr
i∑m
j=1 rj+σ
−2
δr
i
 ,

1∑m
j=1 aj+σ
−2
δa
i
0
0 1∑m
j=1 rj+σ
−2
δr
i

 (B.7)
where φδai =
∑m
j=1
(
aj
[
Yˆij − βj(xi − κj)
])
+µδai σ
−2
δai
, φδri =
∑m
j=1
(
rj
[
Yˆij − βj(xi − κj)
])
+
µδri σ
−2
δri
, and, θδi
(t) = {s, Yˆ,x,β,κ, µδai , µδri , σδai , σδri }. Finally, the algorithm updates the
hierarchical ideal point parameters exactly as in the baseline model, using equations B.5
and B.6.
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B.3 Gibbs Sampler: Conditional Influence Model
First note that Z is an n · m × l matrix such that each row zij of Z represents a vec-
tor of l covariates for MEP i’s vote on question j. Again, the sampler for the condi-
tional influence model closely resembles the samplers for the canonical and baseline in-
fluence models. It starts by drawing latent utilities using equation B.1, but now θYˆij =
{Yˆij,Z, a, r,x,β,κ, δa, δr,γa,γr} and µYˆij = βj(xi − κj) + aj(δai + γazij) − rj(δri + γrzij).
Next, it draws ideal points from their conditional posterior distributions according to equa-
tion B.2 where θxi = {Z, a, r,C, Yˆ,β,κ,Λ,Σx, δa, δr,γa,γr} and wxij = Yˆij + βjκj −
aj(δ
a
i + γ
azij) + rj(δ
r
i + γ
rzij). Again, the sampler normalizes each ideal point to have
zero mean and unit variance on each dimension. The sampler next draws bill cutpoints
according to equation B.3 where, now, θκj = {Z, a, r, Yˆ,x,β,µκj , σκj , δa, δr,γa,γr} and
wκj = [βjx1 − Yˆ1j + aj(δa1 + γaz1j) − rj(δr1 + γrz1j), βjx2 − Yˆ2j + aj(δa2 + γaz2j) − rj(δr2 +
γrz1j), . . . , βjxn− Yˆnj+aj(δan+γaznj)−rj(δrn+γrz1j)]′. The algorithm subsequently draws
bill discrimination parameters using equation B.4, but now θβj = {Z, a, r, Yˆ,x,κ,µβj , σβj ,
δa, δr,γa,γr} and wβj = [Yˆ1j − aj(δa1 + γaz2j) + rj(δr1 + γrz1j), Yˆ2j − aj(δa2 + γaz2j) +
rj(δ
r
2 + γ
rz1j), . . . , Yˆnj − aj(δan + γaz2j) + rj(δrn + γrz1j)]′. Next, it samples MEP fixed
effects from equation B.7 where φδai =
∑m
j=1
(
aj
[
Yˆij − βj(xi − κj)− γazij
])
+ µδai σ
−2
δai
,
φδri =
∑m
j=1
(
rj
[
Yˆij − βj(xi − κj) + γrzij
])
+ µδri σ
−2
δri
, and, θδi
(t) = {Z, a, r, Yˆ,x,β,κ, µδai ,
µδri , σδai , σδri γ
a,γr}. In the next step the sampler draws
γa | θγa ∼ N
(
[Za
′Za]
−1
Za
′wγa , [Za
′Za]
−1
)
(B.8)
where θγa = {Za, a, Yˆ,x,β,κ, δa} and where Za is a matrix contain only those rows of Z
for which aj = 1. Similarly, the n ·m column vector wγ = Yˆij−βj(xi−κj)− sjδi and wγa is
a vector of length
∑n
i=1 ai containing only those elements of wγ for which aj = 1. Turning
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to the other set of regression parameters, the sampler draws
γr | θγr ∼ N
(
[Zr
′Zr]
−1
Zr
′wγr , [Zr
′Zr]
−1
)
(B.9)
where θγr = {Zr, r, Yˆ,x,β,κ, δr} and with Zr and wγr defined analogously to Za and
wγa . Finally, the algorithm updates the hierarchical ideal point parameters exactly as in the
baseline model, using equations B.5 and B.6.
B.4 Model Fitting Details
I used the Scythe Statistical Library (Pemstein, Quinn & Martin Forthcoming) to implement
software to fit all three models. I ran every sampler for 60,000 iterations, discarding the first
10,000 “burn-in” iterations. Standard Markov chain Monte Carlo diagnostics and visual
inspection of sampled parameter chains showed little evidence for non-convergence.
I used the prior values σ2βj = σ
2
κj
= 25 ∀j, σ2x = 1, σ2Λ = 25, and υ = 1 when fitting the
canonical model. For the baseline and conditional influence models, I also set µδai = µδri =
0 ∀i and σ2δai = σ2δri = 1 ∀i. These priors are uninformative and vague and have little influence
over parameter estimates. In the case of the ideal points, of course, the models make use of
detailed prior information encoded in the hierarchical priors described in the main text. On
the other hand, the vague priors for the bill parameters, fixed effects, and hierarchical ideal
point coefficients (i.e. Λ) reflect my lack of prior information about these parameters.
The canonical model is identified by the priors, by restricting one coefficient in each
column of Λ to be greater than or equal to zero to fix the orientation of the ideal point
space, and by normalizing the ideal points to have zero mean and unit variance on each
dimension. The identification of the influence parameters in the extended models rests on
the assumptions that MEP ideal points are constant across codecision and non-codecision
votes, and that the Commission only exerts influence when it lodges an opinion (i.e. on
147
codecision votes).
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